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ROAD MAP FOR PEACE |
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ROAD MAP FOR PEACE |
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US Government Photo |
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Pres. George Bush and Sec. State Colin Powell |
The so called Road Map is a performance-based plan with unambiguous milestones and definitions, intended to lead to a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian Arab conflict by 2005. It follows from the statement made on June 24, 2002 by U.S. President George Bush, a new United States policy formulation for the Middle East. The Quartet (the United States, European Union, Russia and the UN) will supervise and support the plan. British Prime Minister Tony Blair is firmly on board.
The first steps in the plan call for significant reforms in the Palestinian Authority, up to now an entity unable or unwilling to control terrorism aimed at Israel. President Bush in his policy statement set forth a long list of very specific demands and reforms that would be required of the PA to show that they were capable of and willing to eliminate their former dependence on violence as the primary instrument of their policy. Bush correctly saw that no peace discussion with Israel had any meaning so long as the other side of the table was occupied by a terrorist group trying to elevate themselves into a state.
Early versions of the Road Map have been criticized by both sides, but both sides are also interested in the potential it offers. In March 2003, Yasser Arafat responded to Quartet demands for progress by appointing Mahmoud Abbas, known by his nom de guerre Abu Mazen, to be the prime minister of the Palestinian Authority. There are problems with the appointment -- Abbas has a less-than-pristine history and his powers are limited by Arafat -- but he is likely to be accepted by the Quartet and Israel. The Road Map itself will be formally announced after Mahmoud Abbas sets up a new cabinet, a process so far complicated by Arafat's resistance to a truly reform-minded group of ministers with real power. On the Israeli side, Prime Minister Sharon indicated willingness to engage in the process, with reservations (reported to be 15 amendments), and even hinted some flexibility on the matter of settlements. His comments generated a firestorm in Israel among those who do not trust the Palestinian Arabs, those who consider the Oslo "peace process" a costly disaster for Israel.
Fundamental issues such as the "right of return" and "settlements" are set for negotiation under the Road Map. But the key issue, the elephant in the room, is the requirement for Israel's security. How can Israel put any faith in any government of Palestinian Arabs while they continue to march in the streets demanding an end to Israel, including urging Saddam Hussein to attack Israel with missiles during the war in Iraq? Opinion polls show most Palestinian Arabs still support homicide bombings and other violence against Israel -- how can Israel trust such a group?
The U.S. apparently believed that reformist elements in the Palestinian Authority will gain strength as the Road Map progresses and they will be able to restrain the radicals, eventually marginalizing them. Based on the May 23, 2003 statement of the United States Government, in which the United States "committed to fully and seriously address Israel's comments to the Roadmap during the implementation phase", on May 23, 2003 Prime Minister Sharon's Israeli government agreed to go along with this plan, with 14 "reservations". Israel specifically noted that "the resolution of the issue of the refugees will not include their entry into or settlement within the State of Israel". Israel reserved the right to withdraw cooperation if, as happened during the Oslo "peace process", there is non-performance on the Palestinian Arab part, especially if violence escalates. Israel did not want to be committed to a long term result without step-by-step progress from the Palestinian Arabs. The Quartet was impatient with Israel and wanted an overall solution to be embraced at the outset. Israel tried to avoid being pushed into irreversible concessions before actual changes were seen on the Palestinian Arab side -- promises were made before that never materialized. The danger for Israel was that the Palestinian Arabs would use the momentum of the Road Map to gain their long sought objective of a political state, without giving up their even longer-term goal of eliminating Israel.
On June 3, 2003 U.S. President Bush met in Egypt with the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia who offered little help against Palestinian Arab terror or in marginalizing Yasser Arafat as Bush requested. On June 4, 2003 Bush met with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) in Aqaba, Jordan. Under American pressure to give something to the Palestinian Arabs, Sharon released prisoners and made a committment to begin dismantling "unauthorized outposts", Jewish communities in the territories that did not have government approval to build (ignoring much larger examples of unauthorized Palestinian Arab building as well as most of the Jewish communities that the Arabs want to see removed) and to consider other negotiations on settlements. Sharon agreed to recognize a Palestinian state that would be "contiguous", including almost all of the West Bank and Gaza.
For his part, Abbas stated that attacks on Israeli settlers or outposts were not a legitimate form of Palestinian Arab struggle and pledged to end the military aspects of the intifada. Abbas said he would recognize Israel, but made no clear reference to Israel as "a Jewish state", contrary to Israeli hopes. And he would halt the incitement against Jews and Israel by Palestinian newspapers, television, and schools. The minimal concessions and the glaring lack of committment by Abbas to act against terrorists, were still taken as hopeful signs and a welcome advance for proponents of the Road Map.
