The session, which was unusually dramatic, witnessed the motion being approved by an extensive majority. The resolution was passed in Paris, at the UNESCO headquarters, among the cheers and grumbles of the voting parties.

The infuriated US officials declared that Washington is withdrawing its share of funds which was to be $US60 million, amounting to almost a quarter of the overall budget of UNESCO.

In September, Palestine submitted a bid to the Security Council, and UNESCO is the first UN agency that the country has decided to join after that. Result of full UN membership will come out next month.

Earlier, the decision which was made through voting was greeted with loud applause by the 107 countries that voted in favor. The 14 countries that voted against the act included United States, Australia, Israel, Canada and Germany. It was a surprise for everyone when France voted ‘yes’, and the decision was followed by loud cheers. All Asian, Arab, Latin American and African countries followed suit, along with Austria and Ireland while 52 countries abstained from voting, including Japan, New Zealand and UK.

UNESCO’s membership is seen by the Palestinian authorities as a step that will help them in getting recognized internationally and also for putting pressure on Israel for their demands.

Riyad al-Malki, Palestinian foreign minister, who was also present at the time of voting, showed his happiness at the results. The decision is considered to be a historic moment for Palestine and a symbolic victory. “The vote will erase a tiny part of the injustice done to the Palestinian people”, al-Malki said after the announcement of result. On the contrary, the vote is not enough to make Palestine a state, as the concern for borders remains unresolved, along with other disputes which have mutilated peace in the Middle East for years.

Some parties are even of the view that it will be even harder for Palestine to achieve its goals which includes security for the country, placement of Palestinian refugees and the future of Jerusalem.

Jay Carney, White House spokesman, regarded UNESCO’s judgment a ‘premature’ act. He also said that this move has played its part in undermining the efforts of international community to carry on with an effective peace plan for Middle East. He also called it as a hindrance in the goal which was to restart peace talks between Palestine and Israel.

Nimrod Barkan, the Israeli Ambassador, talked about the decision saying, “UNESCO deals in science not science fiction”. “However, a large number of member states, though most emphatically less than two-thirds of the member states of this organization, have adopted a science fiction version of reality”, he further commented.

Full membership of UNESCO has given Palestine options to seek membership of other UN agencies such as the World Health Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency. One of the very first moves of Palestine as a result of UNESCO membership could be an application to list Church of Nativity in Bethlehem as a world heritage site.

This vote has opened up Palestine to take steps for gaining international recognition which will pave their way to achieve statehood. Victoria Nuland, Washington State Department spokesman told the reporters that the United States will continue to be a member of UNESCO and its participation in the organization, which comes up to around 22% of its annual funds.

The Ottoman Empire dominated by the Turks took sides with the Central Powers in World War 1 to stand up against the allies, and it allowed the Emir of Mecca to take this opportunity up as liberation of Arab lands from the Turkish rule and sided with the French and the British.

Britain attacked Gallipoli, an area south of Istanbul, in March 1915 with the intention of diverting Ottoman Turks from supporting Germany. The British Army faced defeat and witnessed losses of huge nature and it was at this time that Britain got an impulse of taking the vast Arab empire under Ottoman rule under its own rule after the war. For their ever-clever ideas, British government decided to seek an agent that will work for detaching Arabs from Turks. These efforts brought out Hussein as a leading contact for British. This led to Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, which although promised Arab independence, did not bind either party in a legal accession. Sharif Hussein launched “Arab revolt” on June 5, 1916 and started to be known as “King of the Arabs”.

Last of the Hashemite Sharifians, King of the Arabs and Emir of Mecca, Sharif Hussein bin Ali reined over Mecca, the Hijaz and Medina, like his ancestors who enjoyed a sovereign rule from 1201 to 1925. Hussein took up the Arab Revolt as he aspired to establish an independent Arab empire that would stretch from Syria (Aleppo) to Yemen (Aden).

T. E. Lawrence, also known as, Lawrence of Arabia, was a military intelligence officer in Cairo and was sent by the British to Mecca on an inquiry mission which led to him becoming the British liaison officer to the Arabs. “Seven Pillars of Wisdom, A Triumph” and “Revolt in the Desert” are two of his very famous literary works in which he has chronicled the account of revolt.

The Hashemite Army was divided into among three of Hussein’s sons; Amir Ali, with headquarters of his Southern Army in Rabigh; Amir Abdullah, with headquarters of his Eastern Army in Wadi Ais and Amir Faysal, with the operational base of his Northern Army stationed at Bir Jaydah.

Positioned at around 50 miles West of Hijaz Railway, Amir Faysal succeeded in capturing Aqaba on July 6, 1917, marking a spectacular victory in the Arab Revolt, spreading a fear among the Turkish Army which was operating against the British. This success led to armies moving further and capturing of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo.

Till next year, in 1918, Arab Army had gained more strength and was doing all it could to uproot Ottoman Turks. Late that year, victory felt at hand and Ottoman Army began to surrender and retreat to British troops. Sharif Naser from the Hashemite rule and an ally of Arab Revolt was the first one to reach Damascus with his forces, followed by Nuri Sha’lan of the Ruwallah tribe. However, these troops remained outside the city, awaiting the arrival of Sharif Hussein. They were joined by Australian troops and T. E. Lawrence later that day.

United Kingdom had agreed to allow independence to Arab lands if they sided with them against Ottoman Turks in Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. However, the British did not keep their word divided up Arab lands among themselves and the French in a way which was unfavorable to the Arabs. Matters went grimmer with the Balfour Declaration of the 1917 which declared a promise to Jews to make arrangements for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The Hijaz region in Western Arab became an independent state under the rule of Hussein, later to be conquered by Saudi Arabia.

On February 3, 2004 Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced in an interview with Haretz:

• It is my intention to carry out an evacuation?sorry, a relocation?of settlements that cause us problems and of places that we will not hold on to anyway in a final settlement, like the Gaza settlements.

With his shocking and unexpected announcement, Sharon created a new dynamic of the Israeli-Arab conflict that was disturbing to the political left and right, to both Jews and Arabs. Suprisingly, PM Sharon historically was the foremost champion of settlement expansion, the basis of his Likud support.

The basic logic of the withdrawal plan was to accomplish several things at once:

• Pull Israel’s military out of areas that were difficult to defend and would likely have to be ceded in any future negotiation, in particular Gaza and isolated areas of the West Bank;
• Reduce pressure from the US and other nations to end Israel’s military control of certain areas, the so-called “occupation”;
• Add to pressure on the Palestinian Arabs to negotiate by showing that time was not on their side;
• Make it easier for Israel to secure the separation between Israel and areas that are sources of terrorists.

Israel had tried many approaches to ending its conflict with Palestinian Arabs. As detailed on other pages of this website, there have been a series of peace attempts from the 1948 founding of Israel, after each of the major wars (1967, 1973), and in the 1990s during the “Oslo peace process“. The US-sponsored “Roadmap” was stalled due to the unwillingness of Palestinian Arab leaders to even begin an effort to crack down on the terrorism. Despite all efforts, since 2000 Israel had seen increased terrorism and nearly 1000 Israeli civilians were killed plus many thousands injured in daily attacks emanating from Palestinian Arab areas adjacent to Israel.

Since diplomacy and negotiations failed, Israel has begun to unilaterally take action to change the situation. They have targeted terrorist leaders for military attack, and have succeeded in killing certain prominent leaders of Hamas including Sheik Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz Rantisi, among others. They have erected a security barrier between Israel and the areas where most attacks come from, a widely criticized move that is nonetheless effective in its purpose. And, potentially most significant, PM Sharon’s plan for disengagement would eliminate most elements of the Israeli military presence in Palestinian Arab areas while increasing Israel’s ability to defend its civilians. Palestinian Arabs would likely benefit from Israeli military withdrawal which would ease their daily life and ability to move freely.

One of the most important changes represented by the Sharon Plan is the unilateral aspect. Prior plans looked for a comprehensive settlement, agreed between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs, that would finalize all issues. Decades of trying had not yielded such an agreement so Sharon sought to change the unacceptable equilibrium by making unilateral changes. This was bold and innovative, but fraught with danger and uncertainty for all involved.

Details of the Plan

The plan was not revealed in complete detail and, in fact, evolved as controversy swirled around it. Some details were stable and made available by the Israeli government:

• Complete Israeli withdraw from the Gaza Strip, with the probable exception of the ‘Philadelphia corridor’ along the Egyptian border. This would include abandoning 21 Jewish Gaza communities, home to over 7,000 Israelis.
• In the West Bank:

• Immediate Israeli withdraw from four small northern settlements, and
• Retaining five blocks of Israeli West Bank communities, protected by the security fence: Givat Ze’ev, Gush Etzion, Ariel, Maale Adumim and Kiryat Arba/Hebron.

Opposition

Many Israelis favored the plan; tired of years of terrorism and war, the disengagement seemed like a way out. But even though the plan apparently had many positive features, the idea almost immediately had many opponents.

• Palestinian Arab leaders dismissed the plan as an attempt to increase Israel’s hold over large parts of the West Bank, basically a “land grab” that would set borders without negotiations. Some welcomed any Israeli withdrawal, but saw it as only a first step toward complete Israeli removal of all presence on lands claimed by the Palestinian Arabs. Since many of the Palestinian Arabs demand that all of Israel be liquidated, they were not mollified by what they saw as a limited withdrawal and hotly contested aspects of the plan that solidifed Israeli positions along the dividing lines.
• Israeli opponents of the plan said it was a surrender to Palestinian Arab violence. They argued that it would signal weakness to Israel’s enemies and decrease the chances for a permanent, negotiated peace. With daily violence against Israel ongoing, why give up territory? The plan also relinquishes Israel’s moral claim to the rights of Jews to live anywhere they wish within the Land of Israel. The plan ethnically cleanses Jews from the Gaza Strip and historically Jewish parts of Samaria, the modern “West Bank”.

Partial Endorsement by US President Bush

US President Bush met with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on April 14, 2004. In a joint press appearence, Bush endorsed Sharon’s plan to disengage from the Gaza Strip and from areas of the West Bank. In what was seen as a major shift of US policy, President Bush for the first time recognized that Israel was not bound to return to the Green Line borders and said Palestinian Arab “refugees” would not have the right to return to Israel under any final peace settlement. He also supported Israel’s right to maintain communities — the so-called “settlements” — in the areas claimed by Palestinian Arabs.

Bush said the world had changed and old policies no longer apply. “In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final-status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949,” Bush stated. Administration officials hoped Bush’s position would stimulate peace talks between Israelis and Palestinian Arabs. These hopes dimmed when news of Bush’s positions angered Arabs in the region and critics said Bush was less than an honest broker between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs.

In subsequent weeks, events in Iraq and Arab pressures led to
US back-peddling on the commitments. A careful reading of Bush’s words along with subsequent clarifications by US Sec. of State Powell and other administration officials revealed less of a commitment than first reported.

The Likud Votes

Opponents of the disengagement plan ran a well-organized campaign pointing out the value of the Jewish communities in Gaza, particularly the beautiful Gaza agricultural area of Gush Katif built by Israeli capital and labor. Why turn such accomplishments over to terrorists, they argued? On April 26, 2004, Israel’s Independence Day, over 100,000 people took buses and cars to visit Gush Katif staging rallies in opposition to giving the community to the Palestinian Arabs. On May 2, 2004 Likud party members in Israel voted on the Sharon plan. Because Israeli law has no provision for a popular referendum, PM Sharon could not call on the entire country to vote. He had the power to ask members of his own party to voice an opinion and they did. They overwhelmingly rejected the proposal, approximately 60% against, although only 40% of 193,000 Likud members voted. Afterward, many called for Sharon to resign.

During the voting, Palestinian Arab gunmen killed a pregnant Gaza resident and her four daughters, ages two to 11, in an ambush on her car, firing guns into the children from close range. This abomination was immediately the top of the news, in Israel and elsewhere, and may have had an effect on the Likud voters, reinforcing their inclination to reject concessions to terrorism.

When the results were known, a defiant Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said he would not resign despite the humiliating rejection. Since general opinion in Israel was more weighted to approval of the withdrawal plan, political insiders predicted Sharon would continue toward implementation of some form of the plan. But public opinion began to turn when senior military officers of the IDF went on record against the plan, stating it would hurt not help Israel’s security. Over the following weeks several attempts were made to have the plan approved by the Israeli cabinet, but the actual cabinet vote was postponed several times when it was clear the vote would be no.

Modified Disengagement Plan Approved

On June 6, 2004 the Israeli cabinet voted in principle to withdraw from the Gaza Strip, exactly 37 years after Israel siezed control of it on the second day of the 1967 Six Day War. The Cabinet resolution approved the staged disengagement plan, but noted “There is nothing in this [decision] to [enable] evacuating settlements.” The resolution did approve implementing the preparatory work necessary to evacuate the settlements. Sharon said Israel’s intention was to “relocate all of the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and four settlements in Samaria by the end of 2005.” The vote was 14-7 in favor and was marked by rancorous debate including Sharon’s firing of two ministers. The plan called for another Cabinet vote in March of 2005 to ratify any actual expulsion of existing communities in areas from which Israel would withdraw. Permits for new construction were frozen immediately although building in progress was allowed to go forward.

After the PLO was expelled from Lebanon in 1982, Yasser Arafat set up a new headquarters in Tunisia. Even though Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba was generally a moderate in his policy on Israel, and had his own misgivings about the PLO, Tunisia was among the Arab countries that allowed the PLO to resettle from Lebanon. About 1,100 PLO fighters arrived by sea at Bizerte to a tumultuous welcome. The chief greeter was Bourguiba himself, waving from the dock.

The Bourguiba government let the PLO set up headquarters in Borj Cedria near Tunis. Tunis was already the headquarters of the Arab League which had transferred there from Cairo to punish Egypt for signing a peace agreement with Israel. From this new headquarters, the PLO gradually resumed guerrilla warfare on Israel utilizing bases in Lebanon.

On September 25, 1985, three Israelis were murdered in Cyprus. Responsibility for the murders was taken by the PLO’s “Force-17″. The Israeli government decided to make a retaliatory strike against the PLO headquarters on the Tunisian beachfront. The difficult mission involved a flight of 1280 miles, entirely over water, with mid-air refueling. Eight F-15 Eagles destroyed almost the entire PLO complex, including the PLO chairman’s bureau and the headquarters of Force-17. Over 60 PLO terrorists were killed, another 70 injured. There were no IAF losses.

The PLO responded with more terrorist attacks, including seizure of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in October 1985. In the Cairo Declaration of November 7, 1985 the PLO renounced terrorism, but did not follow through with the committment. Over 100 new acts of terror traced to the PLO were documented in the next two years.

The first Palestinian intifada began spontaneously in 1987 largely due to instigation from the Muslim clergy in the mosques, but was quickly siezed upon by the PLO who wrested control from radical Islamic elements and gave support and coordination from Tunisia for riots and terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza. The intifada became the main instrument for the PLO to regain the political momentum against Israel.

On April 16, 1988 Israel’s Mossad, authorized by a cabinet decision under Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, sent a commando team to assassinate Arafat’s deputy, Abu Jihad, considered to be the principal PLO planner of military and terrorist operations against Israel. The Mossad team entered Abu Jihad’s well-defended residence and shot him and several guards. Although his wife was present, she was not harmed. Arafat claimed the US government was colluding with Israel and planning to kill more PLO leaders. He ordered attacks on US citizens and facilities.

After the PLO was forced to move to Tunis, Arafat’s leadership was called increasingly into question by Palestinians. The more militant PLO factions based in Syria and Lebanon gained influence and Arafat seemed to fade. But on December 14, 1988, Arafat told the United Nations that the PLO renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s right to exist. He said the PLO supported the right of all parties to live in peace — Israel included. After this surface change of policy, seventy countries recognized the PLO as the government of the Palestinian Arabs, and Arafat was able to reverse his decline to re-emerge as the clear Palestinian leader following the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference and the 1993 Oslo agreement which was negotiated in secret while Arafat remained in Tunis.

Based on the Oslo Accords, Arafat returned to Gaza on July 1, 1994 and set up the new Palestinian Authority there.

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In April 1950, Jordan annexed eastern Jerusalem (dividing the city for the first time in its history) and the “West Bank” areas in historical Judea and Samaria that Trans-Jordan had occupied by military force in 1948 (Jordan changed its name to Trans-Jordan in April 1949). On April 24, 1950, the Jordan House of Deputies and House of Notables, in a joint session, adopted a Resolution making the West Bank and Jerusalem part of Jordan. This act had nobasis in international law; it was only the de facto act of Trans-Jordan as a conquerer.The other Arab countries denied formal recognition of the Jordanian move and only two governments – Great Britain and Pakistan – formally recognized the Jordanian takeover. The rest of the world, including the United States, never did.

After the 1948 War for Independence and the Jordanian takeover, the Palestinian Arabs never attempted to establish an independent state in the territory alloted to them by the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan. They cooperated with its unilateral annexation by Jordan, becoming part of Jordan’s political system. Across the barbed wire that marked the dividing line, Jordanian East Jerusalem was not made the capital, even for its Palestinian residents, in 19 years of Jordanian rule. The capital remained in Amman. There was no outcry of claims of “Palestinian” identity being submerged by Jordan.

The reason there was no Arab outrage over the annexation was because Jordan is a state whose ethnic majority is Palestinian Arabs. On the other hand, the Palestinians of Jordan are disenfranchised by the ruling Hashemite minority. Despite this fact, in the years following the annexation the Palestinians displayed no interest in achieving “self-determination” in Hashemite Jordan. It is only the presence of Jews, apparently, that incites this claim.

The Jordanian “occupation” of the West Bank was very abusive of therights of Jews and Christians, or any resident of Israel. During the 1948-1967 period of its occupation, Jordan permitted terrorists to launch raids into Israel.Jewish and muslim residents of Israel were not permitted to visit their Holy Places in East Jerusalem. Christians, too, were discriminated against. In 1958, Jordanian legislation required all members of the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre to adopt Jordanian citizenship. In 1965, Christian institutions were forbidden to acquire any land or rights in or near Jerusalem. In 1966, Christian schools were compelled to close on Fridays instead of Sundays, customs privileges of Christian religious institutions were abolished. Jerusalem was bisected by barbed wire, concrete barriers and walls. On a number of occasions Jordanian soldiers opened fire on Jewish Jerusalem. In May 1967, the Temple Mount became a military base for the Jordanian National Guard.

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Israel’s nuclear weapons program has never been publically acknowledged (a policy of “ambiguity”), but defense experts generally believe that Israel has a significant stockpile of state-of-the-art atomic weapons. Egypt and other Arab countries, as well as various peace activist groups inside Israel and around the world, continue to raise this issue against Israel. But despite the negative propaganda implications, Israel’s policy against signing the NNP treaty remains unchanged: as long as Israel’s security is under constant threat, Isreal will not agree to a treaty that weakens its defense.

Israel needs a strategic deterrence capability because it is surrounded by much larger neighbors that are hostile to its very existence. Arab nations have repeatedly gone to war against Israel. In the Gulf War, Iraq launched Scud missiles against Israeli cities and has threatened attacks with gas or biological agents. Syria, Iran and Iraq have threatened the use of weapons of mass destruction. Terrorists constantly attack Israel to undermine its stability and will to resist. In this environment, Israel has to maintain the ultimate deterrent to forstall even more aggressive acts by its enemies.

The United States has recognized this requirement and has supported Israel’s refusal to bind itself to the NNP treaty so long as Israel remians ambiguous about its capability, a diplomatic nuance. Even though the US has lobbied against other small nations that desire to acquire nuclear weapons, the US has recognized that Israel’s case is unique. It is easy for nations that have superior military strength, peace, and secure borders to rationalize the need to give up nuclear weapons. It is quite a different strategic calculus for Israel who is facing huge, oil-rich Arab states that have sworn to destroy her, states that have attacked her with large invading armies, that have openly supported campaigns of terrorism against her, and that continue to assert the intention to reduce or destroy the Jewish state. In this environment, why should Israel give up her most effective deterrent weapon?

Israel supports, in principle, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, even though international support of the concept has been ineffective in curtailing Iranian and Iraqi weapons production. Israel is willing to consider eliminating nuclear weapons from the Middle East when its enemies have credibly renounced them and after a sustained period of peace that will give Israel confidence in its own security.

The Palestinian president has also reportedly stated that the bid will not be retreated under any circumstances and that they will forge the bid despite the building pressures from the world. Talking to the media from Ramallah, Abbas stated that Palestine will carry on with the application for UN membership despite the pressures and despite the fact that a number of countries do not approve of this idea. He further stated that if the bid is to be retreated, it will be under the condition that a negotiation chance is offered to Palestine as a result of which Israel would discontinue taking over the settlements in the disputed area. However, the US wants Palestine to retreat stating that a peace talk with Israel will bring Palestinian independence.

The territories of Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and West Banks were occupied by Israel in the war of 1967  and the peace talks promised by US have been but to no effect. Abbas has also explicitly stated that the US and Israel are the most reluctant in giving a chance to Palestine to be the member of UN and that the US and Europe have delayed for a long time, doing nothing to support Palestine in its cause. He has also stated that he has no intentions of jeopardizing his ‘good relations’ with US but it is up to US if they want to act otherwise.

The process of obtaining UN membership will require Palestine to submit the application to Security Council whereby it will be approved and full membership will be allowed. However, US have stated to veto against the move, in which case, Palestine may seek a status short of member at the general assembly under a two-third majority vote.

According to Abbas, Palestine is being pressured to change its mind or to withdraw and despite that the country does not want to confront anyone, keeping in view the present situation, they will have to. The country demands independence from the ongoing occupation of not 63 years but around five centuries, from Israel to dating back to the time of British and Ottoman Mandate. Among the benefits cited as a result of UN Membership is the access of Palestine to the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court. Israel has a fear of Palestine going to ICC and that is just the authority Palestine needs to stop Israel from violating international law. Abbas states that Palestine wants to go to ICC to appeal against the oppression by Israel as there is no one to prevent them from burning mosques and cutting trees, stating an incident reported by the officials involving Israelis uprooting olive trees, setting fires and vandalizing a mosque near Nablus. He said that Palestine will not need to go to ICC if Israel cuts down such attacks.

Palestinian security forces were strictly instructed not to confront the Israeli security forces violently and to avoid any kind of chaos. Although Abbas fears that Israel will send troops to attack Palestinians although the Palestinian forces are instructed otherwise. Israeli UN ambassador has made an attempt to counter Palestinian actions by stating that an establishment of an independent Palestinian State will lead to violence instead of the much focused peace.

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Palestine Facts is dedicated to providing comprehensive and accurate information regarding the historical, military, and political background to the on-going struggle between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. The situation is complex with deep and diverse roots. By using the resources of this large and growing site, you can become much more knowledgeable about what is going on and why.

The information on this site is organized into sections, by historical period. Each page has a menu at the top and bottom. Use the menu to navigate to any section or use the search box at the top to search Palestine Facts. You can also go directly to the search page.

Many of the issues span more than one period so there are frequent cross references between the topic pages. Each section will provide overview information and a summary of key issues and facts along with links to high-quality resources on the web where you can learn more. We have covered the whole array of facts on Palestine, with topics as diverse as the WW I impact on the Arabs and Jews  to events as recent as the Palestinian bid for UN membership and the UNESCO membership acceptance and their aftermath.

We urge our visitors to go beyond the “sound bite” version of events and dig in to find out the truth. This site will do all it can to be a valuable source for your search for information. If you would like to provide additional material for our pages, please send an email to sara@palestinefacts.org.

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Why did Arabs leave the new State of Israel?

The issue of Palestinian refugees sprang during the course of the 1984 War of Independence which is known in the Arab world as the Nakba (disaster). Some of the major factors behind such a huge replacement were the collapse of the Palestinian leadership, the panic and the fear of massacre like that of Deir Yassin, and unwillingness of the Palestinians to live under Jewish authority.

There is a conflict of opinions as to the exact number of Arab refugees who was forced out during the fighting; as Israel reported 520,000, UN reported 726,000 while Arabs reported over 800,000 refugees. This number was increased to add another 4.6 million people who were displaced. Refugees living in the camps were noted to live in poor conditions, overcrowded camps and abject poverty.

Apart from the population that fled from the Israeli territory, around 100,000 Arabs were forced to leave their own villages. Out of these, many left willingly to avoid war and probable massacres and were assured that the displacement is a temporary measure; however, they have not been allowed to return despite the rulings of the Israeli Supreme Court. A special committee was established to deal with the issue of allowing refugees back to their home lands but no progress has been made to resolve this issue.

It is noteworthy here that both Palestinians and Jews have different versions of what happened in 1948. Israel insisted that Palestinians attacked them and fled voluntarily, believing that Arab armies would get rid of them. On the other hand, Palestinians asserted that Zionists made them evict by force as a part of their plan of ‘ethnic cleansing’ they had preconceived.  Israel viewed the refugees as hostile people and passed a law forbidding their return, assigning their lands to a custodian of absentee property. These displaced people and many of their descendents remain refugees to the present day, and they are located in Refugee camps of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza.

