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1973 WAR AGREEMENTS |
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1973 WAR AGREEMENTS |
War was ended on October 25, 1973 by intervention of the US and Soviet Union who instigated the UN Security Council series of resolutions 338-340.
On November 11, 1973 Egypt and Israel formally signed a cease-fire agreement in a tent erected at the "Kilometre 101" checkpoint on the Cairo-Suez road at the edge of the Israeli-occupied enclave west of the Suez Canal. This was the first major agreement between Israel and an Arab country since the signature of the 1949 armistice agreements.
In December 1973 the United States and the Soviet Union made a joint effort to bring about meaningful Arab-Israeli negotiations by inviting Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Israel to a Peace Conference in Geneva on the basis of the UN Security Council's call for a "just and durable peace" in Resolution 338. The conference was also recognized by UN Security Council Resolution 344. However, Syria refused to attend (and the PLO was not invited) resulting in the conference being adjourned inconclusively on January 9, 1974.
US Secretary of State Kissinger was able to mount a direct diplomatic effort with Israel and the opposing Arab states, the first fruit of which was the signature by Egypt and Israel on January 18, 1974, of an initial military disengagement agreement. This agreement was called the Sinai Separation of Forces Agreement (later known as Sinai I). Under its terms Israel withdrew its forces from the areas west of the Suez Canal held since the October 1973 cease-fire and also pulled back several miles on the Sinai front east of the canal, where three roughly parallel security zones were created, each about six miles wide, for Egyptian, UN, and Israeli buffer zones. The UN Zone was occupied by the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) created by UN Security Council Resolution 340.
For Egypt the general effect of the agreement was that it regained control of all Egyptian territory west of the canal and also the whole of the eastern bank. Israel, although withdrawing 12-13 miles east of the canal, was left in control of the rest of Sinai, including Sharm el Sheikh commanding the Straits of Tiran.
Further intense "shuttle" diplomacy by Dr. Kissinger resulted in the signature on May 31, 1974 of the Agreement on Disengagement by Syria and Israel covering the Golan front, ending 81 days of artillery duels. The general effect of the agreement was that Israel withdrew from all the territory it had captured in the October 1973 war as well as from some areas occupied since the 1967 war, including the town of Quneitra. Limited-force zones were established on either side of a central buffer zone in which contingents of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) were stationed, after being authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 350, also dated May 31, 1974. The agreement provided that Syrian civilians who had fled during the hostilities would be able to return to the areas vacated by Israel and Syrian administration restored. Since this May 1974 Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement, no further changes have been negotiated as regards the territorial position on the Golan Heights.
As regards the Sinai front, however, a second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, the Sinai Interim Agreement (Sinai II) was formally signed in Geneva on September 4, 1975 , again after protracted diplomatic efforts by Dr. Kissinger. Under this agreement Israel withdrew its forces by a further 12 to 26 miles and the vacated area became the new UN buffer zone, with the old buffer zone being added to the existing Egyptian limited-forces zone. As part of this general withdrawal Israeli forces moved back to the eastern end of the Mitla and Giddi passes and a new Israeli limited-forces zone was established adjacent to the vacated area on the eastern side. Israel also vacated the Abu Rudeis and Ras Sudar oilfields on the Gulf of Suez (by February 1976), together with a narrow coastal strip running northwards to Egyptian-controlled territory south of Suez (this strip being demilitarized and placed under joint UN-Egyptian administration).
For the Israelis, Prime Minister Rabin saw Sinai II primarily as a measure meant to please the Americans. He signed Sinai II, not so much as an act of Egyptian-Israeli reconciliation, but in order to strengthen the US-Israel relationship, to buttress the new Egyptian pro-American orientation, and introduce a wedge in the Egyptian-Syrian war coalition.
Other features of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement were:
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