Following the Aqaba Summit, chaos reigned. Palestinian Arab groups denounced Abbas for giving too much and getting too little at the summit. In particular, Hamas broke off talks with Abbas for a cease-fire. Among other terrorist actions, on June 8 five Israeli soldiers were killed in Palestinian attacks; Israel retaliated by trying to kill a senior Hamas leader, Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantisi, but only wounded him. On June 11, a Hamas homicide bomber exploded on a Jerusalem bus killing 17 and wounding more than 100. Seeing no action by the Palestinian Arab government under Abbas, Israel resumed attacks on the Hamas leadership, especially in Gaza, killing several and causing the death and injury of civilian Palestinian Arab bystanders. Daily terrorist operations against Israel continued unabated, many thwarted by defense forces but some succeeding.
Initially the U.S. Government criticized Israel for its attacks on Hamas. After the June 11 bombing the message from Washington changed and Hamas was identified as an enemy of the Road Map. The Bush administration was saying that they would support Israel's right to defend themselves and would support Abbas' efforts to control the radicals among the Palestinian Arabs.
By June 15, the Road Map appeared to be faltering. Supporters continued to try to organize meetings between Israel and Palestinian Arab functionaries at a working level to cooperate on security and other matters. But Hamas defiantly refused to participate in any discussions, even with the Abbas government. They vowed to liberate all of Israel and kill or expell all Jews from the land. Abbas was unwilling to initiate a civil war with Hamas, fearing the outcome would favor Hamas and not the enfeebled Abbas government. Meanwhile Yasser Arafat still lurked in the background as a spoiler.
As of mid-June 2003, progress with the Road Map obligations undertaken by the Palestinian Arabs under Abbas was summarized like this:
| Palestinian terror, required by Road Map to cease: | Increased when compared to before the Aqaba Summit. |
| Palestinian incitement, required by Road Map to cease: | No change -- official organs still call for destruction of Israel and the killing of Jews. |
| Palestinian action against terrorists as required by Road Map: | None. |
Then the three main Palestinian Arab terrorist groups — Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah — declared a unilateral "hudna" or cease-fire on June 29, 2003, reacting to Israeli success in targeting their leaders and international pressure to assist the Road Map plan. Israel was not a party to the cease-fire, an arrangement between the Palestinian Authority and the terrorists, a substitute for the more severe actions against terrorists called for by the Road Map document. For its part, Israel released 350 Palestinian Arab prisoners, opened roads in Gaza to unsupervised Arab traffic, withdrew IDF forces from parts of the Gaza Strip and Bethlehem and allowed PA security forces to take control.
But there Israel stopped, refusing to withdraw from more Palestinian Arab zones until the Palestinian Authority showed progress on its Road Map commitment to disarm Hamas and other terrorist groups. Israeli leaders feared that the hudna was merely a tactic, allowing the terrorists time to regroup and re-arm while putting the onus on Israel to make more concessions. Abbas was highly reluctant to take action against the Palestinian Arab terrorists, fearing civil war. It was widely reported that Yasser Arafat opposed any such disarmament and that his opposition was leading to a rupture within the PA.
Israel's refusal to release thousands of Palestinian prisoners accused of involvement in terrorism became the next divisive issue. Even though prisoner release was not referred to in the Road Map, Israel released a few hundred Palestinian Arabs held for lesser crimes. Hamas and others insisted on the release of all prisoners, including known terrorist murderers, as a condition of continuing the hudna.
As of August 1, 2003 events can be summarized as follows:
Despite the lopsided record of compliance with the Road Map, the United States, Europe and others continued to insist that Israel make additional concessions. In particular, the protective security fence that Israel was building to keep terrorists from crossing into Israel from areas of the West Bank became a target of Palestinian Arab demands that it be stopped.
As August 2003 wore on, violence against Israel escalated. In the north, Hezbollah in southern Lebanon initiated shelling of Israeli towns across the UN-supervised border. On August 10, Haviv Dadon, age 16, was the first Israeli civilian to be killed by Hizbullah shelling since the IDF's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000. Then, on August 12th, two Israelis were killed in two separate Palestinian Arab terrorist attacks by homicide bombers. Hamas and al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, a branch of Yasser Arafat's Fatah, took credit for the bombings. Palestinian Arab leaders attempted to blame Israel for provoking the bombings, repeating the long-established pattern of "blaming the victim" to justify the horrific terrorist practice of targeting civilians. On August 14, 2003 Israel announced a halt to further diplomatic gestures towards the Palestinian Authority. Israel temporarily suspended prisoner releases and transfer of territorial control to the PA, asking for demonstrated definite action by the PA against terrorist organizations operating from its jurisdiction, steps required of the PA in the first phase of the Road Map.
On August 19, a homicide bomber blew himself up on a bus packed with Jewish worshipers returning from the Western Wall, killing 21, including five children and five Americans. Hamas and Islamic Jihad both claimed responsibility. The next day, Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas ordered the arrest of those directly involved in the bombing, but said he would not take broader action against terrorist groups without the backing of Yasser Arafat. Abbas and other PA officials met with Arafat without immediate results, precipitating an internal struggle within the Palestinian Authority.