Even after all these years, the status of refugees and the issue regarding their return remains unresolved, and Palestinians commemorate this sad event on May 15 every year as the Nakba Day. It is one of the main factors of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and by solving this issue; UNO can take a step ahead in ensuring sustainable peace in the Middle East. However, it seems that the super powers have a different agenda in hand, and their vested interests are depriving the refugees from their right to return to their homes in Israel.

On November 15, 1988, a meeting of Palestine National Council was held in Algiers where Yasser Arafat declared Palestine as a state. Another such declaration was made in a meeting on October 1, 1948 in Gaza during the 1948 War of Independence, making the meeting of Algiers the second one for Palestine as a state. At the time, Algiers Declaration received much attention; however, both of these declarations stand quite irrelevant at present.

Algiers Declaration was presented almost a year after intifada was initiated and it showed an effort on the part of PLO to let all the parties know of their future intent. The declaration which was written by Mahmoud Darwish, a Palestinian poet, was most of all significant for its information of an independent Palestinian state. Moreover, the document stated its renunciation of violence from Palestine and also of terrorism directed towards Palestine. It was also a first time in Palestinian history to implicitly recognize Israel and admittance to coexist with Israel as an independent Palestinian state.

Where Palestine called for an independent state in Algiers Declaration, it also brought forward features benefiting Israel, contrary to the popular belief of Palestinian intransigence formed by Israel. To achieve independence, (“The State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be”) Palestine was ready to go to any lengths of negotiations. And for that, all the resolutions of United Nations concerning Israel-Palestine conflict were recognized in the Declaration, the major ones being UN Resolution 242 and UN Resolution 338. Resolution 242 was put forward to make Israel withdraw occupation on the territories it assumed in the Six Day War in 1967 and to make Palestine recognize Israel’s right to exist while Resolution 338 required immediate negotiations from both the parties for “a just and durable peace in the Middle East.”

To further their acceptance of the two previous UN Resolutions, Algiers Declaration showed:

• An agreement which would bring the permanent members of the Security Council and PLO to enter peace negotiations, to be held at an international conference under the flagship of the UN.
• Establishment of an independent Palestinian state, with clear acceptance of Israel as a state in the domain.
• Declaring its renunciation and reprobation of violence in all its forms.
• Demanding a solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees as the rules and practices of international law would have it.

The presentation of Declaration called in a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly where Yasser Arafat, Chairman of PLO, gave an address supporting the Declaration. A resolution “acknowledging the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council on 15 November 1988,” was adopted at the UNGA conference, deciding further that “the designation ‘Palestine’ should be used in place of the designation ‘Palestine Liberation Organization’ in the United Nations system.” Votes of this resolution witnessed one hundred and four states in favor of it, forty-four abstaining, while only United States and Israel voting against it. UN decision regarding Palestine as an independent state also included an arrangement asking the replacement of “Palestine Liberation Organization” as “Palestine” for references in all UN bodies.

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The origin of the term “Zionism” is the biblical word “Zion”, often used as a synonym for Jerusalem and the Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael). Zionism is an ideology which expresses the yearning of Jews the world over for their historical homeland – Zion, the Land of Israel. Zionism is the term used to define the international movement for the return of the Jewish people to their original homeland and the resumption of Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel.

Theodor Herzl, a Viennese journalist who wrote The Jewish State (Der Judenstaat) (1896), called for the formation of a Jewish nation state as a solution to the Diaspora and to anti-Semitism. Herzl had been the Paris correspondent of a Viennese newspaper, sent to cover the Dreyfus trial, and was energized by the virulent anti-Semitismhe witnessed. In his room in the hotel close to the Place de la Concorde, he wrote feverishly, and as he described in his diary, he felt as if where was a murmur of angels? wings in the room.

In 1897 Herzl called the first World Zionist Congress at Basel, which brought together diverse proto-Zionist groups into one movement. The meeting helped found Zionist organizations in most countries with large Jewish populations. The term Zionism was coined in 1893 by Nathan Birnbaum who played a prominent part at the First Zionist Congress. At the Congress, the Zionist platform was formulated with this mission statement: “Zionism aspires to establish a homeland for the Jewish people, guaranteed by international law, in the land of Israel.”

The close identification of the Jewish people with the Jewish land is manifest in every page of the Jewish Liturgy. The Jewish people preserve to this day the calendar of the land from which they had been exiled for two thousand years. The seasons which they mark with observance, the times of sowing and of planting, of harvest and of vintage, are the seasons and the times, not of the lands in which they dwell, but of the land in which their forefathers lived and from which they had been exiled.

The aspiration of returning to their homeland was first held by Jews exiled to Babylon some 2,500 years ago – a hope which subsequently became a reality. In Psalms 137:1 we read, “By the water of Babylon, there we sat down and wept when we remembered Zion.” The Jewish sages celebrated the bitterness of exile in many a poignant phrase:

• “The exile atones for all the sins of the Jews.”
• “With him who dwells outside Palestine it is as though God were not with him.”
• “Those Jews who dwell outside Palestine do not enjoy eternal life.”

In prayer, the Jewish worshipper is instructed to face east, towards the Land of Israel. In the morning service, Jews say “Bring us in peace from the four corners of the earth and lead us upright to our land.” Worshippers repeatedly recite, “Blessed are You, O Lord, Who builds Jerusalem,” and “Blessed are You O Lord, Who returns His presence to Zion.” The grace after meals includes a blessing which ends with a prayer for the rebuilding of “Jerusalem, the Holy City, speedily and in our days.” In the marriage ceremony, the bridegroom seeks to “elevate Jerusalem to the forefront of our joy.” At a circumcision the following is recited from the Psalms “If I forget you, O Jerusalem, may my right hand wither.” And in the concluding verse of the Passover sedar, spoken by every Jew throughout the world: “Next year in Jerusalem”.

With this emotional attachment to Eretz Yisrael in Palestine as part of every Jew’s heritage and life, it is little wonder that, when conditions were right, a movement arose in Europe to bring about the return. Political Zionism, which coalesced in the 19th century, invented neither the concept nor the practice of return. Rather, it appropriated an ancient idea and an ongoing active movement, and adapted them to meet the needs and spirit of the times. Zionism was further fueled by continuing episodes of anti-Semitism, which included the slaughter of Jews and confiscation of their property, and which rose in frequency and intensity in the 19th century.

The Zionist movement aimed to solve the “Jewish problem,” the problem of a perennial minority, a people subjected to repeated pogroms and persecution, a homeless community whose alienism was underscored by discrimination wherever Jews settled. Zionism aspired to deal with this situation by effecting a return to the historical homeland of the Jews – Land of Israel. The secularization of Jewish life in Eastern Europe, led many assimilated Jewish intellectuals to seek a new basis for a Jewish national life.

Political Zionism, the national liberation movement of the Jewish people, emerged in the 19th century within the context of the liberal nationalism then sweeping through Europe. This era, which began with a movement in Greece to free itself from the yoke of Ottoman occupation and included national liberation movements in Ireland, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy and later on in the century, Turkey and India, also inspired Zionist leaders, as evidenced by many references to the national struggles of other peoples in the writings of the founders of Zionism. Liberal nationalism usually aspired to two basic goals: liberation from foreign rule, (as in the case of Poland, Greece and Ireland) and national unity in countries which had been partitioned into many political entities (Italy and Germany).

In the United States, relatively free of the anti-Semitism that infected Europe, Jewish support of Zionism was primarily financial and spiritual. Leaders, most prominently Louis Brandeis, urged support for the Zionists but few American Jews thought about emigration to Palestine.

Opposed to Political Zionism were those, like Chaim Weizmann, who were critical of Herzl’s emphasis on external forms of diplomacy as a means to bring about the realization of Zionism. Weizman called such efforts “naive and bound to failure.” Zionism could not rest on personal statesmanship of several figures in the courts of Europe alone, he felt, but must be founded on development of cultural, educational and social institutions in the Jewish homeland – the concrete work of state-building. Weizman also attempted to achieve cooperation and peaceful relations with Arabs living in Palestine who, he felt, would benefit economically from the Zionist enterprise. Weizmann met with the Emir Feisal, then the undisputed leader of awakening Arab nationalism. Feisal promised to recognize Zionist aims in Palestine, as long as the aims of Arab nationalism were achieved in Iraq and Syria. Unfortunately, this agreement was short-lived.

Zionism synthesized the two goals, liberation and unity, by aiming to free the Jews from hostile and oppressive alien rule and to reestablish Jewish unity by gathering Jewish exiles from the four corners of the world to the Jewish homeland. However, Zionism itself was never a unitary endeavor — there were constant squabbles and internal political upheavals. And not all Jews were Zionists; for many reasons, large numbers of Jews did not support all or part of the Zionist agenda in any of its forms. But because the Zionists were always in desperate need of money, non-Zionists became irreplaceable as generous givers.

After World War II and the revelation of the true scope of the Holocaust, the militant Zionists who had the goal of an immediate refuge homeland for Jews gained ascendancy. The end of the British Mandate and declaration of the State of Israel in 1948 was the culmination of almost a century of Zionist efforts. Effort then shifted to support of Israel with its many problems and struggles.

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Early Life

It’s ironic that the man who personified the Palestinian movement was neither born in the region it claims, nor conforms to his own organization’s definition of Palestinian identity. Yassir Arafat, whose real name is Abdel-Rahman Abdel-Raouf Arafat al-Qudwa al-Husseini, was born in August 1929 in Cairo, son of an Egyptian textile merchant. He was sent to Jerusalem as a small child after his mother died, then returned to Egypt via Gaza.

Throughout his career, Arafat’s Egyptian background was a political impediment and source of personal embarrassment. One biographer notes that upon first meeting him in 1967, ‘West Bankers did not like his Egyptian accent and ways and found them alien,’ and to the very end Arafat employed an aide to translate his Egyptian dialect into Palestinian Arabic for conversing with his West Bank and Gaza subjects.

As a young man, Arafat took no part in the formative experience of the Palestinian movement ? the 1948 Arab-Israeli war ? but he would nonetheless claim refugee status throughout his life: ‘I am a refugee,’ he cried out in a 1969 interview, ‘Do you know what it means to be a refugee? I am a poor and helpless man. I have nothing, for I was expelled and dispossessed of my homeland.’

Fatah and the PLO

n the mid-1950s, Arafat joined the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, then rose to the head of the Palestine Student Union at the University of Cairo. In the late 1950s Arafat moved to Kuwait, where he co-founded Fatah (‘Palestine National Liberation Movement’, an acronym meaning ‘conquest’), the faction that would later gain control over the entire Palestinian movement. Fatah’s motley ranks of Islamists, communists and pan-Arabists expanded via brute violence. ‘People aren’t attracted to speeches, but rather to bullets,’ Arafat quipped at this stage.

Fatah began military-style training in Syria and Algeria in 1964, and the following year tried unsuccessfully to blow up a major Israeli water pump. Fatah’s stated goal was the obliteration of the State of Israel, and well before the 1967 war would supply a pretext, Arafat’s organization repeatedly attacked Israeli buses, homes, villages and rail lines.

This violence against Israeli civilians was a pillar of the Palestinian National Covenant (the foundational charter of the Palestinian Liberation Organization – PLO), which states that ‘the liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence’ and that ‘armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine and is therefore a strategy and not a tactic.’ (Despite repeated Palestinian commitments in the late 1990s to annul these sections of the covenant, it was never officially changed.)

Arafat’s public profile got a boost in 1968, when the IDF raided a Fatah stronghold in the Jordanian village of al-Karameh. The uniformed, keffiyah-clad Arafat took this opportunity to project himself as a fearless Arab leader who, despite the post-Six Day War gloom, dared to confront the Israelis. The image stuck, and Fatah’s numbers swelled with new recruits.

Arafat and Fatah consolidated power through bribery, extortion and murder, and at the Palestinian National Congress in Cairo in February 1969, Arafat was appointed head of the PLO, a position he would never relinquish.

Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia

By the late 1960s, heavily-armed, Arafat-led Palestinians had formed a ‘state within a state’ in Jordan, not only attacking Israeli civilian targets, but also seizing control of Jordanian infrastructure.

The tension reached a height during late 1970, when Jordan’s King Hussein cracked down on the Palestinian factions. During this bloody conflict, known as ‘Black September’, Palestinians hijacked four Western airliners and blew one up on a Cairo runway, to both embarrass the Egyptians and Jordanians and, in their words, ‘teach the Americans a lesson for their long-standing support of Israel.’ With the broad publicity this generated, Arafat had hit the world stage.

When King Hussein drove Arafat’s faction out of his Jordanian kingdom (causing thousands of civilian deaths), they relocated in Lebanon. As in Jordan, Arafat soon triggered a bloody civil war in his previously stable host country. Simultaneously, the PLO launched intermittent attacks on Israeli towns from southern Lebanese positions.

Yassir Arafat then brought the high-profile terrorist act to western soil. In Sept. 1972, Fatah-backed terrorists kidnapped and murdered 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic games. And in 1973, Arafat ordered his operatives in the Khartoum, Sudan office of Fatah to abduct and murder US Ambassador Cleo Noel and two other diplomats. (In 2004, the FBI finally opened an official investigation against Arafat for the Khartoum murders.)

The wanton violence fueled Arafat’s political goals, as his presence on the world stage grew: In 1974, he became the first representative of a nongovernmental organization to address a plenary session of the UN General Assembly (pictured at left) In the speech, with a gun holster strapped to his hip, Arafat compared himself to George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. Arab heads of states declared the PLO the sole legitimate representative of all Palestinians, the PLO was granted full membership in the Arab League in 1976, and by 1980 was fully recognized by European nations.

In 1978-82, the IDF invaded Lebanon to root out PLO groups that had continually terrorized the northern Israeli populace. The U.S. brokered a cease-fire deal in which Arafat and the PLO were allowed to leave Lebanon; Arafat and the PLO leadership eventually settled in Tunisia, which remained his center of operations until 1993.

During the 1980s, Arafat received financial assistance from Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, which allowed him to rebuild the battered PLO. This was particularly useful during the first Palestinian intifada in 1987, Arafat took control of the violence from afar, and it was mainly due to Fatah forces in the West Bank that the anti-Israel terror and civil unrest could be maintained. Arafat would then become nearly the only world leader to support Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War. (Saddam would later repay this loyalty by sending $25,000 checks to families of Palestinian suicide bombers.)

The Palestinian Authority

In the early 1990s, the U.S. led Israel and the PLO to negotiations that spawned the 1993 Oslo Accords, an agreement that called for the implementation of Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip over a five-year period. The following year Arafat was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize along with Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin.

In 1994, Arafat moved his headquarters to the West Bank and Gaza to run the Palestinian Authority, an entity created by the Oslo Accords. Arafat brought with him from Tunisia an aging PLO leadership that would bolster his ongoing monopoly over all Palestinian funds, power and authority. Elections in 1996 extended Arafat’s control over the PA, but under the Oslo agreement, the term of that candidacy ended in 1999. Arafat never allowed new elections to take place.

While Israel went about implementing its side of the Oslo agreements, removing troops from nearly all Palestinian areas, recognizing the PA, and educating for peace, the PA utterly failed to live up to its commitment to renounce and uproot anti-Israel terrorism. Instead, unprecedented incitement from Arafat’s official PA media and school textbooks, and active and passive PA support for terrorist groups led to a string of suicide bombings in the mid-1990s that killed scores of Israeli civilians. In October, 1996, at the height of the Oslo years, Arafat cried out to a Bethlehem crowd, ‘We know only one word – jihad! Jihad, jihad, jihad! Whoever does not like it can drink from the Dead Sea or from the Sea of Gaza.’

In July 2000, U.S. president Bill Clinton attempted to keep the Oslo Accords viable by convening a summit at Camp David between Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. There, Barak offered Arafat a Palestinian state in Gaza and 92% of the West Bank, and a capital in East Jerusalem, the most generous offer ever from an Israeli government. Yassir Arafat rejected the offer and ended negotiations without a counteroffer. As American envoy Dennis Ross concluded, ‘Arafat could not accept Camp David… because when the conflict ends, the cause that defines Arafat also ends.’

Immediately following this breakdown, the PA media machine under Arafat’s control ramped up the war rhetoric, and preparations were made for riots that were unleashed following Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount. The Arafat-supported ‘al Aqsa intifada’ would continue for four years. This unprecedented wave of anti-Israel terrorism, which would result in over 1,000 Israeli deaths, was marked by over 120 Palestinian suicide bombers and the growth of an Islamic martyrdom cult.

This stage of violence revealed that Arafat and the PA had never abandoned their longstanding plans to liquidate the Jewish state. Arafat had told an Arab audience in Stockholm in 1996, ‘We plan to eliminate the State of Israel and establish a purely Palestinian state. We will make life unbearable for Jews by psychological warfare and population explosion… We Palestinians will take over everything, including all of Jerusalem.’  Arafat’s colleague Faisal al-Husseini was even more explicit, describing the Oslo process as a ‘Trojan Horse’ designed to promote the strategic goal of ‘Palestine from the [Jordan] river to the [Mediterranean] sea’, that is, a Palestine in place of Israel.

Terrorist to the End

The final phase in Arafat’s life-long commitment to organized terror was channeled through the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, a Fatah group that was responsible for many of the most deadly attacks against Israeli civilians between 2000-2004. In addition, Arafat granted free rein to the radical Islamic terrorist groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad to perpetrate dozens of horrific acts of civilian murder between 2000-2004. (At left: Arafat with Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin, 2003)

Delegitimization

In January 2002, the Israeli Navy seized a Gaza-bound, PA-owned freighter — the Karine A — that was loaded with more than fifty tons of Iranian ammunition and weapons, including dozens of surface-to-surface Katyusha rockets.

In June 2002, upon recognizing Arafat’s ongoing financing and abetting of terrorism, U.S. President Bush called for Arafat’s removal from power. Progress toward peace required, according to Bush, ‘a new and different Palestinian leadership…not compromised by terror.’ Release of a U.S.-backed ‘road map’ for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was therefore delayed until such a new Palestinian leader emerged. On its part, the Israeli government chose to isolate Arafat in his Ramallah compound, the ‘Muqata’, where he would remain from early 2002 until his final days, and where his burial is expected to occur.

In April 2003, hours after Mahmoud Abbas assumed the role of Palestinian prime minister, the official road map was released and diplomatic progress began. But Arafat consistently undercut the authority of Abbas, leading to Abbas’ resignation and the halting of the road map peace process.

Corruption, Autocracy, Jihad

Over the course of his revolutionary career, Arafat siphoned off hundreds of millions of dollars of international aid money intended to reach the Palestinian people.

Estimates of the degree of Arafat’s wealth differ, but are all staggering: In 2003, Forbes magazine listed Arafat in its annual list of the wealthiest ‘Kings, Queens and Despots,’ with a fortune of ‘at least $300 million.’ Israeli and US officials estimate Arafat’s personal holdings between $1-3 billion.

And while the average Palestinian barely subsisted, Arafat’s wife Suha in Paris received $100,000 each month from PA sources as reported on CBS’ 60 Minutes. That CBS report also noted that Arafat maintained secret investments in a Ramallah-based Coca Cola plant, a Tunisian cellphone company, and venture capital funds in the U.S. and the Cayman Islands.

Arafat also used foreign aid funds to pay off cronies who bolstered his autocracy: An International Monetary Fund report indicated that upwards of 8% ($135 million) of the PA’s annual budget was handed out by Arafat ‘at his sole discretion.’ And Arafat’s select PA policemen, far from keeping the peace, were repeatedly among the suicide bombers and snipers.

Money was just one method of strengthening Arafat’s power apparatus. Critics of his PA government were routinely imprisoned, tortured or beaten. One example: In 1999, Muawiya Al-Masri, a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, described Arafat’s corruption to a Jordanian newspaper. For this, he was attacked by a gang of masked men and shot three times. Al-Masri survived the ordeal and described Arafat’s grip on PA power: ‘There is no institutional process. There is only one institution ? the Presidency, which has no law and order and is based on bribing top officials.’

From 2000-2004, Arafat permitted Muslim imams to incite unprecedented anti-Israel and anti-American violence from their mosques and through official PA media. Arafat’s Religious Affairs Ministry employed preachers who regularly called for children to ‘martyr themselves’, and PA television glamorized the act of suicide bombing.

Under Arafat, the Palestinian Authority school textbooks denied Israel’s very existence, and jihad was presented to Palestinian children as an admirable course of action. The Jewish people, meanwhile, was represented to schoolchildren as a tricky, greedy and barbarous nation.

Freedom of the press was virtually non-existent during Arafat’s reign in Gaza, Jericho and Ramallah ? if it didn’t speak favorably of Arafat, it didn’t get printed in the PA-controlled media. Moreover, the PA enacted a systematic policy of intimidation of foreign journalists. One case among many: When an AP cameraman captured footage of Palestinian street celebrations following the 9/11 attacks, he was kidnapped, brought to a PA security office, and Arafat’s cabinet secretary threatened that the PA ‘cannot guarantee [his] life’ if the footage was broadcast.

Yet beyond the terrorism, extortion, embezzlement and intimidation lies Arafat’s most unfortunate ongoing impact: The inculcation of murderous values in an entire generation of Palestinians, who have been educated — under Arafat’s direction — to continue the fight of jihad against Israel, rather than compromise to end the decades-long conflict.

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Palestinian Authority president Yasser Arafat delivered a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 28, 2001. This date was one day after the end of the peace talks held in Taba, Egypt where Arafat’s team had rejected the latest proposals for Israeli concessions. Taba closed with the expectation of further meetings, possibly a summit between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat in Stockholm, Sweden.

Arafat used the Davos forum to launch a blistering attack on Israel. He accused Israel of:

• … the policy of economic strangulations, closures and siege, as well as starvation and collective punishment against our Palestinian people.
• … [waging] a savage and barbaric war, as well as, a blatant and fascist military aggression against our Palestinian people.
• … using internationally prohibited weapons and ammunitions that include in their construction depleted uranium.

He blamed all the violence of the al-Aqsa intifada on Israel, reversing the cause and effect:

• Whoever wants really to achieve peace and seeks it with belief and sincerity, does not resort to killing, persecution, assassination, destruction and devastation as the Government of Israel and its army of occupation are doing to our people these days and since four continuous months.

Arafat went on to ask for help from the international community:

• … [to end] this Israeli war and aggression against our unarmed people; a war and an aggression which constitute a flagrant and blatant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relating to the Protection of Civilians in Times of War. We ask for the provision of international protection for our people immediately, the lifting of the siege and closure and the ending of this escalating military aggression.

Writing in the Hebrew daily Yedioth Ahronoth, Sever Plotzker described the scene this way:

• I saw Arafat up close. He was dressed in the best of his military uniforms and cowboy boots. Full of rage, at times on the verge of tears, he sat in his seat on the stage and waited impatiently for the moment in which he could begin to read his speech.

Shimon Peres, former Prime Minister and Regional Cooperation Minister at the time of Davos, was present on the platform at Davos and had just given a speech of peace and warm words. He was observed to be upset by Arafat’s speech, but did not make any rebuttal at the meeting. As Thomas Friedman of the New York Times said:

• Mr. Peres did extend the olive branch, as planned, but Mr. Arafat torched it. … after the warm words of Mr. Peres [Arafat] made Mr. Peres look like a dupe, as all the Israeli papers reported.

Arafat’s outrageous speech at Davos ended any possibility of continuing negotiations with the Barak government of Israel. When he learned of the speech, Prime Minister Ehud Barak cut off diplomatic contact with Arafat until after the election.Ariel Sharon’s landslide victory on February 6, 2001 took Barak out of the picture. One of Barak’s advisors said:

• I swear. [Arafat] deserves Sharon. He simply deserves him. He has earned Sharon, honestly.

The PLO started its life with an active campaign of terror attacks, but made little progress toward their goal of eliminating Israel.In 1974 the PLO made a conscious decision to alter its focus from a purely terrorist nature into one that would include political-diplomatic elements, necessary for any meaningful progress in international forums, adopting the well-known “Phased Plan”. This created more unhappiness amongst some followers who felt that the PLO, while striking blows, was not truly making progress towards its mark.

But Arafat’s plan made him more acceptable to the world community and things began to change quickly for him. The mid-1970s saw the all-important recognition of the PLO by the Arab League at the Rabat Conference and, remarkably, by the United Nations. Arafat deftly manipulated the organization from one perceived by the Western public as barbaric, into an organization slowly being considered a movement with legitimate claims.

In 1982, the Israeli army chased Arafat and the PLO guerrillas all the way into Lebanon and bottled them up in Beirut. In a decision that radical Palestinians resented, Arafat agreed to come to the bargaining table, after a UN cease-fire allowed him to relocate to Tripoli, Libya. Peace talks with Israel ensued. Little came of these talks, and soon afterward, dissension within the ranks of the PLO became more pronounced and some of the moderate leaders were assassinated.

