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YOM KIPPUR WAR RESULT |
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YOM KIPPUR WAR RESULT |
The Yom Kippur War in October 1973 was a profound shock to Israel. Even though the country emerged from the war victorious, having once again successfully defended itself from attacks by much larger Arab countries, the legacy of the war was somewhat negative. There were significant changes within Israel, and in Israel's relations with other countries, primarily the United States.
The October 1973 War had a devastating effect on Israel. More than 6,000 troops had been killed or wounded in eighteen days of fighting. The loss of equipment and the decline of production and exports as a consequence of mobilization came to nearly US$7 billion, the equivalent of Israel's gross national product for an entire year. Most important, the image of an invincible Israel that had prevailed since the June 1967 War was destroyed forever.
Considering the disadvantageous conditions under which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) entered the war, its ultimate achievements were outstanding. Of the several factors which turned the tide, undoubtedly the most significant was the heroic performance of the IDF's reservists. Pitched into combat at literally a moment's notice, Israel's citizen-soldiers saved the country from military humiliation. That accomplishment exerted a profound effect on Israeli strategic planning. Although in later years, the conclusion came to be questioned, the performance of the IDF reservists in 1973 was considered at the time to be a vindication of the IDF's force structure as a whole. Hence, whereas several other dimensions of Israeli security thinking were subsequently reviewed and in some cases revised, the IDF's retention of its traditional framework of military service was not affected.
The June 1967 War had given Israel in general and the declining Labor Party in particular a badly needed morale booster, but the events of October 1973 shook the country's self-confidence and cast a shadow over the competence of the Labor elite. A war-weary public was especially critical of Minister of Defense Dayan.
In its interim report of April 1974, the Agranat Commission, a body established after the war to determine responsibility for Israel's military unpreparedness, claimed that it couldn't take Moshe Dayan's military background into account, and that it should judge him as a "civilian" defense minister. As such, the commission concluded that Dayan did not bear any personal responsibility, and that his ministerial responsibility was a public and political question rather than a judicial one. Dayan offered his resignation to Prime Minister Golda Meir, but it was not accepted. The commission put the blame on the Israeli military, and called for the dismissal of David Elazar, then army chief of staff.
Upon publication of the Agranat Commission report, Prime Minister Meir, whose performance was praised by the commission, took full responsibility, resigned on April 11, 1974 and brought about the establishment of the first Rabin government. Meir continued to be a major influence in the Labor Party.
The government formed in 1974 by Yitzhak Rabin, who had been chief of General Staff during the Six Day War and later ambassador to the US, signed disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria, and an interim agreement with Egypt. These agreements first established the principle of "territories for peace."
The October 6, 1973 surprise attack on Israel by Egypt and Syria caused huge initial losses of personnel and material. Israel urgently needed more tanks, planes and ammunition. The Soviet Union was supplying the Arab attackers and Israel turned to the United States for help. That help was needed urgently with the survival of Israel at stake. After a delay of 3 days, the United States Nixon administration agreed to provide Israel with full replacement of all its losses.
The resupply set in motion a shift in American policy that would solidify the US-Israel relationship. Israel's vulnerability during the war led to its increasing dependence on United States military, economic, and diplomatic aid. The war set off a spiraling regional arms race in which Israel was hard pressed to match the Arab states, newly enriched by skyrocketing world oil prices. At the same time, Nixon saw Israeli military power as a significant benefit to the United States in offsetting the Soviet's inroads to the region as well as promoting regional stability.
As a direct result of the war, the United States quadrupled its foreign aid to Israel, and replaced France as Israel's largest arms supplier. The doctrine of maintaining Israel's "qualitative edge" over its neighbors was born in the war's aftermath. This was based both on US appreciation of Israel's role as a defender of Western values in a generally hostile region, and also on the Cold War calculus of opposing the client states of the Soviet Union. As a consequence of the war, the Nixon administration became committed to achieving peace in the region in order to offset or replace Soviet influence with the Arab countries and to stop the crippling effects of the Arab oil embargo on the US, Europe, and Japan.
Before the war, Congress barely managed to pass annual loans to Israel in the $500 million range by a few votes. But after the war, Israel began to receive about $2.1 billion a year, half in loans and half in grants. Almost all of the money went to purchase American-made military hardware. Five years later, Israel began to receive $3 billion in grants as a result of the 1978 Camp David accords, that led to the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.
The Yom Kippur War demonstrated to the Arab countries that Israel could not be defeated on the battlefield even under conditions as optimal as they are likely to get. This in turn led to an increased interest in diplomacy as the route to gains against Israel.
As a result of the intensive efforts of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Israel withdrew back across the Suez Canal and several miles inland from the east bank of the Suez Canal behind a UN-supervised cease-fire zone. On the Syrian front too, Israeli territorial gains made in the war were given up. After the war Egyptian and Syrian diplomatic relations with the United States, broken since the 1967 war, were resumed, and clearance of the Suez Canal began. The Yom Kippur War brought about a major shift of power in the Middle East and ultimately led to the signing of the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.
Following the Yom Kippur War most of the African states and some other Third World countries emulated the eariler action of the Soviet block and severed diplomatic relations with Israel. In 1975 the UN General Assembly passed its infamous "Zionism equals racism" resolution. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which strengthened its international status in 1974, continued its terrorist attacks against Israel; Israel, in turn, refused to have anything to do with the PLO.
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