In the absence of action against terrorism by Abbas' Palestinian Authority, Israel struck against Hamas' leadership, killing Abu Shanab in Gaza. Hamas flamboyantly withdrew from the hudna on August 21, followed by the other terrorist groups, all blaming Israel with statements like, "the Zionist enemy has assassinated the truce". The declaration of the end of the hudna had little meaning since the hudna was a) not part of the Road Map, b) unilateral in the first place, and c) not observed by the terrorists. The key issue remained, as from the beginning: would the Palestinian Authority take action against terrorists in its midst? A few days later, Israel struck again, killing four more Hamas members in Gaza as the PA continued to stall, taking no effective action.
The Bush administration seemed to backtrack under the pressure of these events. President Bush's doctrine from his June 24, 2002 speech was clear, saying that "peace requires a new and different Palestinian leadership ... leaders not compromised by terror." Nonetheless, on August 22nd U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell called on Yasser Arafat to help control Hamas, asking him to lend his security forces to the anti-terrorist effort. This appeal to long time terrorist Arafat ended a long effort to effectively eliminate him from the Palestinian leadership.
After additional successful Israeli attacks on Hamas leaders and other terrorists, Yasser Arafat was quoted by CNN on September 3rd: "The road map is dead, but only because of Israeli military aggression in recent weeks." Arafat escalated his effort to undermine Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, forcing a split in the Palestinian Arab leadership. On September 6, after stormy sessions with the Palestinian legislature, Abbas submitted his resignation, and Yasser Arafat accepted it. Abbas blamed Israel, the Bush administration and Arafat for undermining his efforts to govern and work for peace. Within a day, the executive committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization approved Yasser Arafat's appointment of senior official Ahmed Qureia (Abu Ala) as his next prime minister, a move designed to head off international pressure to reinstate Abbas.
Israel continued its strikes at the Hamas leadership. Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was wounded along with others at a meeting in Gaza. Israel failed in its attempt to kill the Hamas leaders only because a small bomb was used against the location, restraint because the house was in a heavily populated area. [Yassin was killed on March 21, 2004 by an Israeli helicopter attack on his car.] The next day, Israeli helicopters fired two missiles at the Gaza home of Abed Al Salam Abu Mussa, another Hamas official. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon called the Hamas leadership "marked men" and the Hamas terrorist group said the region was entering the "gates of Hell". On Sept. 9th a terrorist bomber killed 8 and injured dozens at the Jaffa Gate entrance to the Tzrifin millitary complex near Tel Aviv. Later the same day, in a second attack, a Jerusalem cafe was bombed with 7 deaths and scores injured.
Arafat showed his total control of Palestinian Arab affairs, and distain for international pressure, when he appointed long-time Fatah member and loyalist Ahmed Qurei, to be the next Palestinian prime minister. After a meeting of the Israeli security cabinet with Prime Minister Sharon, the Israeli government announced on September 11:
The cabinet also said that Israel will:
Furthermore, the cabinet "decided to accelerate the construction of the security fence." Israel's decision to act against terrorist Arafat sparked world-wide condemnation of Israel and demonstrations among the Palestinian Arabs.
Arafat used the Israeli decision to his advantage, greeting crowds of hundreds of supporters who assembled at his headquarters in Ramallah:
The crowd held photos of Arafat, and shouted, "With our blood and souls we will redeem you." Arafat offered a correction: "With our blood and souls, we will redeem you Palestine," he said. Reporters heard Arafat praise Dalal al-Mughrabi, a Fatah activist from Lebanon who led the 1978 hijacking of a civilian bus on the Haifa to Tel Aviv road. The massacre left 35 innocent people dead and 100 injured, the deadliest terrorist attack in Israeli history.
The United Nations stirred itself to condemn Israel for threatening Arafat. A Security Council resolution backed by Syria was vetoed by the US because it made no mention of terrorism against Israel. On September 19th the General Assembly passed an Arab-sponsored resolution to proscribe any action Israel might take against Yasser Arafat -- 133 for, four against, with 15 abstentions.
Palestinian prime minister-designate Ahmed Qureia worked with Arafat to assemble a government and forge a new cease-fire to replace the collapsed one. Israel rejected any new "hudna" and vowed to continue its work against terrorists until the Palestinians would take significant action on their own, action required by the Road Map but not expected from Qureia.
In late 2003, Arafat was firmly in control of the Palestinian Authority, terrorism continued with daily attacks on Israel, the IDF continued to operate against terrorists in the Palestinian Arab areas, Israel continued to expand the security fence and homes in settlements. Despite all this, American officials continued to talk about the "Road Map".
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