Yasser Arafat decided to turn his efforts to hijacking. He provided support for the hijacking of a major cruise ship, selecting the Achille Lauro, a move that ultimately did great damage to the reputation of the PLO. Together with operatives from the PLF, terrorists seized the vessel and took the entire ship hostage. In a cowardly and reprehensible act, members of the team shot to death a wheelchair-bound Jewish passenger named Leon Klinghoffer, then dumped his body overboard. World response was swift, and condemning.

By 1988, Arafat had taken the diplomatic road one step further when he not only announced the right of the State of Israel to exist, but feinted a renouncement of terrorism as a means to accomplish a diplomatic end. The perceived commitment to these ideals caused Israel to finally agree to serious talks with the PLO, and finally to the Madrid Peace Conferance and the Oslo Accords.

Describing Arafat personally, in his memoir Red Horizons, Ion Mihai Pacepa, former head of Romanian intelligence, recalls that his own dossier on Arafat provided:

• …an incredible account of fanaticism … of tangled oriental political maneuvers, of lies, of embezzled PLO funds deposited in Swiss banks, and of homosexual relationships, beginning with his teacher when he was a teenager and ending with his current bodyguards. After reading that report, I felt a compulsion to take a shower whenever [I] had just shaken his hand.

Pacepa recalls the strategic advice that Ceausescu gave Arafat during Arafat’s visit to Bucharest in 1978:

• In the shadow of your government-in-exile, you can keep as many operational groups as you want, as long as they are not publicly connected with your name. They could mount endless operations all around the world, while your name and your ‘government’ would remain pristine and unspoiled, ready for negotiations and further recognition.

Arafat tries to distance himself from Hamas and its acknowledged terrorism. But intelligence analyst Christopher Story has written:

• Hamas (and its subdivisions) is and always has been an integral component of the umbrella organization known as the Palestine Liberation Organization, which reports directly to Moscow.

Hamas leader Sheikh Mahmoud Zahar has said of the PLO-Hamas relationship:

• Like the wings of a bird, they must work together.

Arafat has acknowledged this relationship in public speeches extolling suicide bombers — such as those who left the Machane Yehuda marketplace strewn with the bodies of innocent shoppers — as “martyrs.”

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Yasser Arafat

Mohammed Abdel-Raouf Arafat As Qudwa al-Hussaeini was born on August 24, 1929 in Cairo, his father a textile merchant who was a Palestinian with some Egyptian ancestry, his mother from an old Palestinian family in Jerusalem. His full name is also written as Abd al-Rahman abd al-Bauf Arafat al-Qud al-Husseini. Arafat shortened his name to obscure his kinship with the notorious ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Muhammed Amin al-Husseini who collaborated with the Nazis during World War II. Arafat has also been known by the nom de guerre Abu Amar (or Abu Ammar). ["Yasser" is also sometimes spelled "Yasir" or "Yassir".]

In late 1952, Palestinian students from Gaza, studying primarily at Cairo University, set up the Union of Palestinian Students in Egypt. It was there that Yasser Arafat, a Civil Engineering student, and his coterie, including Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), later to become Arafat?s second in command, began their terrorist careers.

The Palestinian students, under Arafat?s leadership, were affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, then in its prime, and by far the most active organization on the Cairo campus. The liquidation of the Muslim Brotherhood by the Egyptian regime explains Arafat?s subsequent hostility toward Egyptian premier Jamal Abdul Nasser.

On October 10, 1959, a group of about 20 Palestinians met in Kuwait and secretly formed Fatah. Fatah (or al-Fatah) is an acronym standing for Harakat Al-Tahrir Al-Watani Al-Filastini?the Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine. In Arabic, HTF means death; when reversed to FTH it means victory. Arafat, who had been working as a construction engineer in Kuwait, soon emerged as the leader of Fatah.

With Fatah, Arafat recurited terrorists and led fedayeen raids into Israeli territory. Among the offshoots of Fatah was the infamous “Black September” who murdered the Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. When the PLO was founded in 1964, as an umbrella organization for various Arab terrorist factions, Fatah was the largest group. It was, and still is, the military arm of the PLO. By 1968 Arafat was PLO’s leader and he has been chairman of the PLO since then.

What was the Wye River Memorandum in 1998?

US President Bill Clinton held a Middle East summit conference at the Wye River Plantation, in Maryland during mid-October 1998. The Israeli delegation was headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat headed the Palestinian group.As a result of the negotiations, the Wye River Memorandum was signed by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat on October 23, 1998 in a ceremony that was also attended by King Hussein of Jordan.

The Wye River Memorandum was intended to clarify mutual responsibilities of the parties in the details of implementation of the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (“Oslo II”) of September 28, 1995. However, the Wye agreement is so riddled with ambiguities that some of its critics have compared it to Swiss cheese. The most prominent concerns center on the very issues that motivated the negotiations at Wye Plantation in the first place:

• The size and timing of the implementation of the sub-phases of Israeli redeployment of forces, specifically the so-called “second deployment” and “third deployment” as specified in the Oslo II agreement, contingent on Palestinian compliance with their commitment in Oslo II and earlier agreements
• The potential Palestinian unilateral declaration of statehood in May of 1999, when the interim period specified in the Declaration of Principles expires.

The Israelis were particularly concerned with ongoing violations of the earlier treaties by the Palestinians:

• Failure to complete the process of amending the Palestinian National Covenant
• Continuing hostile incitement
• Failure to carry out a variety of security measures, including registration of weapons, confiscation of illegal weapons, arrest of suspected terrorists, and reduction of the size of the Palestinian “police force”

During the Wye River negotiations, the United States made a number of secret deals with the Israelis and Palestinians to help secure their agreement on the final memorandum:

• The US agreed to overlook Israeli plans to build at Har Homa if the Israelis did not oppose continuing American delay in moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in violation of the Jerusalem Embassy Relocation Act of 1995
• Israel also agreed to restrict building in West Bank settlements (i.e. only accommodate “natural growth”) in return for a pledge to defer the planned declaration of a Palestinian State beyond May 4, 1999
• The United States provided funding to both parties: $1 billion to cover Israel’s costs of redeploying from the West Bank and instituting new or additional security measures; $300 million to the Palestinians for “economic infrastructure”>

Since it was considered unlikely that there would ever be full agreement between Israel and the Palestinians on all the issues, the Wye Memorandum introduced a third party – the US Central Intelligence Agency – to act as a kind of monitor and arbiter on security issues and the anticipated contradictions between Israeli and Palestinian interpretations of compliance.

The Wye agreement included a specific timeline for implementation, with the obligations of the Israeli and Palestinian sides to be implemented in a phased approach. Most of the Palestinian obligations were never implemented. Delays in implementation, as Israel protested Palestinian non-compliance with halts in redeployment of forces, led to a new timetable at the Sharm el-Sheikh conference in 1999.

Why did Israel withdraw from Lebanon in 1985?

Israel’s experiences in Lebanon were overwhelmingly negative. After the PLO moved to Lebanon and siezed control of the southern areas from the Lebanese government, the ever growing problem of terrorist attacks on Israel from bases in Lebanon began. But the Litani River Operation in 1978 and the larger invasion of Lebanon in 1982 did not solve the problem, however necessary the operations may have been to stem the tide of attacks. Israel could not rely on its Christian allies in Lebanon to secure the peace and Israel could not bear the human and financial costs of occupation on its own. Therefore, Israel had to reduce its committment and try to work with the United Nations, backed up by guarantees from the United States, on the unending problem of securing Israel’s borders.

In June 1985, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres ordered a unilateral withdrawal of most of Israel’s troops from Lebanon, leaving only a small residual Israeli force and an Israeli-supported Lebanese militia in a “security zone,” a 15 km wide strip of land paralleling the border which Israel considers a necessary buffer against attacks on its northern territory. Many terrorists on their way to northern Israel have been caught and stopped in the security zone. This security for Israel comes at a price; since 1985, about 300 Israeli soldiers have been killed in the security zone by terrorist groups such as Hezbollah (Party of God).

The preferred alternative to the “security zone” strategy was always a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon, under the framework provided by UN Security Council Resolution 425. The Resolution did not require Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, as is sometimes claimed by anti-Israel PLO, Syrians and Lebanese. Rather, the resolution was a package of recommendations whose implementation was be the result of negotiations between Israel and Lebanon. If the requirements for security and stability were ever met, then Israel could have been in a position to carry out the withdrawal. The lack of progress towards a peace agreement was caused by Lebanon’s total dependence on Syria, the long history of cross-border attacks staged in south Lebanon, and the constant potential for escalation. Israel instead settled for limited cease-fire agreements and the IDF remained in south Lebanon until May of 2000 when Israel unilaterally withdrew.

After the 1982 Peace for Galilee operation in Lebanon the IDF had to face, on the tactical level, a continued war against terrorism both in Lebanon and within Israel. After the 1985 withdrawal into the security zone, the ongoing war against terrorism included fighting against the PLO, Amal (Lebanese Resistance Detachments) and Hezbollah in extensive areas of Lebanon. After 1987 the struggle against terrorism in South Lebanon was expanded by the simultaneous IDF involvement in the Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The 1991 Gulf War and the breakup of the Soviet Union had a profound effect on the Middle East. These events influenced the Arab World to reassess its position vis-a-vis Israel and caused Israel to reevaluate its perception of the defense situation and redefine the nature of the strategic threat. Peace finally seemed possible when the Madrid Conference met in 1991.

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The Yom Kippur War began with the unprovoked assault on Israel by Egyptian and Syrian military forces. They acted simultaneously against Israeli forces on the Suez Canal in the south and the Golan Heights in the north. The attack took place on October 6, 1973 — Yom Kippur — the holiest day of the religious year in Israel, a time obviously calculated to catch the Israelis off-guard.

While the bulk of the combat was between Isreal and the forces of Egypt and Syria, at least ten other Arab states (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan) actively aided the Egyptian-Syrian war effort with personnel, military equipment, or financial support. Palestinian Arabs shelled Israeli civilian towns from Lebanon and also fought with the attacking armies.

The Arab states received aid from the Soviet Union, which rejected United States efforts to work toward an immediate cease?fire. The United Nations remained quiet until it appeared the Egyptians were about to lose the war, then the UN adopted Resolution 338, which called for an end to military activity.

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Elie Hobeika is best known as the intelligence chief of the Lebanese Christian Phalangist militia group responsible for the Sabra and Chatilla refugee camp massacres in 1982. Hobeika was directly responsible for carrying out the massacres (and other gruesome acts over the years). Before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Hobeika was assigned as a liasion officer with the IDF. Following the war, he turned his back on Israel and joined the pro-Syrian camp in Lebanon, incurring the wrath of the right-wing Christian rank and file in the mid-1980s. He became a crucial ally of Syrian subjugation of Lebanon, and had a long career until he was killed in a massive bomb attack at his house in a Beirut suburb in January 2002.

Hobeika had been under investigation in Lebanon for several years before his sudden death. An investigation into the 1984 assassination attempt against Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss was expected to implicate Hobeika. Other crimes were reportedly linked to Hobeika including the 1978 assassination of Zghorta MP Tony Franjieh and a 1985 car bomb attack that severely injured Sidon MP Mustafa Saad and killed his daughter, Natasha. Hobeika has also been accused of financial improprieties during his term as the “Electrical Minister and in Charge of Hydraulic Resources” in Lebanon.

Many in the Arab/Islamic world immediately blamed Hobeika’s death on Israel, with the motive assumed to be related to Ariel Sharon’s role as the Israeli defense leader at the time of the Sabra and Chatilla incident. Hobeika died a day after saying he was ready to testify in a “crimes against humanity” case brought by Palestinians in Belgium against Sharon, who denies sanctioning the massacres when he was defense minister. Could the assassination be a cover-up on behalf of Sharon?

But there is a much more plausible story. Hobeika reportedly attempted to work with the American Central Intelligence Agency to help locate Osama bin Laden’s ally Imad Mughniyah ? listed on the US?s most-wanted terrorist list. But the Syrians, who occupy Lebanon and impose their will on the Beirut government, discovered Hobeika?s involvement with the CIA and arranged his death in a part of Beirut heavily patrolled by Lebanese security forces.

Israel had no compelling motive to kill Hobeika. There was no reason to believe that he would reveal credible new information about Israeli involvement in the massacre or have anything damaging to say about Sharon’s role.

One of the frequently heard claims against Israel is that she started the Six Day War in1967, that Israel attacked peaceful Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq on June 5, 1967 and seized the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the “West Bank” from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria in an act of aggression.

The background to the Six Day War is quite different from the propagandistic claims of pro-Arab sources. Egypt and Israel’s other neighboring countries — all Arabs — took actions in a series of increasingly provocativeand threatening steps during May and early June of 1967, accompanied with rhetoric stating very clearly the intent to attack and destroy Israel. Attempts by Israel to negotiate, find United Nations support, or other international diplomatic resolution failed. The United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) stationed on the Egyptian-Israeli border were withdrawn without any discussion. A US plan to lift the blockcade of Israeli shipping found little support internationally.

Arab mobilization compelled Israel to mobilize its forces, 80 percent of which were reserve civilians. Israel feared slow economic strangulation because of the costs of long-term mobilization and the damage of the shipping blockcade. Israeli leaders feared the consequences of absorbing an Arab first strike against its civilian population, many of whom lived only miles from Arab-controlled territory. Incendiary Arab rhetoric threatening Israel’s annihilation terrified Israeli society and contributed to the pressures to go to war.

Faced with few choices, on June 4, 1967 the Cabinet authorized the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence to decide on appropriate steps to defend the State of Israel.On June 5, Israel launched a pre-emptive strike against Egypt and captured the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. Despite an Israeli appeal to Jordan to stay out of the conflict, Jordan attacked Israel and thereby lost control of the West Bank and the eastern sector of Jerusalem. Israel went on to capture the Golan Heights from Syria by the time the war ended on June 10. Click here fora more complete article on the Course of the 1967 War.

Count Folke Bernadotte (Count of Wisborg) was a Swedish diplomat, nephew of King Gustavus V, fluent in six languages, who gained international recognition through his work as head of the Swedish Red Cross during World War II. On May 20, 1948 Bernadotte was appointed mediator of the UN General Assembly, and was immediately faced with the volatile situation in the Middle East. The long-standing conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine escalated after the adoption of the UN partition resolution on November 29, 1947. When Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948, five Arab armies invaded Israel.

During the summer of 1948, Count Folke Bernadotte was sent by the United Nations to Palestine to mediate a truce and try to negotiate a settlement. On June 11, Bernadotte succeeded in arranging a 30-day cease-fire. After visiting Cairo, Beirut, Amman and Tel Aviv, he came to the conclusion that the UN partition plan was an “unfortunate” resolution and proposed his own plan.

Bernadotte’s plan called for the Jewish State to relinquish the Negev and Jerusalem to Transjordan and to receive the western Galilee. Bernadotte advocated a total demilitarization of Jerusalem and blamed the Jewish forces for “aggressive” behavior in the city. The boundaries proposed were similar to what had been proposed prior to the partition vote, and had been rejected by all sides. Now, the proposal was being offered after the Arabs had gone to war to prevent partition and a Jewish state had been declared. The Jews and Arabs both rejected the plan. Fighting resumed on July 8, 1948 raging until another cease-fire was arranged July 18th.

LEHI was a Jewish extremist group, also called the “Stern Gang”, engaging in a campaign of “personal terror” against the British in Palestine. When the IDF was established on May 31, 1948, LEHI was disbanded and its members enlisted in the IDF. But in Jerusalem LEHI remained an independent organization, arguing that at the time of the proclamation of independence the city’s fate had not yet been determined.

For LEHI, Count Folke Bernadotte, as UN mediator for “Palestine,” came to symbolize the foreign oppression of the Jewish claim to the Land of Israel. LEHI called Bernadotte a British agent and said he had cooperated with the Nazis in World War II. The organization considered his plan to be a threat to its goal of an independent Israel with expanded territory on both sides of the Jordan River. Bernadotte was assassinated by a LEHI team in Jerusalem on September 17, 1948, an act that resulted in the elimination of the LEHI organization by the Jewish leaders of Israel.

Mainstream Jewish leaders were horrified by the assassination.David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel, responded to the murder in the strongest terms. Although LEHI thought their act was for the State of Israel, Ben-Gurion immediately denounced it as terrorist murder and declared:

• Arrest all Stern gang leaders. Surround all Stern bases. Confiscate all arms. Kill any who resist.

The regular Israeli army positioned itself in Jerusalem, and the orders were given to disband the LEHI camp through mass arrests. The government outlawed the organization’s branch in Jerusalem and shut down its publication, Hamivrak. Two of the leaders of LEHI, Natan Yellin-Mor and Mattityahu Shmuelevitz, were sentenced to long jail terms by a military court, but were later released in a general amnesty. Yitzhak Shamir, another of the top LEHI leaders, reputedly played a role in planning the assassination; however, he was never tried and went on to become Prime Minister of Israel.

A little recognized result of the tragedy of Count Bernadotte’s assassination was the arrival of the Israeli Army in Jerusalem in response. Because the Army was there, sections of Jerusalem remained in the hands of Israel under the truce agreements that ended the War of Independence, rather than have the whole area fall into the Arab-held zone.

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The 1922 White Paper (also called the Churchill White Paper, after Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill) was the first official manifesto from the British Government interpreting the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate. It was issued on June 3, 1922, after investigation of the Arab riots of 1920-1921. Although Churchill’s name is associated with the paper, it was largely influenced by the High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel.

The White Paper stated that Britain stood by the Balfour Declaration, and that the Declaration, “re-affirmed by the Conference of the Principle Allied Powers at San Remo and again in the Treaty of Sevres, is not susceptible of change”. The document reiterated the considerable progress that the Zionists had made in building a community with “‘national’ characteristics”, but made clear that the British did not support a separate nation as a Jewish National Home, only a continuation of the community within the Palestine region. Notwithstanding these assurances, in July 1922 the British partitioned the area of the Palestine Mandate by excluding the area east of the Jordan River from Jewish settlement. That land, 76% of the original Palestine Mandate land, was renamed Transjordan and was given to the Emir Abdullah to rule.

The White Paper also denied that the British had promised the Arabs “that an independent national government should be at once established in Palestine” after World War I, referring to the Arab misinterpretation of the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence. The key section reads:

• But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the District of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty’s Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir. Henry McMahon’s pledge.

In one well known paragraph, the Paper denied that “the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine” and included the statement that the British Government did not wish to see Palestine become “as Jewish as England is English”. But the Paper does say that the Jewish community:

• … should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on the sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection.

This White Paper also established a new principle as a factor for determining an immigration quota of Jews to Palestine. The White Paper confirmed the right of Jewish immigration but stipulated that this should not exceed the economic absorptive capacity of the country, an arbitrary standard that gave the British wide latitude to limit the influx of Jews.

Among other matters, the policy document also recommended the establishment of a Legislative Council with twelve elected and ten official members, one of a number of steps “to foster the establishment of a full measure of self government in Palestine.”

What did the Jews get as a result of World War I?

The First World War was a horrific and bloody war between the great powers of the world, which killed millions of people, changed the map of the world, and opened the chapter of troubled history for many regions. The war between the Allies and Central Powers was full of conspiracies, double-crossing, twists and turns. At that time, the Jews were only 12 percent of the total population of Palestine and they were looking for help in creating Israel. Although the Zionist didn’t play an active role in the World War I, but there is no denying the fact that this war provided them the first breakthrough towards the creation of Israel. The Jews got support of the key powers as a result of World War I, and this support was ensured through a well laid-out plan by the Zionist leaders against the Palestinian Arabs.

During World War I, the Jews realized that the future map of the Middle East would not be determined by the rights and desires of majority of its inhabitants, but by the rivalries between great powers and their strategic goals. Towards the end of the war, both British and French leaders wanted to consolidate their control over Palestinian region, so both promised the Jews to help them in establishing their homeland in Palestine. The 1917 document by French was rather vague but the Balfour Declaration by British, released in the same year, clearly endorsed the Zionist stance and benefitted the Jews in more than one way. Although it was pretty clear that this document was used as a tool by Britain for convincing the Jews to encourage America to get into the war, but the Jews also took full advantage of the situation and arrived as an influential force towards the end of the Great War. Some of the major benefits that Jews got as a result of World War I are:

• The “historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine” was recognized through British Mandate, and it was later approved by the League of Nations Council as well.
• The Balfour Declaration became the greatest Jewish-Zionist achievement which paved the way for the occupation of Palestine and creation of Israel.
• United States also supported the formation of the Jewish national home through a joint resolution of the United States Congress, passed on June 30, 1922.
• The post-War incidents also proved a major step toward a secure, internationally recognized homeland for the Jewish people
• The population of Jews in Palestine increased as a result of World War I and they started to build infrastructure which would eventually help them in creating their homeland and negotiating their stance with the world powers.

It is noteworthy here that the actual role of Jews in WWI has always remained a mystery to the world, mainly because they were providing obscure support to those countries which would later help them in targeting Palestinians and unleashing brutal force in the Middle East. But the historians agree that due to the careful strategic moves by the Jews, World War I became the first diplomatic victory for the Jewish agenda, or political Zionism to be more exact.

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Terrorist Attacks on Israel

From early 1965 to the Six-Day War in June 1967, the PLO through Fatah pursued a consistent policy of border attacks, particularly along the Jordanian and Lebanese borders. Criticism of these activities by the Arab governments and by local public opinion persuaded Fatah leaders to adopt a new approach known as “the entanglement theory.” This involved using sabotage to force Israel to adopt an offensive position, which in turn would force the Arabs to step up their military preparedness. This cycle of action-retaliation-reaction would lead to a gradual escalation of tension on the borders, and eventually to the Six Day War in 1967.

In 1965, 35 terrorist raids were conducted against Israel. In 1966, the number increased to 41. In just the first four months of 1967, 37 attacks were launched.

The number of dangerous incidents on the Syrian border increased following Israel?s activation of the National Water Carrier from the Sea of Galilee to the Negev in 1964. Syria and the other Arab countries opposed the National Water Carrier project and tried to destroy it by diverting the tributaries of the Jordan river located in their territories; Israel bombed the diversion works in response. This tension came against the backdrop of the on-going border clashes along the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria, as Syria resisted Israel’s attempts to increase use of the DMZ for Israeli agriculture. (The DMZ was the result of the terms of the Israel-Syria armistice signed on July 20, 1949.) Syria launched attacks on Israeli farmers cultivating land in the demilitarized zone and on Israeli fishing boats and other craft in the Sea of Galilee, shelling from the commanding Golan Heights that rise dramatically to the east of the border areas.

Military Provocation By Arab Countries and Soviet Disinformation

While Israel consistently expressed a desire to negotiate a peace with its neighbors, there was no matching sentiment on the Arab side. In an address to the UN General Assembly on October 10, 1960, Foreign Minister Golda Meir challenged Arab leaders to meet with Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to negotiate a peace settlement. Nasser (Egypt) answered on October 15, saying that Israel was trying to deceive world opinion, and reiterating that his country would never recognize the Jewish State. Nasser’s rhetoric became increasingly bellicose; on March 8, 1965 he said:

• We shall not enter Palestine with its soil covered in sand. We shall enter it with its soil saturated in blood.

A few months later, Nasser expressed the Arabs’ goal to be:

• … the full restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people. In other words, we aim at the destruction of the State of Israel. The immediate aim: perfection of Arab military might. The national aim: the eradication of Israel.

Other Arab leaders from Syria, Jordan, and Iraq joined in the rhetoric and preparations for war, increasing pressure on Egypt’s President Gamal Nasser, perceived as the leader of the Arab world. Syria’s attacks along the DMZ grew more frequent in 1965 and 1966. Syria’s attacks on Israeli kibbutzim from the Golan Heights provoked a retaliatory strike on April 7, 1967, during which Israeli planes shot down six Syrian MiGs. Israel followed up by re-introducing military forces to the DMZ.

At the same time, and unknown to the Israelis, the Soviet Union mounted a disinformation campaign pushing Egypt to join Syria against Israel. At that time, the Soviets were providing military and economic aid to both Syria and Egypt. On May 13, 1967 a Soviet parliamentary delegation visited Cairo and informed the Egyptian leaders that Israel had concentrated eleven to thirteen brigades along the Syrian border in preparation for an assault within a few days, with the intention of overthrowing the revolutionary Syrian Government. This was a complete fabrication designed by the Soviets to destabilize the Middle East. Similar false information may have been given to Egypt by the Soviets as early as May 2.

The build up and aggressive intent were denied by Israel. UN Secretary General U Thant reported that UNTSO observers on the Syrian border:

• … have verified the absence of troop concentrations and absence of noteworthy military movements on both sides of the [Syrian] line.

Nasser probably correctly interpreted the Soviet information as an indication to him that the time was ripe for an attack on Israel and that he had their backing. With the United States deeply distracted by the War in Vietnam, the Soviets had reason to think there would be no US intervention. Nassar then abandoned his former cautious policy and took the lead for new aggression against Israel. Syria and Iraq eagerly joined Egypt’s preparations, increasing the momentum toward war.

On May 15, Israel’s 19th Independence Day, Egyptian troops began moving into the Sinai and massing near the Israeli border. By May 18, Syrian troops were prepared for battle along the Golan Heights.

On May 16, Nassar requested the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force, stationed in the Sinai since 1956. Egyptian forces moved up to the UNEF lines and began to harrass the UN positions. Without bringing the matter to the attention of the General Assembly, as his predecessor had promised, Secretary-General U Thant complied with the demand. This was a direct violation of the conditions under which Israel had returned control of the Sinai to Egypt after the Sinai Campaign. TheUN force was supposed to safeguard Israel from Egypt again closing the Straits of Tiran or launching terrorist attacks from that quarter.

Blockade of the Straits of Tiran

In 1956, the United States gave Israel assurances that it recognized the Jewish State’s right of access to the Straits of Tiran. In 1957, at the UN, 17 maritime powers declared that Israel had a right to transit the Strait. Moreover, any blockade violated the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which was adopted by the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea on April 27, 1958. Nonetheless, on on the night of May 22-23, 1967 Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to all Israeli shipping and all ships bound for Eilat. This blockade cut off Israel’s only supply route with Asia and stopped the flow of oil from its main supplier, Iran.

Nasser was fully aware of the pressure he was exerting to force Israel’s hand. The day after the blockade was set up, he said defiantly:

• The Jews threaten to make war. I reply: Welcome! We are ready for war.

Final Blows Lead to War

There is evidence that Egypt was warned by the US and the Soviet Union in late May 1967 that war should be avoided, but by then the momentum to war was unstoppable.

King Hussein of Jordan signed a defense pact with Egypt on May 30, 1967, under which Jordan joined the Egyptian-Syrian military alliance of 1966 and placed its army on both sides of the Jordan river under Egyptian command. He had little choice since Jordan housed 700,000 Palestinian Arabs whose rioting in November 1966 almost brought down Hussein’s government. On June 4, Iraq joined the military alliance with Egypt, Jordan and Syria. President Abdur Rahman Aref of Iraq added these words to the mountain of provocation:

• The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is our opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948. Our goal is clear — to wipe Israel off the map.

Armed forces in the Arab countries were mobilized. Israel was confronted by an Arab force of some 465,000 troops, over 2,880 tanks and 810 aircraft. The armies of Kuwait, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq were contributing troops and arms to
the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian fronts.

Israeli forces had been on high alert during the three weeks of tension which began on May 15, 1967 when it became known that Egypt had concentrated large-scale forces in the Sinai peninsula, an alert status Israel could not maintain indefinitely. The country could not accept interdiction of its sea lane through the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel had no choice but preemptive action. To do this successfully, Israel had to achieve surprise, not wait for an Arab invasion, a potential catastrophic situation. On June 4, the Cabinet authorized the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence to decide on appropriate steps to defend the State of Israel.

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In the years following Israel’s independence in May 1948, 600,000 to 800,000 Jews from Arab North Africa and the Middle East (approximately as many as the number of Palestinian refugees who left Israel in 1948) arrived in the new state, as a direct result of official and popular anti-Semitic actions against them. Israel received them as returning countrymen, granted them citizenship and helped them begin new and productive lives. There is currently no visible sign of their being “refugees,” since they have long since been absorbed into Israeli society. Nevertheless, they still have substantial claims against those countries which forced them to flee, often penniless, and these must be addressed in any comprehensive resolution of the refugee problem.

Throughout Arab lands, 1948 Jewish populations have been decreased to next to nothing. To where did these Jewish refugees vanish? The majority went to Israel, often living in tent camps for up to 12 years, just as the Palestinian refugees. However, they got citizenship in Israel and did not remain permanent refugees.

Jewish refugees from Arab lands have received no compensation for expropriated property, while Arabs who lost property in Israel are eligible to file for compensation from Israel?s Custodian of Absentee Property.

In the wake of the War of Independence in 1948, when Israel was invaded by the armies of five of its Arab neighboring countries, 860,000 Jewish refugees fled from Arab countries to Israel, and, at about the same time, about 70% of the Arab population of Mandatory Palestine fled to Arab states from the portion of Palestine that is now Israel. The Arab exodus was almost entirely because of the actions of Arab leaders and not because of anything the Israeli Jews did. Estimates of the total number who left range from 540,000 to 720,000. Not all of those who fled their homes departed Mandatory Palestine itself. By some estimates, 45% of them simply crossed into the eastern sector of the country occupied by Jordan’s Arab Legion. Around 5% crossed the Jordan River and entered the Hashemite Kingdom itself. About 30%, who originally had encamped in the south, fled toward the Gaza area. Nearly 15% sought refuge in Lebanon, another 5% in Syria, with smaller groups traveling on to Iraq and Egypt — and later to the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms.

This population exchange mirrored far larger population movements following the end of World War II, which involved millions of Hindus and Muslims in India and Pakistan, as well as Poles, Germans and many other nationalities in Central and East Europe. These population exchanges were resolved through the integration of all refugees into the host states. While Israel absorbed the Jewish refugees, the Arab states refused to allow such resettlement and integration of their Palestinian brethren, preferring instead to exploit the Palestinian refugees to serve their own political agendas. Since there has been no integration of the refugees with the populations of the countries to which they fled, the current “refugees” are the children and mostly grandchildren of those who left Israel during the 1948 War of Independence.

In 1949, Israel offered to admit 100,000 Arab refugees, with the understanding that their repatriation would be linked to meaningful peace negotiations. Although 35,000 Arabs eventually returned under a family reunification plan, further implementation of the offer was suspended in the 1950′s, after it became clear that the Arab states steadfastly refused to consider Israel’s peace overtures, preferring instead to maintain a state of war with and economic boycott against Israel. In contrast, as a gesture of goodwill, Israel unilaterally released the frozen bank accounts and safe deposits of Arab refugees.

In 1973, Khaled al-’Azm, who served as Prime Minister of Syria in 1948 and 1949, published his memoirs in Beirut. He includes the following:

• We have brought destruction upon a million Arab refugees, by calling upon them and pleading with them to leave their lands, their homes, their work and their business, and we have caused them to be barren and unemployed though each one of them had been working and qualified in a trade from which he could make a living. In addition, we accustomed them to begging for hand-outs and to suffice with what little the UN organisation would allocate them.

Following the war, the Arab countries consistently refused to take steps necessary to improve the lives of the Palestinian refugees. In early 1950, the UN General Assembly established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, with a budget of $54 million. UNRWA was charged with the task of employing the Palestinians on projects in the Arab states in which they resided. It was an explicit expectation of the program that within 18 months most of these refugees would be as self-supporting as their Arab neighbors, and relief handouts could be ended. However, when UNRWA officials initiated talks with the Arab governments, they encountered an uncompromising refusal to cooperate with any plan designed for economic integration.

Arab leaders argued that Paragraph Eleven of General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 1948 guaranteed the refugees the right to return to their homes, and that they could not participate in any scheme that might compromise such a right. In fact, the Arab states themselves had voted unanimously against the resolution, since it envisaged peace negotiations with Israel. The refugee issue accordingly served as a useful obstacle to future discussions and as an effective lien on the world’s conscience. By the end of 1950, as a result, no more than 10,000 of the refugees were employed.

Throughout the 1950′s, UNRWA put forward additional plans to resettle and rehabilitate the Palestinian refugees. Like the earlier plan, these too were rejected by the Arab countries, individually and through the Arab League. By 1959, UNRWA was obliged to report that its rehabilitation fund, created in 1950 to provide homes and jobs for Palestinian refugees outside the camps, had been boycotted by the Arabs. The fund had set a goal of $250 million, but after three years only $7 million had been spent, and a further $28 million lay unused in the fund. Thereafter, a small part of the money was used on agricultural development; the rest of the money was used to augment UNRWA’s general reserves.

Some of the Palestinians were formulating their own solution by then. In 1952, UNRWA observed that a good number of the Arab refugees had recently found homes and livelihoods in neighboring countries, in Iraq and the Persian Gulf states. At least 280,000 refugees had established themselves in Jordan and, by their own efforts, had become an integral part of that country’s economy. For others, however, the situation was different.

In January 1951, the “Committee of Palestine Refugees” in Lebanon wrote the Arab League political committee, observing that a return to their homes was less than imminent for most of the Palestinians. Until a political solution could be found they could hardly be left to rot in Arab countries without decent food, shelter or means of providing a livelihood. The letter suggested that the Arab states should at least provide those refugees willing to settle outside Palestine with the opportunity to do so. Yet the single affirmative response to this appeal was King Abdullah’s decision to confer Jordanian citizenship on the 200,000-odd refugees of the West Bank. Of these, 100,000 found employment; the rest continued to live in camps on UNRWA’s dole.

By contrast, the refugees in Gaza were confined as virtual prisoners within the Strip. With the exception of perhaps 20,000 who managed to secure jobs in Iraq and the Persian Gulf area by 1951, they were denied employment or citizenship in Egypt itself.

As a result of this situation, UNRWA relief aid became a fixture in the lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. The “advantages” of refugee status were not unsubstantial. The refugees had access to health services. The incidence of sickness and death accordingly was lower among them than among the surrounding Arab populations. Some 45% of their children of school age received free education. While their rations were meager, they did not suffer from malnutrition. By the end of 1956, only 39% of registered refugees actually lived in UNRWA camps; yet nearly all of them drew UN rations. Israel, therefore, cannot be held solely responsible for the socio-economic problems of the Gaza refugees, which were created by deliberate Arab neglect before 1967.

In 1959, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold personally investigated the possibility of a comprehensive resettlement scheme in the Middle East. Such a scheme would, like the earlier recommendations of the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission, have been based on the general principle of resettling Arab refugees in Arab countries; as a result, it encountered Arab opposition and was dropped.

Since UNRWA’s inception, Arab countries have made totally inadequate contributions to its funding. UNRWA’s annual budget, and deficit
s, have been covered almost entirely by Western countries; Arab states have made only token contributions, amounting to about 5% of the total budget. As a major contributor to international relief funds and the United Nations, the UnitedStates has made up for a large share of Arab neglect of their own people.

Over the years, Arab governments have placed a higher priority on the destruction of Israel than on the welfare of the Palestinian refugees. They perceived it as their interest to keep the bitterness and anger of the Palestinian refugees alive. For decades, in fact, Arab leaders used the Palestinians’ misfortune to promote their efforts to undermine Israel, linking a return of refugees to Israel’s destruction. In an interview to the Cairo journal “Al-Masri” on 11 October 1949, Egyptian Foreign Minister Muhammad Salah A-Din said:

• In demanding the return of the Palestinian refugees, the Arabs mean their return as masters, not slaves; or, to put it quite clearly — the intention is the termination of Israel.

This motif was repeated in later years, with President Nasser of Egypt saying, in a 1965 speech, that:

• Our aim is to restore the national rights of the Palestinian people, namely to destroy Israel.

The refugee issue remains unsolved. Arab governments have made no attempt to assist their own people to resettle or integrate with their host countries, in marked contrast to the outcome for the Jewish refugees in Israel or, indeed, refugees in every other world trouble spot. Only the Palestinians remain refugees because only the Palestinians have been enslaved to the Arab political agenda against Israel. This exploitation of the PalestinianArab refugees by huge and wealthy Arab countries happened in the same time period as tiny Israel absorbed millions of Jewish immigrants who fled persecution in Arab countries and from Nazi or Soviet Europe.

By 2002, many of the refugee camps were still in operation and the inhabitants were still being politically manipulated by radical Palestinian Arabs. During Israel’s Operation Defensive Shield the camps were entered by the Israeli military and were found to be centers of terrorist activity with bomb factories, illegal arms caches, and schools for terrorist fighters.

History of Settlements

Kiryat Arba, near Hebron

As documented on the page titled, “Why did Israel begin to move Jewish people into areas captured in the Six Day War?“, Jews have lived in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and the Gaza Strip throughout recorded history, until the 1948 War of Independence, when they were forced to flee the invading Arab armies.

In Hebron, the Jewish community existed throughout the centuries of Ottoman rule, until the massacre during the Arab rioting of 1929. Such settlements as Neve Ya’acov and the Gush Etsion block were established under the British Mandatory Administration, which allowed Jewish settlement in these areas. Even though British Mandate Authorities, particularly in the latter period of the Mandate, were not sympathetic to the Zionist cause, they nevertheless permitted the establishment of Jewish settlements in all areas west of the Jordan River, implementing the League of Nations Mandate. In fact,the Mandate called for Jewish settlement in all of the areas under British control including the almost 80% of the Mandate land that the British gave to create Trans-Jordan and prohibited Jewish settlement there.

Why has Israel continued to expand settlements? Is this an obstacle to peace?

Israeli settlements in the so-called “occupied territories” are there for multiple reasons, including:

• The land is disputed. Both Arabs and Jews have claims and since there was no other sovereign authority, Israel, representing the Palestinian Jews, had as much right to settle people there as the Palestinian Arabs. The last internationally recognized sovereign was the Ottoman Empire, a distant and oppressive ruler. Israel captured the West Bank land from Jordan that had overrun the land in 1948 when it had just emerged from the British Mandate. Gaza was captured from Egypt who had overrun it in 1948. There never was a Palestine or other country that Israel invaded and “stole the land”
• There had been Jewish communities and dwellers in the West Bank long before 1967 or even 1948. In, for example, Hebron and Gush Etzion, both sites of massacres by Arabs in which large numbers of Jews were killed. Kfar Etzion and other villages in the Jerusalem-Bethlehem corridor, fell to Arab forces in May 1948 and those captured were massacred. Sons and daughters of Jews who lived there until 1948 were the first to return after the 1967 war. Why prohibit former residents or their families from returning?
• The land belonged to Jews. Near Jerusalem, for example, Palestinians describe Gilo as a neighborhood built on “West Bank land annexed to Jerusalem” that they consider an “illegal Jewish settlement”. Suddenly Gilo, an integral part of Jerusalem proper for years, seems subject to negotiation, at least in the public mind. As to the “illegality” of Gilo, the vacant land in the Gilo area was purchased, before World War II, by a group of young Jewish lawyers, including Dov Yosef, who later became one of David Ben Gurion’s most important advisors and government ministers. When the land was taken back from the Jordanians in 1967, it was returned to its owners.
• The so-called West Bank, according to the Bible and tradition, represents the cradle of Jewish civilization, and some Jews, driven by faith and history, wanted to reassert that link. The area was called Judea and Samaria, its name in the Bible, up until 1950 when Jordan, an Arab country created arbitrarily by the British out of 77% of the Mandate for Palestine, annexed it and called it the West Bank
• The Israeli government believed that certain settlements could serve a useful security purpose as a buffer against future attacks like the ones in 1948, 1967, 1973
• Some Israeli officials felt that building settlements, and thus creating facts on the ground, might hasten the day when the Palestinian Arabs, presumably realizing that time was not on their side, would talk peace

In most parts of the world it is not considered a disaster if someone new comes to town and buys a farm or a dwelling. Only in Arab parts of the Middle East is it an unacceptable affront for a Jew to arrive with plans to stay. And “world opinion” only accepts this sort of behavior when it is the Jew who is being rejected. If a black person is denied the right to buy a house in the community of his choice, it is considered racial discrimination. If a Catholic can’t move into a Protestant neighborhood it is religious discrimination. And Americans, including Jews, are very careful to avoid any appearance of discrimination against Muslims. But if a Jew wants to buy a place to live in the West Bank, it is considered a brutal Israeli invasion. Mitchell Bard writes:

• It would certainly be called racist if Jews were barred from living in New York, Paris or London; barring them from living in the West Bank, the cradle of Jewish civilization, would be no less objectionable.

And Eugene Rostow, former Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs wrote:

• The Jewish right of settlement in the area is equivalent in every way to the right of the local population to live there.

By violently rejecting Jewish settlement, the Palestinian Arabs are exhibiting behavior which is unacceptable, even dispised in the civilized world. In this they echo most other Muslim countries that have a prohibition on Jews living there, where land transfers to a Jew can carry the death penalty. These practices should be universally condemned and rejected. Arabs insist it is unacceptable for a few hundred thousand Jews to live among millions of Arabs while Israel’s Arab citizens are almost 20% of Israel’s population.

The Israeli government did not move to prohibit settlement (which would have required new laws) and, in fact, offered financial incentives to Jews to move to the territories. But these settlement communities did not exploit any Arab ownership or displace any Arab community or farm. The Jewish settlements have been established only on:

• Land in pre-existing Jewish communities, or
• Land that was unowned (that is, was previously controlled by Jordan and had no private owner), or
• Land purchased from established owners.

The propagandistic idea of Palestinian Arabs being “forced out” is not the case. Much land was still empty or underutilized. Many Jews bought the land or dwelling they moved to. When public land was involved, Israeli settlements were established only after an exhaustive investigation process, under the supervision of the Supreme Court of Israel, designed to ensure that no communities were established on private Arab land.

A segment of a 1994 documentary “Road to Palestine” (Discovery Channel) focuses on the case of Mohammed Khatib, an Arab whose land was allegedly stolen by Israel for a “settlement” near Jerusalem. In fact, the land was taken by eminent domain for the development project, mostly from Jewish owners, several of them wealthy and prominent. The show emphasizes Khatib’s claim to his land, implying the Israelis had disputed it and seized his property, but nothing of the so
rt occurred. His claims were valid and were the basis of compensation, same as his Jewish neighbors.

Since 1967, Israeli governments have maintained a willingness to withdraw from areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in a peace agreement with the Arabs, within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 242. In such a case, it was commonly expected that at least some of the settlements would have to be uprooted, just as the Israeli town of Yamit was dismantled following Israel’s 1979 peace agreement with Egypt. At Camp David in July 2000, Ehud Barak reportedly offered to uproot all Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and the isolated settlements on up to 95 percent of the territory of the West Bank, as part of a final status agreement. The Palestinian Arabs rejected this offer.

Aren’t the Settlements Illegal?

The settlements are not “illegal” as sometimes charged. The Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply to settlements even though you will often hear the claim that it does. Israel took over the land in a defensive war in 1967 from rulers (Jordan, Egypt) who themselves had recently acquired control of the land by aggressive war. The only internationally recognized agreements are those of the Oslo process which do not in any sentence prohibit settlements. At some points in time Israel has voluntarily agreed to a temporary halt to new settlements in anticipation of negotiating breakthroughs. But the repeated reversion to terrorism by the Palestinian Arabs has ended such restraint. The endlessly repeated refrain about “occupied territories” is propaganda, since a) the territories never belonged to Palestinian Arabs, b) the Palestinian Authority was given control of the areas, and c) the only reason Israel continues to exert control is in reaction to Palestinian Arab violence.

The United Nations has frequently addressed the question of Israel’s policies and activity of Israelis in the territories, starting with Resolution 242, passed right after the 1967 war. That Resolution seeks a just resolution of the conflict and calls for withdrawal and mutual recognition, but it says nothing about legality. Resolution 338, passed after the 1973 Yom Kippur war, requires Israel and the Arabs to negotiate peace. By insisting that the Palestinians negotiate with Isreal, the Security Council Resolution implicitly agrees that the occupation itself does not violate international law. Later Security Council resolutions – numbered 446, 452 and465 – do indeed condemn Israel’s policy of buildingsettlements in the occupied territories and declare thatthese settlements have “no legal validity.” However, these are political statements reflecting the balance of power in the UN and not a reasoned legal analysis. The Resolutions are not binding on Israel and do not of themselves create illegality.

At Camp David in 2000 and Taba in 2001 Israeli Prime Minister Barak offered to redeploy and uproot settlements from up to 95 percent of the West Bank and 100 percent of the Gaza Strip. Settlements in the remaining 5 percent of the West Bank ?? where the majority (about 70%) of the settler population lives ??are just over the arbitrary Green Line from Israeli cities and would be annexed to Israel and other land given in exchange. These were serious Israeli offers — when Israel made peace with Egypt, settlements in the Sinai were dismantled. If settlements are the “real problem” then why was this offer unacceptable?

It would be very hard to find documented cases of actual exploitation of Palestinian Arabs in order to establish Jewish settlements, notwithstanding the tsunami of allegations. That is not to claim everyone is happy about everything that happened, but that is different from a cause that requires bloody violence and death. Eminent Domain cases, for example, cause hard feelings and local political fights in the United States and other countries all the time, but they are settled in courts or by elections. If unfair settlement practices by Israelis could be documented, then compenastion or other arrangements could have long since been disposed of by negotiation. Only insane fanatics resort to violence — in a country with a real government, they are quickly suppressed.

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The internationally-recognized border between Lebanon and Israel is based on the boundary line between Palestine, Syria and Lebanon surveyed by Britain and France in 1923. This same border was established as the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement signed on March 23, 1949 at the end of the War of Independence. Until 1978, neither Lebanon nor Israel occupied any territory in violation of this demarcation line.

When Israeli forces invaded southern Lebanon in 1978, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 425, which called upon Israel to “withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory” and established the UN Interim Force in Lebanon [UNIFIL] “for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces.” The official position of the UN has always been that Resolution 425 required Israeli forces to withdraw to the pre-1978 line of separation, that is, to the 1949 ADL.

Until 1999, Lebanon endorsed this position; the 1949 ADL was considered the border and Resolution 425 meant withdrawal across that line. Lebanese tenant-farmers were allowed to cross the border to work the fields south of it, considered to be in Israel. But in late 1999, Lebanon, under pressure from Syria, began to make territorial claims to villages in the Shaaba Frams area, south of the 1949 ADL.

When UN surveyors marked the Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel in the summer of 2000 after Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, they determined that the Shaaba Farms villages were on the Israeli side, that is, on land that will be the subject of peace negotiations between Israel and Syria at some time in the future.

Since Israel’s withdrawal, Hezbollah has kept the dispute over Shaaba Farms boiling with assertions that they have evidence supporting Lebanese claims to the land. This gives them a pretext to attack Israel for holding land Hezbollah still considers to be part of Lebanon; that is, they claim Israel has not yet withdrawn from all of Lebanon.

But the United Nations agrees with Israel, as this quote from the Secretary General’s report makes clear:

• On 15 May 2000, the United Nations received a map, dated 1966, from the Government of Lebanon which reflected the Government’s position that these farmlands were located in Lebanon. However, the United Nations is in possession of 10 other maps issued after 1966 by various Lebanese government institutions, including the Ministry of Defence and the army, all of which place the farmlands inside the Syrian Arab Republic. The United Nations has also examined six maps issued by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, including three maps since 1966, which place the farmlands inside the Syrian Arab Republic.

Syria and Iran have provided support for Hezbollah in order to keep pressure on Israel and the United States. Recognizing this, Israel has chosen to respond to certain Hezbollah attacks on the IDF by attacking Syrian targets in Lebanon, among them a Syrian radar position in Dahar al-Bader, on the Damascus-Beirut Highway. This made it clear that it was within Israel’s capability to directly attack Hezbollah’s patron — Syria — when Israel is sufficiently provoked.

In March 2002, as Israel carried out its Operation Defensive Shield, Hezbollah increased its cross-border attacks from Lebanon as a “second front” supporting the Palestinian Arabs.

Israel obtains roughly 40 percent of its water from the Sea of Galilee and the Coastal Aquifer, both of which are entirely within Israel’s pre-1967 borders. Another 30 percent comes from the Western and Northeastern Aquifers of the Mountain Aquifer system. These two aquifers straddle the Green Line that separates Israel from the West Bank, but most of the stored water is under pre-1967 Israel, making it easily accessible only in Israel.

Agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs included discussion of water resources and responsibilities for them. Prior to the Oslo agreements, when Israel had full control of the West Bank, Israel’s policy was to ensure a safe supply of drinking water for all inhabitants, although some Palestinian Arab communities refused to be hooked up to the Israeli-built system for political reasons. Annex III, Article 40 of the Oslo II agreement stipulates an increase of water for Palestinian use and sets forth the details of measures each side is to take to achieve this increased water supply. Two-thirds of the increase was to be developed by the Palestinians, one-third by Israel.

After Oslo II, Israel moved expeditiously to fulfill its side of the water development, but the Palestinian Authority (PA) has severely neglected its obligations. In some locations, nothing was done. In other cases, Israel produced wells but the PA did not build the pipes to carry the water to Palestinian Arab consumers. The PA has not repaired antiquated and corroded pipes which cause significant water losses. In line with other corruption rampant in PA-controlled areas, there is considerable theft of water. Water trucks tap the resource illegally from water mains, then sell the water to thirsty customers.

In areas where the PA controls water for Jewish communities, in the vicinity of Hebron for example, there are frequent supply disruptions and shortages. Some of the water that is supplied is undrinkable. Wealthy Palestinians in Bethlehem, Hebron and Ramallah have private swimming pools and ample water supply, a fact that always escapes the notice of pro-Palestinian reporters.

In the 1950s Israel used 95 percent of the Western Aquifer’s water, and 82 percent of the Northeastern Aquifer’s water. By 1999 Israel’s share of those aquifers declined to 83 percent and 80 percent respectively. That is, under Israeli administration the Palestinian share of the aquifers increased. Another 40 MCM (million cubic meters) of water per year from sources within Israel is piped over the Green Line for Palestinian use and additional water is sent to Jordan. Ramallah, for example, receives over 5 MCM annually from Israeli sources. The Palestinians are using Israeli water, not the other way around.

There is a continuing, serious issue of water management in the region from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. With an increasing population in Israel and the Palestinian Arab areas, the future must include more intensive application of the most advanced methods of water conservation and use along with improvements in new technology such as advanced methods of desalination. The science and technology for this will have to come from the Israelis.

Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Brig. General Raful Eitan (1968)

The Arab states suffered a great loss of credibility following the June 1967 Six Day War when they lost badlyto the much smaller Israeli forces. This was especially true for Egypt which had to endure Israeli troops entrenched on the east bank of the Suez Canal. the The canal was closed to shipping, and Israel was occupying the Sinai, a large piece of Egyptian territory. Israel built the Bar Lev Line, strong fortifications along the Suez Canal defense line. In addition to hostilities with Egypt, the War of Attritionincluded attacks along all three fronts (Egypt, Syria/Lebanon and Jordan) ever since the June 1967 cease-fire. For example, terrorists continuously infiltrated into the Jordan Valley, leading to IDF helicopter-borne search operations.

Nasser responded by maintaining a constant state of military activity along the canal–the so-called War of Attrition, Various dates are given for the start of this war, but it reallybegan immediately after the cease fire of the Six Day war, in July of 1967. There was shellingand sniper fire along the Suez front continuously, with escalating activity which peaked from late1968 through August 1970. The period included a naval battle on October 21, 1967, when Egypt sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat, killing 47, with the first successful employment of antiship missiles with homing warheads.

Nassar was determined to test Israel’s ability and determination to hold onto its gains from the June 1967 Six Day War. Given the wide disparity in the populations of Israel and Egypt, Israel could not long tolerate trading casualties one-for-one with the Egyptians. Therefore, the Israeli government, led by Golda Meir, pursued a policy of “asymmetrical response”– retaliation on a scale far exceeding the individual attack.

On March 3, 1969, Egyptian President Gamal Abd El-Nasser announced that the ceasefire agreement with Israel was null and void. The Egyptians opened a heavy artillery barrage along the entire length of the Canal on March 8, 1969, in a well-planned and premeditated offensive. In April, the Egyptians advanced two SA-2 missile batteries to the Canal, limiting the IAF’s freedom of action in the skies. In early July of 1969, the IAF initiated a series of air battles against Egypt’s MiGs near the Suez. About 20 MiGs were shot down in these dogfights. From July 20th onwards, the IAF began a series of attacks against Egypt’s SAMs. The IAF carried out roughly 500 sorties against the SAMs, until – by late November – they had been crippled.

In an attempt to pressure the Egyptians to stop the fighting, the IAF began attacking strategic targets deep within Egypt. Between January and April 1970, 118 sorties were carried out against radar stations, SAMs and military camps in Egypt.

In March 1970 the Soviet Union began to install in Egypt SA-3 missile batteries manned by Soviet personnel. In April it became known that Soviet pilots were flying operational missions from air bases in Egypt. The heavy involvement ofthe Soviets in Egypt and the United States support of Israel increased the chance ofa super-power confrontation in the Middle East. To avoid this, the US became more active in attempting to reach a cease-fire agreement (See the Rogers Plan).

On August 7th 1970, Israel and Egypt accepted the American proposal, that led to a ninety-day cease-fire between the sides. But subsequent US efforts to negotiate an interim agreement to open the Suez Canal and achieve disengagement of forces were unsuccessful.

On August 7, 1970 the Soviets and Egyptians deployed sophisticated ground-to-air SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles in the restricted 32-mile-deep zone along the west bank of the Suez Canal,in a 78-mile band between the cities of Ismailia and Suez. This was a clear violation of the cease-fire agreement, which barred the introduction or construction of any military installations in this area.

According to Time magazine, US reconnaissance:

• …showed that the 36 SAM-2 missiles sneaked into the cease-fire zone constitute only the first line of the most massive anti-aircraft system ever created.

The Israeli death toll between June 15, 1967, and August 8, 1970, was 1,424 soldiers and more than 100 civilians. Another 2,000 soldiers and 700 civilians were wounded.Israel also lost 10 Israeli airmen killed and 15 combat aircraft.

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The Palestinian Authority (PA), rather than using its position to prevent violence and urge restraint, has allowed its official television and radio (the Voice of Palestine — VOP) to be used for the purposes of incitement, calling on its people to carry out violent attacks on Israeli citizens and soldiers. Although specifically prohibited by the Oslo accords and later agreements of the peace process, anti-Israel incitement, including the vilest anti-Semitic invective, has been chronic in the Palestinian Arab media. Bad as it was, it actually increased in intensity during the al-Aqsa intifada that started in September 2000, the VOP has been a constant source of anti-Israel invective and calls to action.

The prohibition was very specific. For example, the Oslo II Interim Agreement of September 1995 (Article XXII) states that Israel and the PA:

• … shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each other and, without derogating from the principle of freedom of expression, shall take legal measures to prevent such incitement by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction.

The examples of violations are uncountable; many can be seen in the references cited at the bottom of the page. A few samples of broadcasts carried by Voice of Palestine:

• I now see the walls of Jerusalem, the mosques of Jerusalem, the churches of Jerusalem. My brothers! With blood and with spirit we will redeem you, Palestine! Yes, with blood and with spirit we will redeem you, Palestine! [PA Chairman Yasser Arafat, April 28, 1997]
• We did not pay with the dear blood of thousands of martyrs so that the Israeli government could establish settlements on our land in the name of peace. We have sacrificed in the past and we will be ready to sacrifice again in the future for the sake of liberating our land and returning it to the bosom of the Palestinian nation and for the sake of establishing an independent Palestinian state whose capital is Jerusalem. [From statement by the PA cabinet, May 17, 1997]
• The Jews always set a trap for the community of Muslims? The Koran repeatedly warns against the traps and plots of the “people of the book”. They relentlessly scheme in all times and places and this is what they do today and tomorrow against the Muslim camp. [From the weekly Friday prayer sermon at Al-Aqsa mosque, October 24, 1997]
• Oh, Allah, destroy America for it is controlled by Zionist Jews…Allah will avenge, in the name of his Prophet, the colonialist settlers who are the descendants of monkeys and pigs…forgive us, oh Muhammad, for the acts of these monkeys and pigs who wished to profane your holiness. [From the weekly Friday prayer sermon by PA Mufti Ikrima Sabri, July 11, 1997]
• The occupation is shooting at children, women and infants? The latest reports reaching us from Hebron prove that the occupation forces have opened fire on children, women and infants. … our enemies have no mercy and no heart … this shows that they have no conscience. Their hearts are like stone. They are not human beings. One can not compare them to people. They are like animals, they are like animals. [From the daily news program, June 24, 1997]
• We are fighting and struggling with an enemy who is Shylock. We must know that he is Shylock. Statement by Othman Abu Gharbiya, PA Chairman Yasser Arafat?s Adviser on National Political Guidance. [From an interview, March 15, 1997]
• Whomever has occupied part of Palestine or Jerusalem faces jihad [holy war] until Judgment Day. Our destiny is jihad… [Sheikh Muhammad Hussein, in the weekly Friday prayer sermon at Al-Aksa Mosque, May 15, 1998]

An especially troubling aspect of the incitement is the appeal to children. The standard fare on the Voice of Palestine radio station is for programs to open with details of martyrs’ deaths and burials sandwiched between patriotic and Islamic songs with martial melodies. A particularly popular song on Voice of Palestine, also broadcast on PA television, features a father singing about his son as a martyr — the son being Mohammed Al-Dura. On March 3,1999 Senator Connie Mack of Florida gave a speech on the Senate floor during which he stood in front of a poster-size photograph of a scene from the Palestinian Authority television program, “The Children’s Club,” in which a child is shown saying:

• When I wander into the entrance of Jerusalem, I will turn into a suicide warrior in battle dress. In battle dress! In battle dress!

On April 30, 1999 the Voice of Palestine broadcast a religious sermon tellingMuslims that recognition of Israel’s right to exist is “forbidden byreligious law”, in violation of the most fundamental requirement of the Oslo peace process.

There are many reasons for the strong bond between the US and Israel, on many levels. The fundamental moral and philosphical basis for the support is explained very well in the article A Nation Like Ours: Why Americans stand with Israel by David Gelernter, referenced in the Sources section at the bottom of the page. On a practical level, the following sections review various dimensions of the US support.

Political Support

The US was the first country to recognize Israel, only minutes after it was officially created in 1948, consistent with a 1922 Congressional resolution backing the League of Nations mandate for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Since then, the two countries have developed a rock-solid friendship that does not depend on the parties in power either in Washington or Jerusalem. While there have certainly been ups and downs, the basic bond between the US and Israel, the only country in the Middle East that resembles the US in its values and democracy, is very strong. Both countries have long-recognized that their mutual interests of deterring war, promoting stability and eventually achieving peace are only possible if the United States continues to stand firmly behind Israel.

United Nations

In the United Nations, the United States did not cast its first veto until 1972, on a Syrian-Lebanese complaint against Israel. From 1967-72, the U.S. supported or abstained on 24 resolutions, most critical of Israel. From 1973-2000, the Security Council adopted approximately 90 resolutions on the Middle East, again, most critical of Israel. The U.S. vetoed a total of 33 resolutions and, hence, supported the Council’s criticism of Israel by its vote of support or by abstaining roughly two-thirds of the time. The United Nations has been generally hostile to Israel and often the US was her sole defender in the world body. Israel has returned the friendship by voting soldily with the US on virtually all issues.

Military Cooperation

US Government Photo

US Sec. of Defense Wm. Cohen escorts Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai at Pentagon, March 27, 1998

After Israel became an independent country in 1948, the United States joined an embargo on weapons sales to Israel, the 1949 Tripartite Agreement on weapons. Although the US sold hundreds of millions of dollars in weaponry to Arab states during the 1950s and early 1960s, there were no sales to Israel until 1962 when the US agreed to sell to Israel its first significant American system, the HAWK anti-aircraft missile.

American military involvement with Israel remained sporadic until the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Following an Egyptian refusal to accept a cease-fire and a Soviet military airlift to the Arab states, the Nixon Administration sent a United States airlift of weapons and supplies to Israel enabling her to recover from earlier setbacks. Starting on October 14, 1973 US Air Force “Operation Nickel Grass” flew resupply missions to Israel for a full month.

As a direct result of the Yom Kippur War, the United States quadrupled its foreign aid to Israel, and replaced France as Israel’s largest arms supplier. The doctrine of maintaining Israel’s “qualitative edge” over its neighbors was born in the war’s aftermath. This was based both on US appreciation of Israel’s role as a defender of Western values in a generally hostile region, and also on the Cold War calculus of opposing the Arab client states of the Soviet Union.

In the following decades, Israel and the US worked together to counter the greatest threats to American interests in the Middle East. These threats include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by rogue regimes; state-sponsored terrorism; the potential disruption of access to Middle East oil; and the spread of Islamic adicalism.

Cooperation has extended to programs for sharing cutting-edge technology and valuable intelligence; conducting joint military exercises; researching and developing new weapons; establishing joint anti-terrorism strategies; and pre-positioning materiel in Israel for use in the event the US ever needs to respond quickly to a future Middle East conflict.

In the 1990s, Israel and the US collaborated on a theater ballistic missile defense system, the ARROW, vital to Israel to defend against missile from nearby hostile Arab countries. Israel’s missile defenses were integrated with US capabilities, including enhanced interoperability and upgraded regional early warning systems.

Economic Cooperation

In 1951 the US provided the first aid to Israel, $65 million to help Israel take in Holocaust survivors and endangered Jews from Arab lands. Within 3 years, Israel’s 650,000 Jews absorbed 600,000 refugees from Europe and the Arab nations.

There has been economic aid to Israel every year since 1949, with the amounts fluctuating, generally increasing as the cooperation with Israel became closer or in years when Israel was forced to fight defensive wars or terrorism. From 1960 until 1985, there were no grants; aid consisted largely of loans, which Israel repaid, and surplus commodities, which Israel bought. The reference “U.S. Assistance to Israel” gives a table of annual amounts. The aid to other countries in the region has also increased and is similar in total amount. Much of the aid to Israel is for defense and the money is actually spent with U.S. suppliers so it recycles back to the United States.

Israel is one of the most technologically advanced countries in the world. Several binational programs allow American companies and universities to benefit from Israel?s expertise in agriculture and high technology, while others aim to break down barriers to trade and cooperation between the two countries to make collaboration easier. Israel was the first country to sign a free trade agreement with the US, which has resulted in a quintupling of trade between the two countries. The US-Israel Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has served as a model for other trade agreements including the October 2000 FTA between the US and Jordan.

For many years Israel received US financial and military assistance in a combined total of about $3 billion, divided into $1.2 billion in economic assistance and $1.8 billion in military aid. As the Israeli economy grew, and Soviet-era refugees were absorbed, the need for the aid package decreased. In recent years the economic aid has been reduced, while the military package has grown a little since the start of the al-Aqsa intifada.

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US State Department Telegram, May 14, 1948

Margaret Truman said it was the most difficult decision Harry Truman ever faced as president. Should he support the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, or shouldn’t he?

Presidential advisers and the government were split. Clark Clifford, Truman’s legal counsel, strongly favored recognition. The Jews deserved a sanctuary after the horror of the Holocaust, Clifford argued. Besides, the new state would likely come to pass whether Truman urged it or not.

But the Department of State, including the highly respected Secretary of State, George Marshall, advised against it, as did much of his cabinet. Truman greatly admired Marshall and had said, “there wasn’t a decoration big enough” to honor Marshall’s leadership during World War II. At a White House meeting on May 12, 1948, Marshall objected to quick US recognition of a Jewish homeland. It would look as if Truman was angling for Jewish votes, he said, and might endanger access to Arab oil. He went so far as to say that if Truman went ahead and recognized the new state, then Marshall would vote against him in the coming election.

Truman made his own decision. Two days later, May 14, 1948 Israel was born at the stroke of midnight, Jerusalem time. The United States announced its recognition of the new nation only 11 minutes later.

Danial Pipes, in reviewing Michael T. Benson’s book Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel makes these observations about Truman’s decision:

• Everyone knows that Harry Truman provided help to the Zionists because he could count votes, and there were few Arab votes in 1948. That, anyway, is the thesis developed by John Snetsinger in 1974 and since repeated ad nauseum. Well, it turns out not to be true. In a masterful and exciting presentation, Benson proves that Truman’s policies resulted not from nose-counting but from deeply-held beliefs. His pro-Israel outlook “was based primarily on humanitarian, moral, and sentimental grounds, many of which were an outgrowth of the president’s religious upbringing and his familiarity with the Bible.” Extensive research into Truman’s biography and earlier career shows his impressive consistency. Benson, of the University of Utah, establishes Truman as a studious child and deeply religious young man who, when he unexpectedly found himself in the Oval Office, lived faithfully by his precepts. In the case at hand, he expressed sympathy for Zionism as early as 1939 and reiterated his views many times subsequently.
• Truman’s determination had great importance; of the many momentous issues in his presidency, he personally involved himself most directly with what he called the “puzzle of Palestine.” In Benson’s words, these personal interventions against the entirety of the American foreign policy establishment “constantly rescued” the Jews from defeat. The author concludes that the standard account of Truman risking U.S. security interests for cheap political advantage is deeply unfair to this most moral and honorable of American presidents.

At the request of a number of members, the Security Council met in closed session on December 15, 1973, on the eve of the opening of the Geneva Peace Conference called by the United States and the Soviet Union. In an effort to ensure a United Nations role in the Conference, a draft Resolution 344, submitted by Australia, Austria, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan and Yugoslavia was adopted by 10 votes in favour, none against with four abstentions (France, USSR, United Kingdom, United States). China did not take part in the vote.

Resolution 344 confimed the connection between the Geneva Peace Conference andUN Security Council Resolution 338, and provided the UN’s

blessing and support for the conference.

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When it became clear that Israel was going to defeat the Arab armies that invadedIsrael and Israeli-held lands in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, the US and the Soviet Union asked the United Nations to intervene. A series of Security Council resolutions followed, calling for a cease-fire, negotiations and UN observers in an attempt,eventually successful, to stabilize the situation.

United States Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger flew to Moscow on October 20, 1973 and, together with the Soviet government, the United States proposed a cease-fire resolution to the United Nations. The Security Council met on October 21 at the urgent request of the US and the USSR. By 14 votes to none and no abstentions (China did not participate in the vote), the Council adopted UN Security Council Resolution 338. calling fora cease-fire, implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 (adopted afterthe 1967 Six Day War), and negotiations “aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East”.

The cease-fire did not take hold. With fighting in Egypt still going on, and Egypt losingground, Egypt asked for another meeting of the Security Council. The council held an urgent meeting on October 23, and UN Security Council Resolution 339, submitted jointly by the Soviet Union and the United States, was adopted with 14 votes for, none against and no abstentions (again, China did not participate in the voting). This brief resolution again called fora cease-fire and asked the Secretary General to dispatch observers.

On October 24. with skirmishes continuing, Israel and Egypt agreed to a new cease-fire call by the head of the United Nations Truce Observers to go into effect at 7:00AM local time. But firing continued along the southern sector of the Egyptian front. On that day Egypt lost 15 planes. The cease-fire finally went into effect at 5:00PM Israel time. The next day, October 25, the Security Council met again and adopted UN Security Council Resolution 340 setting up a United Nations Emergency Force for the Middle East, the second such force after the first was used following the Sinai Campaign in 1956.

In December 1973 the United States and the Soviet Union invited Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Israel to a peace conference in Geneva on the basis of the UN Security Council’s call for a “just and durable peace” in Resolution 338. In recognition and support of this effort, the UN Security Council adopted UN Security Council Resolution 344.

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At the request of a number of members, the Security Council met in closed session on December 15, 1973, on the eve of the opening of the Geneva Peace Conference called by the United States and the Soviet Union. In an effort to ensure a United Nations role in the Conference, a draft Resolution 344, submitted by Australia, Austria, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan and Yugoslavia was adopted by 10 votes in favour, none against with four abstentions (France, USSR, United Kingdom, United States). China did not take part in the vote.

Resolution 344 confimed the connection between the Geneva Peace Conference andUN Security Council Resolution 338, and provided the UN’s blessing and support for the conference.

In the later stages of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, after Israel repulsed the Syrian attack on the Golan Heights and established a bridgehead on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal, international efforts to stop the fighting were intensified. US Secretary of State Kissinger flew to Moscow on October 20, 1973 and, together with the Soviet government, the US proposed a cease-fire resolution in the UN Security Council. The Council met on October 21 at the urgent request of both the US and the USSR, and by 14 votes to none, adopted the resolution on October 22, 1973.

Resolution 338 is quite short and calls for:

• …all parties to the fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately…
• …all parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts.
• …immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned “aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East”.

A cease-fire was arranged with the efforts of Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, but the peace negotiations demanded by Resolution 338 would not begin for almost another decade.

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Following the June 1967 Six-Day War, the situation in the Middle East was discussed by the United Nations General Assembly, which referred the issue to the Security Council. After lengthy discussion, a final draft for a Security Council resolution was presented by the British Ambassador, Lord Caradon, on November 22, 1967. It was adopted on the same day. This resolution, numbered 242, established provisions and principles which, it was hoped, would lead to a solution of the conflict. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (UNSCR 242) became the cornerstone of Middle East diplomatic efforts in the coming decades.

Pro-Arab sources often claim that UNSCR 242 requires Israel to withdraw from the West Bank, Gaza, and other areas. This is not true. In summary, here is what UNSCR 242 actually means:

1. UNSCR 242 calls on all parties to the conflict to negotiate a solution
2. It anticipates that Israel will withdraw to secure borders (not specified in the resolution) in exchange for peace guarantees from the Arab parties

The Resolution was carefully worded to require that Israel withdraw from “territories” rather than “the territories.” This construction, leaving out “the,” was intentional, because it was not envisioned that Israel would withdraw from all the territories, thereby returning to the vulnerable pre-war borders. And any withdrawal would be such as to create “secure and recognized boundaries.”

How do we know this is what was intended by the resolution? There is a long record of public statements about how the resolution was negotiated and what was intended for it to accomplish.

In an article, referenced among the Sources at the bottom of the page, by Eugene V. Rostow (Distinguished Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, and former US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs), the intent is explained in considerable detail. Rostow was one of the US officials involved in drafting 242 so he knows first hand what was and was not intended. He states:

• Resolution 242, which as undersecretary of state for political affairs between 1966 and 1969 I helped produce, calls on the parties to make peace and allows Israel to administer the territories it occupied in 1967 until “a just and lasting peace in the Middle East” is achieved.

It was widely recognized that the balancing of the ideas of a territorial return with “secure and recognized boundaries” for Israel would mean that Israel would not be forced to withdraw from 100% of the land captured in the June 1967 war. There is a dispute between the British-American understanding of the wording of the resolution and the French understanding of the wording, but in the United Nations the binding version of any resolution is the version that is submitted to the voting body. In this case, the English version takes precedence over the French version.

Various other officials have commented on the negotiation of UNSCR 242 and how it relates to Israel’s position. The British UN Ambassador at the time, Lord Caradon, who introduced the resolution to the Council, has stated that:

• It would have been wrong to demand that Israel return to its positions of June 4, 1967, because those positions were undesirable and artificial. After all, they were just the places where the soldiers of each side happened to be on the day the fighting stopped in 1948. They were just armistice lines. That’s why we didn’t demand that the Israelis return to them.

The United States’ UN Ambassador at the time, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, has stated that:

• The notable omissions – which were not accidental – in regard to withdrawal are the words “the” or “all” and the “June 5, 1967 lines” … the resolution speaks of withdrawal from occupied territories without defining the extent of withdrawal. [This would encompass] less than a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territory, inasmuch as Israel’s prior frontiers had proved to be notably Insecure.

A detailed description by Goldberg of the negotiating process behind UNSCR 242 appears in “U.N. RESOLUTION 242: ORIGIN, MEANING, AND SIGNIFICANCE” in the Sources at the bottom of the page.

Max M. Kampelman, former counselor of the US State Department, said in a letter to The New York Times on April 8, 2002, referring to “territories recaptured from Jordan in 1967, territories that Jordan captured in its war against Israel in 1948-49“:

• The United States voted in favor of Resolution 242 only after insisting that “all” had no place in it. The United Nations instead referred to the need to arrive at “secure and recognized” boundaries.

No one realistically expects Israel to withdraw before its security is assured. UNSCR 242 emphatically does not put any preconditions on Israel (or the Palestinian Arabs for that matter). Israel is perfectly within its rights to remain in place until there is a negotiated peace agreement acceptable to Israel as well as to the Palestinian Arabs. Israel moved into the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas as part of a defensive war started by the Arab enemies of Israel. Israel does not have to move out of those areas unless and until there is a negotiated peace that offers Israel security guarantees that make it unnecessary to keep control of the areas. Every terrorist incident proves that the time to trust the Palestinian Arabs has not yet arrived.

Despite the very clear record on the purpose and meaning of UNSCR 242, misconceptions continue. For example, on January 23, 2001 the New York Times was forced to print this correction:

• An article yesterday about peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians referred incorrectly to United Nations resolutions on the conflict. While Security Council Resolution 242, passed after the 1967 Middle East War, calls for Israel to withdraw its armed forces “from territories occupied in the recent conflict,” no resolution calls for Israel to withdraw “to its pre-1967 borders.”

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In the long-running war between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs, the suggestion is often raised to interpose “neutral international observers” or “a UN force” to keep the peace between the parties. Israel has opposed such a move and takes a lot of heat from “world opinion” because of that opposition. The simplistic view is that such observers would defuse the situation and Israel must oppose them because Israel has something to hide.

In fact, Israel has opposed the presence of UN observers because past experience has shown that UN observers are ineffective and often biased against Israel. UN observers have been in Hebron since 1994 (the TIPH), in Lebanon since 1978 (UNIFIL), and in the Golan Heights since 1974 (UNDOF). In each location they have been unable or unwilling to stem the violence against Israel or bring pressure against the Arab parties violating agreements.

A UN Emergency Force was stationed in Sinai in the 1950s to serve as a buffer between Israel and Egypt. In 1967, in the prelude to the Six Day War, Egypt ordered them to leave, which they did, leaving the field open for Egypt’s threatened aggression.

In 2000 Hizbollah terrorists crossed the border from Lebanon to Israel and abducted soldiers from sovereign Israel. Not only did the UN presence not prevent the abduction but also it later emerged that the UN peacekeepers had important evidence that they withheld from Israel.

In addition to the ineffectiveness of observers, Israel also opposes the imposition of observers because UN involvement undermines the peace process. The peace process is based on the idea of direct negotiations between the parties. Whenever the UN attempts to impose solutions or passes resolutions of condemnation, to either side, they undermine direct negotiations. Add to that the fact that the UN has been heavily biased against Israel for decades and cannot be trusted with matters that are vital to Israel’s survival.

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The UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been stationed between Israel and Lebanon since 1978, but violence continues. Despite UNIFIL?s presence, PLO terrorists operating from southern Lebanon routinely carried out terrorist operations in northern Israel until 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon and eliminated the PLO. Subsequently, UNIFIL failed to interfere with or prevent Hezbollah from bombarding the residents of northern Israel with Katyusha rockets during Israel?s 20-year presence in the Southern Lebanon security zone. Israeli counterstrikes often caught UNIFIL in the middle and some UNIFIL personnel were killed or injured.

Even since Israel’s full withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, UNIFIL has made no effort to thwart attacks against Israelis by Hezbollah terrorists. On October 7, 2000 three IDF soldiers were abducted by Hesbollah near a UNIFIL position, an event that was witnessed by UNIFIL personnel who may have even been involved. They were abducted while patroling the southern (Israeli) side of the Israeli-Lebanese border. UNIFIL’s impartiality has been called into question since allegations have surfaced concerning the possible bribery of UNIFIL personnel facilitating the kidnapping and by the refusal of UN personnel to cooperate in the Israeli investigation of the kidnapping.

Several videotapes and numerous photographs were made at the time of the kidnapping event, and afterward when the vehicles used by Hezbollah were discovered abandoned. Israel demanded access to the tapes and photos but UNIFIL, and UN Headquarters in New York, denied their existence for over a year until forced to admit at least some of the materials were in UN possession. Only heavily edited versions were eventually turned over to Israel, indicating a cover-up was still operating in the matter, probably to protect UNIFIL personnel who were involved or who were negligent in their duties. An Indian member of UNIFIL gave an interview to an Israeli newspaper in which he said that four Indian members of UNIFIL helped Hezbollah carry out the abduction.

Israel continues to demand unedited tapes from the UN. Hezbollah issued a statement that they will treat the UN personnel as spies if the tape is turned over to Israel. The fate of the abducted soldiers (and others kidnapped by Hezbollah) remains unknown.

Up until the mid-1950s there was a relatively benign, if not overtly friendly, period in UN-Israel relations. The UN General Assembly passed the one-sided Resolution 194, calling for repatriating or compensating Palestinian refugees (not a “right of return”) while ignoring an equal or greater number of Jewish refugees from Arab countries. UN truce observers also seemed to have a blind spot for Arab violations. But all this was merely prolog to much more serious anti-Israel bias to come.

In the mid-1950s Israel was criticized for launching retaliatory strikes against Palestinian fedayeen bases in neighbouring Arab countries, while the UN was silent on the cross-border terrorist provocations. During the Sinai Campaign of 1956, a series of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions condemned Israeli “aggression” against Egypt, with no reference to Israeli complaints about Nasser’s closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, Egyptian support for and encouragement of Palestinian terrorist incursions into Israel, and the 1955 Egyptian-Soviet arms deal.

In the spring of 1967, UN Secretary-General U Thant’s hasty capitulation to Nasser’s demand for the withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) peacekeepers from the Sinai and Gaza fronts accelerated the precipitous slide toward the Six Day War. The subsequant failure of the UN to pressure the Arab states to negotiate with Israel based on UN Resolution 242 further eroded Israel’s faith in the world body as a viable source of stability and assistance.

Starting in the mid-1970s, an Arab-Soviet-Third World bloc joined to form what amounted to a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) lobby at the United Nations. The solidly anti-Israel Arab block was joined by the Soviet Block (opposing Israel as leverage against the US) and many smaller countries from Africa or elsewhere who were intimidated by Arab oil-power, were leaning toward the Soviets, or were anti-American as a reaction to their own colonial histories.

Since the UN Security Council was protected by the US veto power,it was in the General Assembly where these countries — nearly all dictatorships or autocracies — frequently voted together to pass resolutions attacking Israel and supporting the PLO. Sometimes this was directly related to issues with Israel itself, and sometimes Israel was a convenient proxy for a multitude of other agendas.

In 1974, when the UN General Assembly invited Yaser Arafat to address the body, and in 1975 granted the PLO “observer status”, the first time any non-nation was give such recognition or standing.

Even with this prelude, it was shocking when on November 10, 1975 the United Nations General Assembly adopted, by a vote of 72 to 35 (with 32 abstentions), its Resolution 3379, which states as its conclusion:

• Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.

The resolution also endorsed an August 1975 statement by the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries (Lima, Peru), that:

• …severely condemned Zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperalist ideology.

The resolution was adopted despite strong opposition by Israel’s supporters, most notably the United States delegation under the leadership of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then the United States Ambassador to the UN. Immediately after the adoption of Resolution 3379, Israeli Ambassador Chaim Herzog rose to denounce the resolution, and those who voted for its adoption. He expounded at length on the origin and meaning of Zionism. He said that Israel was not bound by the resolution and would not abide by it. He further pointed out the significance of the date, November 10th:

• This night, 37 years ago, has gone down in history as the Kristallnacht, or the Night of the Crystals. This was the night of 10 November 1938 when Hitler’s nazi stormtroopers launched a co-ordinated attack on the Jewish community in Germany, burnt the synagogues in all the cities and made bonfires in the streets, of the Holy Books and the Scrolls of the Holy Laws and the Bible. It was the night when Jewish homes were attacked and heads of families were taken away, many of them never to return. It was the night when the windows of all Jewish businesses and stores were smashed, covering the streets in the cities of Germany with a film of broken glass which dissolved into millions of crystals, giving that night the name of Kristallnacht, the Night of the Crystals. It was the night which led eventually to the crematoria and the gaschambers, to Auschwitz, Birkenau, Dachau, Buchenwald, Theresienstadt, and others. It was the night which led to the most terrifying holocaust in the history of man.

In the early 1990′s as hope rose for a negotiated peace in the Middle East, the fight against Resolution 3379 intensified. Israel could not be expected to have any confidence in the United Nations until the stain of 3379 was removed. On September 23, 1991, in a speech given by President George H.W. Bush before the General Assembly of the United Nationshe stated:

• …to equate Zionism with the intolerable sin of racism is to twist history and forget the terrible plight of Jews in World War II and indeed throughout history.

Israel made revocation of the infamous resolution a condition of Israel’s participation in the Madrid Peace Conference in progress in the last quarter of 1991. The culmination of the long struggle came on December 16, 1991 when the UN General Assembly finally revoked Resolution 3379, with a vote of 111 to 25 (with 13 abstentions).

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The third session of the General Assembly refused to accept any decision altering the Partition Resolution of the preceding year, nor did it decide on ways of its implementation. Instead, on November 12, 1948, with Resolution 194 (III)it decided to set up a United Nations Conciliation Commission, reiterated the decision on internationalization of Jerusalem, and laid down several principles on the refugee question.

Since the War of Independence was still going on, most of Resolution 194 deals with seeking a diplomatic solution to the conflict, including setting up an international Conciliation Commission to mediate between the parties. The refugees are mentioned only in Article 11, which resolved:

• … that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.

Article 11 also instructed the Conciliation Commission:

• … to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation.

Palestinian Arabs constantly repeat claims of rights based on Resolution 194, in particular the right to return to lands that are now part of the State of Israel. That position has no basis, certainly not in Resolution 194. General Assembly resolutions, unlike those of the Security Council, are non-binding and essentially are only suggestions. Resolution 194 does not use the language of “rights” or “right of return”. The resolution does not specify the nationality of the refugees; recall that the Palestinian Arab refugees, who voluntarily leftIsrael at the urging of their leaders, are approximately equal in number to the Jews who fled persecution from Arab countries. Any “right of return” or right to compensation is equally present in Resolution 194 for Arabs and Jews. Since the resolution also specifies that its recommendations would apply to refugees who wish “to live at peace with their neighbors,” Arabs would be excluded. It was the Arabs who began the war in 1947 and they continue to be at war with Israel today.

The present-day insistance on a “Right of Return” by Palestinians is a transparent attempt to eliminate Israel by means other than war. If all the refugee Palestinian Arabs, and their descendents, are given the right to return to Israel, then Israel quickly becomes a country with a Jewish minority. The majority Arabs would put an end to Israel without delay. Therefore, any ultimate resolution of this issue will certainly be in terms of limited return (perhaps limited to the few living Arabs who actually once resided in Israel) plus a forumula of compensation for both Arabs and Jews who were displaced by events surrounding the 1948 War of Independence.

The third session of the General Assembly refused to accept any decision altering the Partition Resolution of the preceding year, nor did it decide on ways of its implementation. Instead, on November 12, 1948, with Resolution 194 (III)it decided to set up a United Nations Conciliation Commission, reiterated the decision on internationalization of Jerusalem, and laid down several principles on the refugee question.

Since the War of Independence was still going on, most of Resolution 194 deals with seeking a diplomatic solution to the conflict, including setting up an international Conciliation Commission to mediate between the parties. The refugees are mentioned only in Article 11, which resolved:

• … that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.

Article 11 also instructed the Conciliation Commission:

• … to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation.

Palestinian Arabs constantly repeat claims of rights based on Resolution 194, in particular the right to return to lands that are now part of the State of Israel. That position has no basis, certainly not in Resolution 194. General Assembly resolutions, unlike those of the Security Council, are non-binding and essentially are only suggestions. Resolution 194 does not use the language of “rights” or “right of return”. The resolution does not specify the nationality of the refugees; recall that the Palestinian Arab refugees, who voluntarily leftIsrael at the urging of their leaders, are approximately equal in number to the Jews who fled persecution from Arab countries. Any “right of return” or right to compensation is equally present in Resolution 194 for Arabs and Jews. Since the resolution also specifies that its recommendations would apply to refugees who wish “to live at peace with their neighbors,” Arabs would be excluded. It was the Arabs who began the war in 1947 and they continue to be at war with Israel today.

The present-day insistance on a “Right of Return” by Palestinians is a transparent attempt to eliminate Israel by means other than war. If all the refugee Palestinian Arabs, and their descendents, are given the right to return to Israel, then Israel quickly becomes a country with a Jewish minority. The majority Arabs would put an end to Israel without delay. Therefore, any ultimate resolution of this issue will certainly be in terms of limited return (perhaps limited to the few living Arabs who actually once resided in Israel) plus a forumula of compensation for both Arabs and Jews who were displaced by events surrounding the 1948 War of Independence.

The International Conference on the Question of Palestine took place at the United Nations Office in Geneva from August 29 to September 7, 1983. It was attended by representatives of 137 States -117 as full participants and 20 as observers – as well as by the PLO. This initiative did not receive the support of all parties: Israel, the United States and some other countries expressed their opposition to the holding of the Conference. In general, this conference reflected the anti-Israel bias that infected the United Nations soon after Israel was founded.

The Conference adopted by acclamation a Declaration on Palestine, and approved a Program of Action for the Achievement of Palestinian Rights. The Conference considered it essential that an international peace conference on the Middle East be convened under United Nations auspices, with participation on an equal footing of all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the PLO.

Later in 1983, the General Assembly endorsed the Declaration and welcomed the Geneva Conference’s call for an international peace conference on the Middle East. Throughout the 1980s, the Assembly reaffirmed the call for convening the proposed conference. After politically motivated changes in the PLO’s position were announced by Yasser Arafat in 1988, and a peace plan fielded by Israel in 1989, a peace conference did eventually take place at Madrid in 1991.

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Dr. Gunnar Jarring, Sweden’s Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was appointed by the United Nations to work with Israel and the Arab states to try toimplement UN Security Council Resolution 242. This was a strange appointment because Jarring remained Ambassador to the Soviet Union, a country which had broken off its diplomatic relations with Israel, making it difficult or impossible for Jarringto do anything that might be viewed as favorable to Israel. Jarring met with parties in the Middle Eastin early 1968, but the Arab states refused direct or even indirect contact with Israeland Jarring was not the man to challenge them.

The failure of the Jarring Mission led the United States to create its ownapproach to Middle East peace, the Rogers Plan.

The Yom Kippur War in October 1973 ended with a cease-fire between Israel and Syria, but tension remained high, and from March 1974 the situation became increasingly unstable. Against this background, the United States undertook a diplomatic initiative, which resulted in the conclusion of an Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces. The Agreement provided for an area of separation and for two equal zones of limited forces and armaments on both sides of the area, and called for the establishment of a United Nations observer force to supervise its implementation. The Agreement was signed on May 31, 1974 and, on the same day, the Security Council adopted Resolution 350 by which it set up the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).

UNDOF is entirely deployed within and close to the area of separation, with two base camps, 44 permanently manned positions and 11 observation posts. The headquarters of UNDOF is located at Camp Faouar and an office is maintained at Damascus. In addition, the Force operates patrols by day and night.

As of May 31, 1999, UNDOF consisted of 1,029 troops; assisted by some 80 UN military observers, and supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff. Austria, Canada, Japan, Poland, Slovak Republic contributed troops to the force, which suffered 39 fatalities through the end of 1998.

UNDOF continues to assist the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with facilities for mail and the passage of persons through the area of separation. Within the means available, medical treatment is provided to the local population on request. The situation in the Israel-Syria sector has remained quiet. Both parties cooperate fully with the mission and for a number of years there have been no serious incidents.

The British underwent a change of heart about the establishment of the Palestine Mandate. The reasons were related to political developments that had taken place in the region between 1920 and 1922. The result was that Abdullah, an Arab from the Hejaz (now Saudi Arabia), was abruptly installed as the Emir of Transjordan by the British. In a British memorandum presented to the League of Nations on 16 September 1922, it was declared that the provisions of the Mandate document calling for the establishment of a Jewish national home were not applicable to the territory known as Transjordan (today called Jordan),thereby severing almost 80% of the Mandate land from any possible Jewish Homeland.

The world seems to have plunged into historical amnesia about this. Most people somehow forgot that Arab claims towards Palestine were already satisfied once. It is the Jews and not the Arabs who suffered from the “game” that was played between the Great Powers after World War I. International lawyer David Fromkin described these events in his book A Peace To End All Peace. Fromkin wrote:

• Britain feared that if Arabs from the territory of British Palestine were to attack the French in Syria, France would retaliate by invading British Palestine.

Thus, Winston Churchill opted for a “Hashemite solution.” He decided to “buy off [Prince] Abdullah: to offer him a position in Transjordan.” Churchill brought a memorandum to the March, 1921 Cairo Conference, which envisaged:

• … establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine west of the Jordan and a separate Arab entity in Palestine east of the Jordan. Abdullah, if installed in authority in Transjordan, could preside over the creation of such an Arab entity.

Churchill disregarded important objections that “since Transjordan had been included by the League of Nations in the territory of [mandated] Palestine, it was not open to Britain unilaterally to separate it from the rest of Palestine.” In order to silence Churchill’s opponents, Britain accepted a “compromise concept of Transjordan: while preserving the Arab character of area and administration to treat it as an Arab province or adjunct of Palestine.”

It is important to indicate that the British Colonial Office regarded “the administrative separation of Transjordan as a merely provisional measure. It [was] decided not to allow Zionism in Transjordan for the present but also not to bar the door against it for all time.” As it often happens, the temporary arrangement “hardened into an enduring political reality and the Arabian prince became a permanent factor of the Palestine Mandatory regime.”

Therefore, 76% of the country was given “to an Arab dynasty that was not Palestinian. The newly created province of Transjordan, later to become the independent state of Jordan, gradually drifted into existence as an entity separate from the rest of Palestine; indeed, today it is often forgotten that Jordan was ever part of Palestine.”

From the moment of its creation, Transjordan was closed to all Jewish migration and settlement, a clear betrayal of the British promise in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and a patent contravention of its Mandatory obligations. Britain continued in its role as Mandatory over the whole of the area of the Mandate from 1922, but Jewish hopes of reconstituting the Jewish National Home were thereafter to be limited within the 23% of Palestine west of the Jordan River, an area that includes whatis today called the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The League of Nations was dissolved after the conclusion of World War II with the terms of the Mandate still uncompleted, and a new body, the United Nations,was founded on June 26, 1945. Article 80 was specifically placed in the UN Charter to cover Mandates for places like Palestine where the purposes of those Mandates still remained uncompleted at the time of the demise of the League of Nations. Article 80 made it clear that the rights created by the Mandate and the terms of the Mandate were not to be affected.

Palestine continued to be administered by Great Britain under the Mandate until 1946 when Transjordan was granted independence. In one fell swoop, sovereignty in 77% of Palestine had been awarded to the Arabs. On November 29, 1947, the United Nations recommended that both a Jewish State and an Arab State be created in the remainder of the Mandated territory west of the Jordan River, and that Jerusalem be internationalised. Eventhough this was dramatically favorable to the Arabs and punative to the Zionist Jews, the Jews accepted the proposal. The Arabs rejected it.

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Gen. Allenby in Jerusalem, 1917

On December 9, 1917, as World War I neared its end, Jerusalem surrendered to the British forces. Two days later General Allenby entered the Jaffa Gate on foot, at the head of a victory procession. This act marked the end of four centuries of Ottoman-Turk rule and the beginning of thirty years of British rule.

The mandate system was established by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations as formulated at the Paris Peace Conference (January-June 1919). Under this article it was stated that the territories inhabited by peoples unable to stand by themselves would be entrusted to advanced nations until such time as the local population could handle their own affairs. This concept was incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919.

Representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, and Belgium met at San Remo, Italy, in April 1920, to discuss methods of executing the Treaty of Versailles. Members of the supreme council of the Allies took leading parts. The basic features of a peace treaty with Turkey (the Treaty of S?vres) were adopted, and mandates in the Middle East were allotted.

In the case of Palestine, the administrative control, in the form of a Mandate, was given to the British. By naming this territory the “British Mandate for Palestine” the area that is today Israel and Jordan became the first and only geographic division with the name Palestine since before the Ottoman Empire controlled the area (beginning in 1517). In July 1920 the Mandate civil administration took over from the military. For the first time since Crusader days Jerusalem was again a capital city.

The terms of the British Mandate incorporated the languageof the Balfour Declaration and were approved by the League of Nations Council on July 24, 1922, although they were technically not official until September 29, 1923. The United States was not a member of the League of Nations, but a joint resolution of the United States Congress on June 30, 1922, endorsed the concept of the Jewish National Home.

Like the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate recognized the “historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine,” called upon the mandatory power to “secure establishment of the Jewish National Home,” with “an appropriate Jewish agency” to be set up for advice and cooperation to that end. The World Zionist Organization, which was specifically recognized as the appropriate vehicle, formally established the Jewish Agency in 1929. Jewish immigration was to be facilitated, while ensuring that the “rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced.” English, Arabic, and Hebrew were all to be official languages.

In March 1921, Winston Churchill, then British colonial secretary, convened a high-level conference in Cairo to consider Middle East policy. As a result of these deliberations, Britain subdivided the Palestine Mandate along the Jordan River-Gulf of Aqaba line. The eastern portion–called Transjordan–was to have a separate Arab administration operating under the general supervision of the commissioner for Palestine, with Abdullah appointed as emir. At a follow-up meeting in Jerusalem with Churchill, High Commissioner Herbert Samuel, and Lawrence, Abdullah agreed to abandon his Syrian project in return for the emirate and a substantial British subsidy.

A British government memorandum in September 1922 (“The Churchill White Paper”), approved by the League of Nations Council, specifically excluded Jewish settlement from the Transjordan area of the Palestine Mandate. The whole process was aimed at satisfying wartime pledges made to the Arabs and at carrying out British responsibilities under the Mandate. Unfortunately for the Zionists and counter to the whole expressed purpose of the Mandate in the first place, by this action more than three-quarters of the territory of the British Mandate was taken away from the potential Jewish Homeland without any corresponding action favoring the Palestinian Jews. The squeeky Arab wheel was greased with concessions at the sole expense of the Jewish population.

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The British pledge that formally committed the British to the Zionist cause, was the Balfour Declaration of November 1917, an instrument created after the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence and the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

Before the emergence of David Lloyd George as prime minister and Arthur James Balfour as foreign secretary in December 1916, the Liberal Herbert Asquith government had viewed a Jewish entity in Palestine as detrimental to British strategic aims in the Middle East. Lloyd George and his Tory supporters, however, saw British control over Palestine as much more attractive than the proposed British-French condominium. Since the time of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Palestine had taken on increased strategic importance because of its proximity to the Suez Canal, where the British garrison had increased to 300,000 men, and because of a planned British attack on Ottoman Syria originating from Egypt. Lloyd George was determined, as early as March 1917, that Palestine should become British and that he would rely on its conquest by British troops to obtain the abrogation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

In the new British strategic thinking, the Zionists appeared as a potential ally capable of safeguarding British imperial interests in the region. Furthermore, as British war prospects dimmed throughout 1917, the War Cabinet calculated that supporting a Jewish entity in Palestine would mobilize America’s influential Jewish community to support United States intervention in the war and sway the large number of Jewish Bolsheviks who participated in the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution to keep Russia in the war. Fears were also voiced in the Foreign Office that if Britain did not come out in favor of a Jewish entity in Palestine the Germans would preempt them. Finally, both Lloyd George and Balfour were devout Christians who attached great religious significance to the proposed reinstatement of the Jews in their ancient homeland.

The negotiations for a Jewish entity were carried out by Chiam Weizmann, who greatly impressed Balfour and maintained important links with the British media. In support of the Zionist cause, his protracted and skillful negotiations with the Foreign Office were climaxed on November 2, 1917, by the letter from the foreign secretary to Lord Rothschild, which became known as the Balfour Declaration. This document declared the British government’s “sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations,” viewed with favor “the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People,” and announced an intent to facilitate the achievement of this objective. The letter added the provision of “it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”

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Several UN committees and divisions of the Secretariat, which primarily serve the interests of the Arab nations that encouraged their creation in the 1970s, are also extremely critical of Israel. Among these are the Division for Palestinian Rights in the Secretariat, the The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices in the Occupied Territories, and the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

Some mainstream UN agencies have also exhibited anti-Israel sentiments. For example, between 1974 and 1987 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) instituted financial sanctions against the Jewish State, passed hundreds of resolutions criticizing Israel?s activities on the West Bank, and denounced Israel?s archeological and restoration efforts in Jerusalem.

Israeli officials have termed these committees “propaganda instruments” of the PLO. In contrast, no UN organization investigates terrorist crimes against Israel or protests desecration of Jewish heritage sites by Arabs. The UN General Assembly never debates resolutions critical of Palestinian or Arab behaviour in the Arab-Israel conflict, even when terrorist atrocities are committed, when the Palestinians violate accords signed with Israel, or in the face of human rights violations by the Palestinian Authority against its own people. In the last 55+ years, since the establishment of the UN, there have been at least 80 conflicts between states in which major refugee situations have developed. Nevertheless, only the Palestinians have gotten the kind of attention they have received, while many other peoples have suffered and are still suffering.

These committees spend more than five million dollars a year, essentially to spread viciously anti-Israel propaganda. These bodies are the focus of the worst anti-Israel activity under the aegis of the UN. They organize, inter alia, the annual “Palestine Day” events at the UN, as well as symposia and other events.

The United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People annually hosts “The International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People” on November 29, the anniversary of the UN vote to partition Palestine in 1947 (UN Resolution 181). The event is symptomatic of the extremely hostile, anti-Israel attitude of the committee, which has about 20 members from third-world countries. High-ranking UN officials, including the Secretary-General and the presidents of the Security Council and General Assembly regularly take part, although the US and Israel reject the event and do not attend. The Palestinians’ focus on this event shows that they still do not accept the legitimacy of Israel.

Until the advent of the Oslo Peace Accords in 1991, the UN made an annual show of passing many anti-Israel resolutions in the General Assembly with lopsided votes. The only result was to lead many to question the legitimacy of the United Nations itself. This still happens, but to a lesser extent, since the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of hope for a rational peace process with the Palestinians.

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What was the controversy over the Western Wall during the Mandate Period?

The Jewish connection to the Temple Mount and Western Wall dates back more than 3,000 years and is rooted in tradition and history. When Abraham bound his son Isaac upon an altar as a sacrifice to God, he did so atop Mount Moriah, today?s Temple Mount. The First Temple was constructed during King Solomon’s reign, which started in 967 BC. The Temple’s Holy of Holies contained the original Ark of the Covenant, until the Temple was destroyed by the Babylonians in 586 BC. The Second Temple was built on the same site seventy years later, and then greatly expanded during the first century BC by King Herod. Both the First and Second Temples were the centers of Jewish religious and social life until the Second Temple?s destruction by the Romans in 70 AD.

The massive stone rampart of the Western Wall (or Wailing Wall, or Kotel in Hebrew) is in the midst of the Old City in Jerusalem. It is the section of the western supporting wall of the Temple Mount which has remained intact since the destruction of the Second Jerusalem Temple in 70 AD, the last vestige of the Temples on the site chosen by Solomon. The street in front of the Wall and the Wall itself became the most sacred spot in Jewish religious and national consciousness and tradition by virtue of its identification with the Western Wall of the Holy of Holies in the Temple, from which, according to numerous sources, the Divine Presence never departed.

The import of the area to Islam is based on events after the death of Mohammed The Prophet in 632 AD. Since he died six years before Jerusalem surrendered to the Muslims, Mohammed could never have set foot in Jerusalem. The Arabic name of Jerusalem Al-Quds (The Holy One) is derived from ‘Beit-el-Muqadas’ (i.e. ‘Beit H?amikdash’), the Hebrew name for the Temple mount. The sanctity of Jerusalem was not enshrined in Islam at its inception and the city is not mentioned once in the Koran, but was introduced into it only after the death of Mohammed, perhaps to lure pilgrims from Mecca and Medina on the Saudi Arabian Peninsula.

During the 19th century there were a number of Zionist attempts to to get control of the Wall and surrounding districts, but none succeeded. The Arab owners of the property correctly sensed its importance to the Jews and were not willing to sell, even at very favorable terms offered by Baron Rothschild. On the contrary, the Arab religious authorities, supported by the Turks and later the British, made changes in the streets, buildings and Arab practices specifically to prevent Jewish observance and to disrupt any Jewish presence at the Wall.

After the Balfour Declaration gave the Jews hope for a homeland in Palestine, the Land of Israel, the Western Wall gained national significance among the Jews together with the traditional religious significance. In order to frustrate these Jewish aspirations, the Arab Mufti of Jerusalem started to incite his community against the Zionists who, he claimed, intended to seize control of the Wall. In order to antagonize the Jews, the Mufti ordered the opening of a gate at the southern end of the street the follows the base of the Wall, thus converting it into a thoroughfare for people and animals. In addition the Muslims deliberately held loud-voiced ceremonies in the vicinity. They also complained to the British about the placing of accessories of worship near the Wall, and a partition between men and women was removed by the British police on Yom Kippur of 1928.

In August 1929 an instigated Muslim crowd rioted among the worshipers and destroyed ritual objects. This unrest was followed by widespread riots a few days later stemming from Arab opposition to Jewish prayer at the Western Wall. muslim propaganda claimed that Jewish prayer endangered the mosques holy to Islam. The riots of 1929 began in Jerusalem and spread to many other areas of Palestine. Particularly infamous is the massacre of the Jews of Hebron, accounting for over one third of the victims in this wave of riots.

The British set up a committee of inquiry (the Shaw Commission) to determine the causes of the riots and subsequently an international committee (the “International Commission for the Wailing Wall” consisting of a Swede, a Swiss, and a Dutchman) was appointed by the League of Nations to resolve “the problem of the Wall”. It conducted in Jerusalem, in the summer of 1930, “the trial of the Wall”. During the meetings 52 witnesses were examined, 21 of them being called by the Jewish Counsel, 30 by the muslim Counsel, and one, a British official, by the Commission.

The Jewish witnesses recited the ancient history of the Temple and the continuous record, well documented, of Jewish devotions at the Western Wall. They did not make any property claim about the Wall, taking the position that the Wall did not belong to anyperson or nation, but only to God. The asked only that there would be enforcement of the written intent of the Mandate: “according to Article 15 of the Mandate, the Mandatory Power shall guarantee the Jews free exercise of worship at the Wall in the form prescribed by the ritual of their religion without any interference whatever from the Arabs or the adherents of any other religion.”

The Arab respresentatives made it difficult for the Commission because they refused to recognize the authority of the British Mandate. They stated, and it is quoted in the Commission’sreport, “The Palestine Arab nation have rejected continually and in every opportunity the British Mandate over Palestine, and therefore they cannot be bound by any arrangement or regulation derived from that.” The Arabs further asserted that, it is the “Balfour Declaration that has incited the Jews to claim certain rights which in reality do not exist” and to generally insist on continued Arab control of all sites in Jerusalem that the Arabsconsidered sacred.

In Deceomber 1930 the Commission concluded that the Muslims had absolute ownership of the Wall and adjacent property. However, the Jews were to be given free access to the Western Wall for the purpose of devotions at all times subject to explicit stipulations that allowed Jews to come to the Kotel only in small groups and forbade them to pray there on Muslim festivals and on Fridays. In addition, Jews were also forbidden to bring Sifrei Torah to the Kotel, to place any chairs in front of the Wall or to blow the Shofar, lest it offend the Arab population.

The Jewish authorities agreed to this unfair verdict, except for the prohibition of the Shofar, considering it a humiliation. The Arabs rejected the report. The Betar Youth Movement organized Plugut Hakotel, a special unit of young men who would “illegally” blow the Shofar at the Wall on Yom Kippur to stir and arouse the Jewish people and fulfil the commandment of blowing the Shofar. Their activities would always lead to the intervention of the British police.

In 1949, the United States was the central force behind the US-British-French Tripartite Agreement that formally placed an embargo on weapons deliveries to the countries involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This Agreement set up a multinational committee based in Washington to carefully monitor and control western arms sales to the Middle East.

In practice, this agreement did not prevent the Arab states from obtaining weapons through their alliance relationships with suppliers, but Israel was excluded. Little foreign aid was provided by the United States, and Israeli military officials who sought to purchase weapons and ammunition in the United States were rebuffed. One official recalled that he could not obtain “even a single bullet.”

In 1955 the first Egyptian-Soviet arms deal took place, disguised as a Egyptian-Czech transaction, an event which had a seriously destabilizing impact on the regional arms race. Egypt was able to purchase some two hundred tanks and other weapons after which the Tripartite Agreement collapsed. France, motivated tohelp Israel by Egypt’s support of Algerian rebels, sold about two hundred tanks to Israel.

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George J. Tenet CIA Director

The Tenet work plan for a Mideast cease-fire, advanced by the US Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet on June 10, 2001, has not been made public as a formal document. The objective of the plan was to get the security organizations of Israel and of the Palestinian Authority to reaffirm their commitment to the security agreements forged at Sharm al-Sheikh in October 2000 which were then embedded in the Mitchell Report of April 2001.

The operational premise of the workplan is that the two sides will have a cease-fire, and a joint security committee will then resolve any issues that may arise during the implementation of “specific, concrete, and realistic security steps” to reestablish security cooperation and the situation on the ground as they existed prior to the start of the al-Aqsa intifada September 28, 2000. Tenet’s main goal was to put in place a cease-fire that would allow for implementation of the Mitchell report.

The Tenet Plan is very detailed, listing specific steps and points of agreement to resume security cooperation, enforce strict adherence to the cease-fire,suppress terrorism, and redeploy the IDF to positions as of September 28, 2000. The key elements are:

• An immediate cessation of hostilities, the arrest of terrorists by the Palestinians and efforts to stop anti-Israel incitement in Palestinian media
• Israel would ease travel restrictions and pull its troops back from Palestinian population centers, after the Palestinian steps against terrorists
• A cooling-off period before implementing peacemaking suggestions from the Mitchell Commission

The Tenet Plan was scheduled to start on June 13, 2001. At the insistence of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the Tenet Plan assumed a period of seven days without attacks as a condition for starting the implementation. The Palestinians have not been able or willing to stop their attacks for a week, so the process never started. Even during the calmest periods, there was enough violence to render the rest of the plan moot. In early 2002, renewed severe violence by Palestinian terrorists led to stepped-up Israeli military operations in the territories, including invasion of refugee camps looking for terrorist staging facilities. The Tenet Plan was again introduced as a means to restore the cease-fire and work toward resolution of the conflict.

Benjamin (or Binyamin or “Bibi”) Netanyahu served as Israeli Prime Minister from 1996 to 1999, the culmination of a rapid rise in Israeli politics in the right-wing Likud party. He was born in Tel-Aviv and grew up in Jerusalem, but spent his young adult life in the United States, including B.Sc. and M.Sc degrees from MIT and a promising early career in international consulting and business. He returned to Israel in 1967 and served with distinction as an officer in the IDF, reaching the rank of captain following the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

Motivated by the death of his brother Yoni in the course of the 1976 Entebbe rescue operation, Netanyahu organized two international conferences against terrorism (1979 and 1984) that attracted participation from world leaders, including former US President George Bush and former US Secretary of State George Shultz. During the 1980s he served as Deputy Chief of Mission in the Israeli Embassy in Washington and in 1984 became Israel’s Ambassador to the United Nations where he served for four years.

In 1988, Netanyahu was elected to the 12th Knesset as a Likud member and was appointed Deputy Foreign Minister. During the Gulf War he served as Israel’s principal representative in the international arena. In October 1991, he was a senior member of the Israeli delegation to the Madrid Peace Conference, which initiated the first direct negotiations between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

On March 25, 1993, he was elected Likud Party Chairman and the party’s candidate for Prime Minister leading to his election on May 29, 1996 as Israel’s 9th Prime Minister, with a narrow victory margin of less than 1 percent. The closeness of the election left him weak within his own party and dependent on right-wing members to hold onto power. Accusations of fraud in his government further weakened his hold on power and he was never able to form a stable coalition in the Knesset.

His term ended three years later when he and his right-wing Likud Party were defeated by Labor Party leader Ehud Barak, who was determined to restore momentum to the Oslo peace process despite the continuing bad faith of Yasser Arafat.

In 2002, as the government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon struggles with the ongoing al-Aqsa intifada and the end of any hope of peace with the Palestinians as long as Yasser Arafat is their leader, Netanyahu is seen as a potential Prime Minister in the next Israeli election cycle.

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The PFLP was founded on December 11, 1967, by Dr. George Habash, a Palestinian Greek Orthodox Christian. The organization quickly specialized in showcase, large-scale terrorist operations beginning on July 23, 1968, with a hijacking to Algeria of an El Al flight on route from Rome to Tel Aviv. Habash ran the PFLP until his death in 2000, after which Mustafa Zubaydi (whose nom de guerre was Abu Ali Mustafa) was elected head of the PFLP. Mustafa had been Habash’s right-hand man since 1969.

As with Hamas, Yasser Arafat and his Palestinian Authority have found it convenient to have the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) conduct terrorist operations against Israel. After Arafat took the political steps to renounce terrorism in 1988 and then entered into the Oslo peace process of the 1990s, he could not be the point man in violent attacks on Israelis and other Jews as he did in the earlier days of his PLO organization. On the contrary, Arafat and his Palestinian Authority were obligated to end terrorism and incitement against Israel as a condition of Israel’s acceptance of its obligations.

In public, to Western audiences, Arafat claims he cannot control the independent terrorist organizations like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. But the PFLP, a secular Marxist Palestinian movement, is the second largest constituent organization in the PLO, after Fatah. There is ample evidence that Arafat fully supports PFLP and its involvement in terrorism. Despite the fact that the PFLP carried out dozens of terrorist attacks against Israel after the signing of the Oslo accords, killing and wounding Israelis, and that the PFLP was included on the official US list of terrorist groups:

• In 1996 Arafat provided seats in his cabinet for the PFLP, and even appointed one of his cabinet ministers to represent the PFLP until it formally joined the cabinet
• PFLP representatives take part in PLO Executive Committee meetings
• Arafat has permitted the PFLP to stage marches in Bethlehem and other cities

It was the PFLP that planned and ordered the murder of Rehavam Ze’evi, Israel’s Minister of Tourism, in Jerusalem on October 17, 2001. Israel demanded that the Palestinian Authority arrest and transfer to it the suspects in Ze’evi’s assassination, but the PA did not comply. Despite Palestinian Authority declarations that they are vigorously persuing the killers, Ze’evi’s murderers continue to benefit from sanctuary in Palestinian Authority-controlled areas and the PFLP did not halt its armed operations against Israeli civilians. PFLP leaders continue to be based in Ramallah, not far from the offices of Yasser Arafat.

In 1969, in Cairo, the prime minister of Lebanon reached an agreement with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) that effectively endorsed PLO freedom of action in Lebanon to recruit, arm, train, and employ fighters against Israel. This was the beginning of a disaster for the people of Lebanon.

Fatah and other Palestinian Liberation Organization factions had long been active among the 400,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanese camps. Through the 1960s the center for armed Palestinian activities had been in Jordan. Then, in 1970, after the PLO tried to destabilize Jordan and take over, King Hussein of Jordan decided to evict the bulk of the armed Palestinians in three weeks of bloody fighting in what the Palestinians call “Black September.” One of the major results was the forced migration of a large number of PLO fighters from Jordan to Lebanon. There they based their military and economic activities in the fertile environment of the refugee camps. Soon the Palestinians were well on their way to creating what the Lebanese called “a State within the State.”

Under the guise of preparing armed resistance to Israel, the PLO insisted on political, police, and economic control of the refugee camps, as well as access to large areas of South Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley that were used for training. This generated increasing friction with the Lebanese population. Clashes over who was in charge between the Palestinians and Lebanese security and military led to armed incidents flaring up all over Lebanon, as the Palestinians were operating from refugee camps in the South, in and around Beirut, and in the North.

For Arab residents of south Lebanon, PLO rule was a nightmare. Countless Lebanese, interviewed by western journalists, told harrowing tales of rape, mutilation and murders committed by PLO forces. Palestinians and Lebanese leftists sacked Damour, a Christian village near Beirut, and massacred hundreds of its inhabitants before turning the town into a military base.

Father Mansour Labaky of the Church of St. Elias in Damour gave this description:

• The PLO came and bombed the church without entering it. They kicked open the door and threw in the grenades.
• An entire family had been killed, the Can?an family, four children all dead, and the mother, the father, and the grandfather. The mother was still hugging one of the children. And she was pregnant.
• The eyes of the children were gone and their limbs were cut off. No legs and no arms. It was awful.

After brutally killing 582 people in the town and terrorizing the rest of the 25,000 residents into fleeing, the PLO forces took over Damour and began using it as a base for their terrorist activities. Father Labaky’s church, the one that was gutted by PLO grenades, was turned into a combination garage and gun range. Targets were painted on the eastern wall of the nave.

Throughout the 1970s, PLO terrorists mounted intermittent cross-border attacks against civilian and military targets in Israel. There were also interational terrorist spectaculars, e.g., the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, perpetrated by groups based in Lebanon. In turn, the Israelis struck back at targets and groups across the border in Lebanon.

By 1975, relations between assorted Lebanese groups and the Palestinians had degenerated into open warfare. Lebanese militia groups armed themselves for self-protection from the PLO terrorists. Soon various Lebanese groups were fighting one another as old feuds revived and new atrocities demanded revenge. This fighting would continue in one form or another until 1990.

In 1976, the Lebanese Christian leadership invited the Syrian Army in for assistance in fighting the PLO. An Arab peace-keeping force (usually called the “Arab Deterrent Forces”) was subsequently deployed by the Arab League, incorporating into its ranks the Syrian forces. Intermittent cease-fires were followed by new rounds of fighting. The civilian population of all faiths suffered greatly.

By 1978, Israel had had enough of the constant attacks by terrorists based in Lebanon and launched a counterattack in the form of a limited invasion of Lebanon, the Litani River Operation.

In early June of 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with a massive force, called Operation Peace for the Galilee, driving all the way to Beirut and putting the PLO and residents, as well as the Lebanese civilian population of that city, under siege. Israel justified its action by citing the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador in London and a build-up of PLO armaments in South Lebanon in addition to the constant attacks on Galilee settlements across the border.

In August 1982, US Ambassador Philip Habib negotiated the withdrawal of Yaser Arafat and his PLO forces from Lebanon. They relocated their headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia.

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In December 1987, a collective Palestinian popular uprising erupted against Israel in the West Bank and Gaza areas. This period of violence is known as the Intifada, or “shaking off.” At first a spontaneous outburst instigated by false rumors and incitement by Muslim clerics, the Intifada quickly developed into a well-organized rebellion orchestrated by the PLO from its headquarters in Tunis. Masses of civilians attacked Israeli troops with stones, axes, Molotov cocktails, hand grenades, and firearms supplied by the Fatah, killing and wounding soldiers and civilians. Israeli troops, trained for combat with opposing armies, were not well prepared to fight this kind of war.

The original outbreak was a misunderstanding seized upon as a pretext. On December 6, 1987, an Israeli was stabbed to death while shopping in Gaza. The next day, four residents of the Jabalya refugee camp in Gaza were killed in a traffic accident. Rumors spread that the four had been killed by Israelis as a deliberate act of revenge. Mass rioting broke out in Jabalya on the morning of December 9, during which a 17-year-old threw a Molotov cocktail at an army patrol and was killed by an IDF soldier. His death became the trigger for large-scale riots that engulfed the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem.

Once the violence started, each incident provided rumor material to keep the violence going. Accumulated frustrations of the Palestinians, largely the result of their own leader’s policies, were vented against the Israelis. As the intifada ran its course from 1987 to 1993, the level of violence and the degree to which it was organized and coordinated by the PLO only increased.

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Heads of state from eight Arab countries attended a summit conference in Khartoum, Sudan held from August 29 to September 1, 1967. The meeting formulated the Arab consensus that formed the basis of the policies of most Arab states participating in the conflict with Israel until the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The resolution adopted September 1, 1967 called for the continued struggle against Israel, the creation of a fund to assist the economics of Egypt and Jordan, the lifting of an Arab oil boycott against the West and a new agreement to end the war in Yemen.

The best remembered action at Khartoum, however, was the adoption of the dictum of “Three NOs” with respect to Israel:

1. NO peace with Israel
2. NO recognition of Israel
3. NO negotiations with Israel

With this resolution, the Arab states slammed the door on any progress towards peace with Israel and ultimately led to the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

The stridency of the Khartoum resolution, however, masked important changes that the June 1967 Six Day War caused in inter-Arab politics. At Khartoum, Nasser was promised badly needed economic assistancein exchange for his pledge to stop destabilizing the region and end his propaganda attacks against the Persian Gulf monarchies. This meant that Egypt, along with the other Arab states, would focus on consolidating power at home and on pressing economic problems rather than on revolutionary schemes to unify the Arabs. After 1967 Arab regimes increasingly viewed Israel and the Palestinian Arab problem not as the key to revolutionary change of the Arab state system, but in terms of how they affected their domestic political stability.

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Pres. George Bush Rose Garden Speech June 2002

On June 24, 2002 US President George Bush put forward a new United States policy formulation for the Middle East. For the first time Bush stated that the Palestinian Arab regime under Yassir Arafat was not acceptable to the US as the leadership of any future Palestinian Arab state. The US does support the idea of a Palestinian state for the benefit of the Palestinian people, but not as a platform for continued terror against Israel or other peaceful states.

Before the US will support the emergence of a sovereign Palestinian state — to exist side by side with Israel, Jordan and other neighbors — Pres. Bush set forth a list of conditions to be met to indicate that the Palestinian state will be a peaceful country, contributing to regional stability and economic development.

The list of conditions included:

• Election of new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror
• Build a practicing democracy, based on tolerance and liberty
• Entirely new political and economic institutions, based on democracy, market economics and action against terrorism
• A new constitution which separates the powers of government
• A Palestinian parliament having the full authority of a legislative body
• Local officials and government ministers, chosen in fair, multi-party local elections, with authority of their own and the independence to govern effectively
• End of official corruption in Palestinian institutions
• A major project of economic reform
• Effective courts of law where Palestinians can defend and vindicate their rights
• A system of reliable justice with a truly independent judiciary
• Palestinian leaders who engage in a sustained fight against terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure
• Rebuild and reform the Palestinian security services
• Come to terms with Israel, Egypt and Jordan on practical issues, such as security

This long list of conditions reflects the miserable extent of the terrorism, corruption and despotism of the Palestinian Arab regime under Yassir Arafat. In this speech, Pres. Bush for the first time revealed the depth of disgust that the United States had for the failures and perfidy of Arafat and his cronies.

In addition, Pres. Bush gave a message to the Palestinian Arabs and other countries who are currently encouraging or supporting terrorism by Palestinian Arabs or other groups such as Hezbollah:

• All states must end incitement to violence in official media, and publicly denounce homicide bombings
• All states must stop the flow of money, equipment and recruits to terrorist groups seeking the destruction of Israel
• All states must block the shipment of Iranian supplies to terrorist groups, and oppose regimes that promote terror, like Iraq
• Syria must close terrorist camps and expel terrorist organizations
• Arab states will be expected to build closer ties of diplomacy and commerce with Israel, leading to full normalization of relations between Israel and the entire Arab world

Assuming that these concrete steps are taken, and a new climate of security and cooperation is established, then Israel will be expected to begin withdrawals from Palestinian Arab areas and enter into negotiations for a final status agreement. A sovereign Palestinian Arab state could finally emerge allowing the Palestinian Arab people to recover from the decades of disastrous leadership that has doomed them to failure. Since the Israelis have repeatedly engaged in such negotiations in the past — including comprehensive offers to Arafat at Camp David and Taba — Pres. Bush emphasized the conditions for the Palestinians, who had been and continued to be the obstacle to peace.

In comments after the speech, Arafat and backers of the Palestinian Arabs tended to read it very selectively. They like the vision of sovereignty in the foreseeable future, but they ignored or downplayed the long list of changes that Bush demands. Others said that the US should not tell the Palestinian Arabs how to run their country; Pres. Bush and Sec. Powell replied that Palestinian Arabs can make their own choices, but don’t expect US support without serious, permanent reform.

The overriding issue for Jews and Arabs was the future of Palestine in general and Jerusalem in particular. Zionist success in Eretz Yisrael led to rising tension between Jews and Arabs that erupted into bloody riots in 1920 and 1929, followed by the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939.

In 1920, Arab riots during the Pesach (Passover) holiday resulted in 5 Jews killed and 211 wounded, and Jewish property was destroyed, while Arab casualties were 4 killed and 21 wounded. The Arab mobs were incited by rumors that the Jews were taking over Muslim holy sites and had attacked Arabs. In June 1920, the Hagana (Jewish self-defense organization) was formed by Vladimir Jabotinsky as a result of British inability to protect Jewish residents. Had it not been for the preliminary organization of Jewish defence, the number of victims would undoubtedly have been much greater. The British military authorities did not stop the Arab rioters, however they did arrest the Jewish defenders, including Jabotinsky, and sentenced them to prison terms.

A British Commission of Enquiry was appointed, under the Chairmanship of the Chief Justice of Palestine, Sir Thomas Haycraft, to investigate the causes and circumstances of the riots. From the Haycraft Commission report:

• The racial strife was begun by the Arabs, and rapidly developed into a conflict of great violence between Arabs and Jews, in which the Arab majority, who were generally the aggressors, inflicted most of the casualties.
• The raids on five Jewish agricultural colonies arose from the excitement produced in the minds of the Arabs by reports of Arabs being killed by Jews in Jaffa. In two cases unfounded stories of provocation were believed and acted upon without any effort being made to verify them.

The British used the rioting as a pretext for limiting Jewish immigration and used other measures to suppress the Zionists, despite the abundant evidence of Arabs as the source of the disturbances. There were many reasons for this including British strategic objectives involving other Arab states in the region.

Although the British attempted to imprison Haj Muhammed Amin al-Husseini, an ardent anti-Zionist dedicated to theeradication of the Jewish presence in Palestine and a major figure behind the April 1920 riots, in the wake of the riots, none of his sentence was served, as Husseini fled to Transjordan, and was soon after given amnesty by the British. In 1921 British High Commissioner Samuels appointed Husseini as mufti (chief Muslim religious jurist) of Jerusalem. In 1922 Samuels augmented Husseini’s power by appointing him president of the newly constituted Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), which was given wide powers over the disbursement of funds from religious endowments, fees, and the like. By heading the SMC, Husseini controlled a vast patronage network, giving him power over a large constituency. He was the most prominent Arab figure in Palestine during the Mandatory period and was the person most responsible for poisoning the relations between the Jewish and Arab populations.

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The key to any peace agreement between Israel and its hostile Arab neighbors has always been the concept of “secure borders”. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, the basic building block of any such peace agreement, anticipates that Israel will withdraw to secure borders (not specified in the resolution) in exchange for peace guarantees from the Arab parties. Over the years, many plans have been put forward designed to achieve this balance of “land for peace”.

One of the early attempts, not long after the June 1967 Six-Day War, was the “Allon Plan”, written by Yigal Allon, who specified what “secure borders” meant in the pages of Foreign Affairs in October 1976. Allon was Israel’s foreign minister under the first Rabin government, and was one of Israel’s greatest military minds.

The Allon Plan proposed that Israel would relinquish the main Arab-populated areas of Judea and Samaria to Jordanian political jurisdiction, while retaining under Israeli military control a narrow, thinly-populated strip along the Jordan River. This strip would start in the North near the Syrian border, continue down through the Jordan Valley and the Judean desert, and connect further down with the Negev.

In this concept, Israel would control a strategic zone in the eastern West Bank running up from the Jordan Valley to the eastern slopes of the West Bank hill ridge. This area would allow Israel’s small standing army to hold off an assault from a combination of Arab states to Israel’s east for enough time for Israel to mobilize and deploy its reserve forces, which constitute the bulk of Israel’s military power. For these “secure borders” Allon envisioned that Israel would need some 700 square miles of the 2100 square miles that make up the West Bank (about one-third).

Additionally, Allon wrote in July, 1967, that Israel needed to include the road connecting Jerusalem to the Dead Sea as well as a widened Jerusalem corridor west of Ramallah and stressed the importance of Greater Jerusalem. These additions could easily bring the Alon Plan to about 40 percent of the West Bank.

The “Allon Plan” was originally conceived when Middle Eastern armies were relatively small and primarily composed of slow infantry formations. The contemporary situation is much different, and ballistic missiles can arc over any defense at the border, but this only increases the importance of superior topographical conditions and secure borders for Israel’s small standing army.

Following the concepts of the Allon Plan, the 1967-1977 Israeli Labor governments created 21 settlements along the Jordan Valley and Eastern slopes of Samaria during that period, and avoided construction on the mountain ridge from Nablus to Jerusalem to Hebron.

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The morning of August 21, 1969, a fire engulfed the southeastern wing of the holy Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Al-Aqsa is known to Muslims all over as Haram-al-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary). This is a cherished location for Muslims for over 1,300 years, a site visited by Prophet Muhammad SAW on his winged horse, El-Baraq on The Night of Ascend.

The fire destroyed a 1000 year old precious and historic pulpit that was presented by Saladin in the 12^th Century. The damage done to the Mosque was restored to some extent with the contribution of $US 9 million by Jordan.

As the natural reaction would be, heated demonstrations took place in the Arab parts of Jerusalem to condemn this act. All access points to the Mosque were blocked, hundreds of police officers were recruited to curb the agitators, and a curfew was put in East Jerusalem the same evening. The initial assumptions stated that an electrical fault became the cause of the fire but reports started spreading about Israelis responsible for it. At the time the fire was being extinguished, there were also claims that the Israeli fire extinguishers threw gasoline on the fire instead of water.

The next day brought to limelight another culprit, Dennis Michael Rohan, an Australian tourist who was termed responsible for the arson and was arrested on August 23. Rohan turned out to be a Protestant follower of the Church of God which is an evangelical sect. Rohan believed that the process of the second coming of Messiah will fasten with the burning of the Mosque. Presented in front of the court, Rohan stated that he was acting as “the Lord’s emissary” following the divine instructions and also stated that his reason for trying to destruct Al-Aqsa Mosque was in order to give a chance to rebuild it as the Jewish Temple. He was later found to be mentally ill and was hospitalized in a mental institution.

One of the consequences of Al-Aqsa fire was the creation of the OIC by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in the first-ever meeting of Islamic Summit which was convened in September 1969 in Rabat, Morocco. However, the efforts of the OIC have not succeeded in keeping the Mosque safe from the terrorist attacks and defilement even to this day.

Israel has been trying to destruct al-Aqsa Mosque through different means even after the arson, damaging the Mosque’s foundations by building tunnels leading to the Temple Mount (i.e. the Jerusalem Shrine). A letter from Ahmed Ibrahim Lobad was published in the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle on June 13, 1996 stating that “It is impossible to detail all incidents of Israeli destruction, desecration and usurpation of Muslim and Christian holy place in a brief letter. To mention a few: In 1969 Zionists burned and heavily damaged part of the al-Aqsa Mosque, Israeli authorities would not help [sic] in extinguishing that fire.”

Even while Israel has repeatedly denied that Rohan was a Jew, facts have proved him to be a Zionist, recruited by the violating parties to commit this sinful task. This claim of Rohan being an Israeli was also stated by The Wall Street Journal on November 13, 2000. Taissir Rajab Al-Tamimi, who is the Chief of Judges and Chairman of the Islamic Law High Council in the Palestinian Authority, stated in an Interview on August 23, 2004, “The Israeli government conspired and formed an alliance with this criminal – who came from Australia, and is a Jew – for the burning of the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque.” Another prominent figure, Ibrahim Hooper who is a member of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, listed down “the 1969 arson attack on Al-Aqsa Mosque” in the list of the major violations made by Israel to the sacred Islamic sites, in his article for The Washington Post on October 16, 1996.

Despite repeated denials by Israelis, media and independent reports have repeatedly blamed Israel as a major force behind the Al-Aqsa fire, thus bringing shame and ignominy for the Jews all around the world.

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Ronald Reagan was the first President to see Israel as a valuable ally in the Cold War. Reagan once wrote:

• Only by full appreciation of the critical role the State of Israel plays in our strategic calculus can we build the foundation for thwarting Moscow’s designs on territories and resources vital to our security and our national well-being.

The Israelis cultivated Washington’s perception of their capability to deter the Soviet Union, while the Arab states refused to join the “strategic consensus” that Alexander Haig tried to create to oppose Soviet expansionism in the region. By mid-1982, Reagan Administration attempts to align Arab Middle Eastern states with the US and blunt potential Soviet moves in the region were faltering. The Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave the ideas some credibility, but Arab leaders were not motivated to respond to the American initiatives. Arab Governments were reluctant to become identified with American political objectives, but there was progress toward military cooperation since this directly benefited the Arab states.

The series of clashes along the Israel-Lebanon border, followed by Israels invasion of Lebanon in June of 1982, turned the attention of the Reagan Administration toward the Israel-Arab conflict. In June 1982 the Secretary of State, Alexander Haig — a leading advocate of close relations with Israel — resigned. The stage was thereby set for an experiment by a section in the State Department, supported by the incoming Secretary of State, George Shultz, and the National Security Adviser, William Clark that favored a pro-Arab tilt and a top priority effort to find a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Influenced by the State Department’s Bureau of East Affairs, under the leadership of Assistant Secretary of State Veliotes, they argued that there was a major opportunity for a breakthrough to peace. Jordan was believed ready to enter negotiations, possibly with the permission or, they hoped, even with the PLO’s participation. Ambassador Philip Habib assured Shultz that Syria was ready to negotiate its withdrawal from Lebanon. Unfortunately for peace, all these assertions were proved erroneous during 1983.

The Reagan plan approach grew out of the belief that the US must show progress towards solving the Arab-Israeli issue — or, at least, make energetic attempts in that direction — to retain US influence in the Arab world. The policy was meant to show the Arabs that America was trying to respond to their grievances. There was also an important domestic political component or Reagan. In a speech delivered on September 1, 1982 President Reagan outlined a proposed solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict. He labelled his position as the “next step” in the process that was begun with the Camp David Accords to pave the way for autonomy for the Palestinian people. He spoke of “”the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.” He proposed a five-year transition period for “the peaceful and orderly transfer of domestic authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza” and a freeze on new Israeli settlements during that time. Self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza would be in association with Jordan and not a separate state. Jerusalem would remain undivided, its final status to be decided through negotiations.

Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the PLO’s Arafat had been consulted in preparation of the plan, but Israel had not been notified by the Reagan Administration until right before the speech. In fact, the American Secretary of State had met with Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban a few days before and concealed the imminent announcement from him.

Although Labor leader Peres expressed support for the plan, Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the Likud opposed it. Begin reacted very negatively, calling the plan “national suicide for Israel”. In September Begin wrote to Ronald Reagan:

• What some call the ‘West Bank,’ Mr. President, is Judea and Samaria, and this simple historic truth will never change. There are cynics who deride history. They may continue their derision as they wish, but I will stand by the truth. And the truth is that millennia ago there was a Jewish Kingdom of Judea and Samaria where our kings knelt to God, where our prophets brought forth the vision of eternal peace, where we developed a rather rich civilization which we took with us in our hearts and in our minds, on our long global trek for over 18 centuries; and, with it, we came back home.
• By aggressive war, by invasion, King Abdullah conquered parts of Judea and Samaria in 1948; and in a war of most legitimate self-defense in 1967, after being attacked by King Hussein, we liberated, with God’s help, that portion of our homeland.
• Geography and history have ordained that Judea and Samaria be mountainous country and that two-thirds of our population dwell in the coastal plain dominated by those mountains. From them you can hit every city, every town, each township and village and, last but not least, our principal airport in the plain below.
• Mr. President, you and I chose for the last two years to call our countries ‘friends and allies.’ Such being the case, a friend does not weaken a friend, an ally does not put his ally in jeopardy. This would be the inevitable consequence were the ‘positions’ [Begin refers here to the Reagan Plan which called on Israel to withdraw to the 1967 lines] transmitted to me on August 31, 1982, to become reality. I believe they won’t.
• ‘For Zion’s sake will I not hold my peace, and for Jerusalem’s sake I will not rest.’(Isaiah 62).

The Reagan Plan was finally rejected by Jordan and the PLO in April 1983 — a development that discouraged Washington about prospects for settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the reliability of Arab “moderates”. Consequently, the US-Israel alliance was strengthened, recovering from the blows it had suffered during Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and Syria was again identified as the prime obstacle to regional stability.

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BBC

Tanzim in the Streets

Origins

On October 10, 1959, a group of about twenty Palestinians met in Kuwait and secretly formed Fatah (or al-Fatah, which is an acronym standing for Harakat Al-Tahrir Al-Watani Al-Filastini – the Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine), an organization that became the principle component of the Palestine Liberation Organization under the leadership of Yasser Arafat. The Tanzim (“organization” in Arabic) was established in 1983 as part of Fatah. While the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has yielded to the Palestinian Authority (PA), Yasser Arafat’s Fatah contingent remains the dominant player.

Note that when Fatah was formed in 1959 and when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed in 1964, the only territory to liberate was the State of Israel. After Israel’s 1948-49 War of Independence, until the Six Day War of 1967, the territories of the West Bank and Gaza were occupied by Jordan and Egypt respectively.

Activities

The Tanzim is a body divided into sectors and cells and is involved in all central Fatah functions within the Palestinian population i.e., political and educational activities and military training at all levels, including youth camps from a very young age. These military courses are run by officers from the Palestinian security apparatus. The organization has many weapons, some of which are known to have been illegally supplied by the PA under orders from Arafat.

The PA financially supports day-to-day activities of the Tanzim, and Arafat is personally involved in the selection of senior leaders in the organization. Tanzim operates as an armed militia for enforcing order on the Palestinian street. Arafat uses the Tanzim to inflame the situation in the field to achieve goals that he has been unsuccessful in achieving via diplomatic means. Arafat also uses the Tanzim to incite Israeli Arabs, with whom they associate and mix. In this way, he can always claim that the violent outbursts are a result of popular sentiment venting itself on the street. Tanzim’s operations were the spearhead of Fatah activities against Israel during the period of the Intifada.

The senior commanders of the Tanzim enjoy high-ranking status in the PA. As a result of their seniority and position, together with the recommendation of the appropriate authorities in the PA, some of them are members and active in the ruling central bodies and institutions.

There are often tensions and power struggles between the Tanzim and another faction in the PA, known as the “outsider” leadership. These are the people who arrived from Tunisia following the Oslo Agreements and who today represent the majority among the leaders of the various mechanisms and senior positions in the PA. The Tanzim face an identity problem: on the one hand, Tanzim is part of the general organization, while on the other, it reflects the feelings of the population, not necessarily in line with the official position of the PA leaders. Often this is reflected in more extreme positions coming from Tanzim.

History of Violence

Tanzim activists have been responsible for numerous recent riots, under the direction of Arafat. This has been an acknowledged pattern of operation since the Oslo Agreements, such as the Western Wall Tunnel riots in September 1996, the Nakba day riots in May 2000 and during Summer, 2001.

During October 2000, Fatah created a special unit for armed operations against Israel: the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Tanzim commanders, like Atef Abiyat in Bethlehem, doubled as the local commander of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades.

Israel has requested incessantly, after every violent outburst, that the Tanzim be disarmed. According to the Oslo Agreements, the PA weapons were supplied for use by the Palestinian police only, and the quantities of guns were specified and supposed to be known. The Tanzim are not part of these agreements, and it is a persistent violation of the Oslo Agreements that they have weapons. Although the Palestinian Authority promised to disarm the Tanzim and curtail their activities, exactly the opposite occurred in reality.

• The Tanzim has distributed weapons to their supporters and organized militias that have open fire on IDF troops during demonstrations, forcing the soldiers to open fire in the direction of the demonstrators;
• The Tanzim organizes demonstrations in the West Bank and Gaza with armed people among the demonstrators who regularly open fire on IDF troops;
• The Tanzim has distributed inciting flyers against Israel among the population of the West Bank and Gaza;
• Tanzim officials have held regular meetings with Hamas leaders, encouraging them to act against Israel;
• The Tanzim has pressured the PA to release jailed extremists and Hamas activists who committed acts of terror against Israel.

Tanzim Leaders

In the West Bank, the Tanzim have had two main leaders. Marwan Barghouti, was one of the founders of the Shabiba, the Fatah youth organization. Expelled by Israel in the late 1980s, Barghouti served in PLO headquarters in Tunis. He returned to the West Bank in 1994, and in 1996 was elected to the PA’s Legislative body, representing the Ramallah district. In the last elections, he lost to his opponent, Hussein Al-Sheikh for the position of General Secretary of Fatah in the West Bank, but Arafat cancelled the results of the elections. Barghouti was head of the Fatah supreme committee in the West Bank and leader of the military wing of the Al-Aqsa Brigades. During the al-Aqsa Intifada Barghouti’s Tanzim were the main force organizing and carrying out thousands of terror attacks against Israel, including suicide bombings.

On April 14, 2002 an IDF force in Ramallah captured Barghouti, and Israel put him on public trial in Tel Aviv in Summer, 2002, which Barghouti used as a forum to challenge Israeli policies against the Palestinians. Barghouti’s nephew, Ahmed Taleb Mustapha Barghouti, alias “The Frenchman”, was arrested on April 15, and on June 23, 2002, was charged with a 52-count indictment for terrorist acts.

Hussein Al-Sheikh, also a Ramallah resident, is a political opponent of Bargouti. He is a central figure in Ramallah-based activities, and recently had been competing with Bargouti for extremist viewpoints. Al-Sheikh is supported by Hachem Balawy, who was appointed by Arafat to reduce the power of Bargouti.

In the Gaza Strip, Ahmad Chiles was a minor activist in the organization until he was recently appointed as the Fatah secretary in Gaza. Chiles is a seasoned veteran from the Intifada period. He is an extremist and serious inciter of violence. His brother, Dachlan, a senior officer in the Palestinian security forces, controls the Fatah apparatus in the Gaza Strip.

Tanzim in Bethlehem

Since Fall, 2001, Tanzim in the Bethlehem area purposely shot from churches and holy sites on several occasions, in an attempt to provoke an Israeli response that would result in harsh criticism of Israel from the international and Christian communities. After the 38 day occupation of the Church of the Nativity in Bethle
ham during Spring, 2002, the terrorists involved were released into European exile. Two of them, Tanzim members Ibrahim Mussa Abayat and Jihad Yusef Halil Ja’ara had murdered an American citizen in Israel before fleeing to the Church of the Nativity. Under US law, individuals who commit acts of terrorism against American nationals may be prosecuted for such acts in the United States, regardless of where the acts took place. The US Congress has prodded the Executive Branch to enforce the law by extraditing the terrorists.

In December 2000, talks were held with Israeli and Palestinian teams in Washington hosted by President Clinton who presented a bridging proposal to the parties aimed at ending the al Aqsa intifada. That proposal was taken up at marathon talks between Israeli and Palestinian delegations at the Egyptian resort of Taba between January 22 and January 28, 2001. The Clinton administration had already left office and the Bush team was not yet engaged. This was also the end of the peace process during the Barak government, and effectively the end of the entire Oslo peace process that started in Madrid in 1991. The Barak government continued to offer concessions to the Palestinians, but neither the Israeli public nor the Knesset supported these positions. Ariel Sharon’s landslide victory was only days away on February 6, 2001.

At Taba, Yasser Arafat hoped to lock the new Bush administration into the same set of proposals that had been put forth under Clinton, proposals that Arafat hoped would be a floor under any new negotiations with the Israelis. At the same time, Barak was hoping for some breakthrough that would bolster his election chances in the few weeks remaining of his term as Prime Minister.

The talks revealed that Palestinian positions had hardened since Camp David and that gaps between the two sides were larger than before. In fact, on January 28, 2001, the day after Israel made a last ditch effort to save the Peace Process by making major concessions in Taba, Yasser Arafat spoke at the Davos World Economic Forum where he delivered an anti-Israel diatribe full of misinformation, so hostile and vitriolic — calling Barak’s Israel “fascist” — that it left the international attendees stunned. Although a joint statement at the conclusion of the Taba talks said, “the sides declare that they never been closer to reaching an agreement”, no such agreement was forthcoming.

The talks were structured around four committees to discuss different aspects of the peace negotiations – Jerusalem, the refugees, territory and security.

On Jerusalem, Israeli negotiators presented to the Palestinians the idea of creating a special international regime for the “Holy Basin” — an area including the Old City and some areas outside the walls including the Mount of Olives cemetery. The Palestinians rejected the proposal, insisting on Palestinian sovereignty instead.

On territory and settlements in Judea and Samaria, the main basis for any agreement, the new maps presented by the two sides were closer than ever before to an agreed-upon borderline. Israel reduced its demands to six percent with territorial compensation that would offset about three percent, while the Palestinians proposed an Israeli annexation of approximately three percent along with a territorial compensation of the same amount. While the Israeli proposal would have given the Palestinians some 97 percent of the land area of the West Bank, there was no agreement.

In the refugees committee, at Taba the Israelis and Palestinians again took up the question ofArab refugees from Israel and the equal number of Jewish refugees forced out of Arab countries, a problem dating back to the 1948 War of Independence. One of the Israeli negotiators at Taba, Justice Minister Yossi Beilin, is quoted as saying that he and his counterpart on the Refugee Committee, Nabil Sha’ath, did in fact reach an agreement on the Palestinian right of return, one of the most difficult issues. But Abu Alaa (also known as Ahmed Korei) speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, overrode their agreement and issued a statement saying that:

• … the Palestinians insisted on the Right of Return, and Israel was the one who rejected it.

This is significant because the seeming inablility to agree on the right of return is one of the reasons many in Israel have little hope of ever reaching a settlement with the Palestinians. Given the escalating Palestinian terrorism against Israel since early 2001, Taba might have been a “last chance” that was thrown away by Abu Alaa’s ploy.

The bottom line of Taba was probably to convince Arafat that the intifada violence was a good tactic for the Palestinian Arabs. Dore Gold said in May 2001:

• During the period from September 2000 to February 2001, Arafat could have concluded that his intifada violence was working since Israel continued to negotiate under fire and proposed additional concessions at Taba even greater than the concessions previously offered at Camp David.

The violence continued, the Sharon government turned away from the Barak policy of concessions, and the peace process ground to a halt.

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The first large-scale assaults began on January 9, 1948, when approximately 1,000 Arabs attacked Jewish communities in northern Palestine. By February, the British said so many Arabs had infiltrated they lacked the forces to run them back. In fact, the British turned over bases and arms to Arab irregulars and the Arab Legion.

Early in the war, from November 29, 1947 until April 1, 1948, the Palestinian Arabs took the offensive, with help from volunteers from neighboring countries. The Jews suffered severe casualties and passage along most of their major roadways was disrupted. Starting in April 1948, the Haganah took the initiative, and in six weeks was able to turn the tables by capturing the Arab sections of Tiberias, Haifa and later also Safed and Acre. They temporarily opened the road to Jerusalem and gained control of much of the territory alotted to the Jewish State under the UN Resolution.

From mid-May to mid-July, the critical phase of the war, came the simultaneous, coordinated assault on the new State of Israel by five regular Arab armies from neighboring countries (Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon and Iraq), with an overwhelming superiority of heavy equipment – armor, artillery and airforce. From then through the negotiated agreements that ended the war in 1949, Israel not only ejected the invading Arab forces, it also captured and held some 5,000 sq. km. over and above the areas allocated to it by the United Nations.

On April 26, 1948, Transjordan’s King Abdullah said:

• [A]ll our efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Palestine problem have failed. The only way left for us is war. I will have the pleasure and honor to save Palestine.

On May 4, 1948, the Arab Legion attacked Kfar Etzion. The defenders drove them back, but the Legion returned a week later. After two days, the ill-equipped and outnumbered settlers were overwhelmed. Many defenders were massacred by the Arabs after they had surrendered.

The UN blamed the Arabs for the violence. The UN Palestine Commission was never permitted by the Arabs or British to go to Palestine to implement the resolution. On February 16, 1948, the Commission reported to the Security Council:

• Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein.

The Arabs were blunt in taking responsibility for starting the war. Jamal Husseini told the Security Council on April 16, 1948:

• The representative of the Jewish Agency told us yesterday that they were not the attackers, that the Arabs had begun the fighting. We did not deny this. We told the whole world that we were going to fight.

The British commander of Jordan’s Arab Legion, John Bagot Glubb admitted:

• Early in January, the first detachments of the Arab Liberation Army began to infiltrate into Palestine from Syria. Some came through Jordan and even through Amman… They were in reality to strike the first blow in the ruin of the Arabs of Palestine.

On May 14, 1948 David Ben-Gurion read Israel’s Proclamation of Independence in Tel Aviv. It included these paragraphs:

• We appeal … to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the building-up of the state on the basis of full and equal citizenship and representation in all its … institutions.
• We extend our hand to all neighbouring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and goodwill, and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land.

The Arabs, inside and outside the territory defined for the State of Israel, gave no consideration to these offers of peace or the many other attempts to negotiate a settlement. Immediately following the declaration of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948 and the departure of the British the next day, the five Arab armies invaded Israel. Their intentions were declared by Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League:

• This will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades.

In response to UN Security Council Resolution 340, adopted October 25, 1973, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim moved immediately to implement it by deploying the United Nations Emergency Force called for in the resolution. This force is often called the Second United Nations Emergency Force (or UNEF II) because a force of thesame name was deployed in the wake of the Sinai Campaign in 1956. It is also sometimes called the United Nations Emergency Force Middle East (UNEFME). The first elements of the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) arrived in Cairo on October 26, 1973. The task of the Force on arrival was to supervise the cease-fire between Egyptian and Israeli forces. The UNEF commander served as the chairman of the Egyptian-Israeli military disengagement negotiations. Following the conclusion of the agreements of January 18, 1974 and September 4, 1975, negotiated with the help of US Secretary of State Kissinger, the work of UNEF came to include supervision of the redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces and to man and control the buffer zones established under those agreements. Initially authorized at 7,000 troops, after several countries withdrew their units in late 1974, the UNEF force stabilized at 4,000 troops from states that were nonpermanent members of the UN Security Council (Sweden, Indonesia, Ghana, Senegal, and Finland). The five permanent Security Council members were prohibited from participating in the peacekeeping force under the terms of Resolution 340. Egyptian and Israeli officers were attached to the UNEF and participated in the monitoring activities. This new element contributed to the development of confidence between Egypt and Israel. Over the years, troops of other countries (Canada, Ireland, …) rotated in and out of the UNEF. After the Sinai II agreement of September 4, 1975, UNEF increased in size slightly to 4,200 plus 124 UN observers. Four helicopters and three light aircraft were added. The UNEF marked the lines on the ground with numbered, weighted oil drums painted white. The markers were placed so that the next in line was visible from the preceding marker. UNEF personnel also supported the construction of the Egyptian early warning station. Extensive monitoring operations were the basis of a stable peace that developed in the buffer zones. UNEF was located in the Suez Canal sector and later the Sinai peninsula, with its headquarters in Ismailia. UNEF II was allowed to expire on July 24, 1979 when the Soviet Union vetoed an extension. Its monitoring work was continued by a joint US-Israeli-Egyptian organization.

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As a result of the Six Day War, Israel gained all of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, Sinai, the Gaza Strip, and Judea and Samaria, known as the West Bank since its capture by Jordan in 1948.Almost immediately, Jews began to return to those areas to re-settleterritories commonly referred to as areas “outside the Green Line” (the pre-1967 border).The motivations of the inhabitants, or settlers, of these areas ranges from political, ideological or religious goals to financial considerations as they seek cheaper, more spacious living quarters commonly available outside the Green Line. [All settlements in theSinai were dismantled as part of the Israel-Egypt 1979 peace treaty.]

Jews have lived in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and Gaza Strip throughout recorded history, until the 1948 War of Independence, when they were forced to flee the invading Arab armies. Indeed, some of the current Jewish settlement communities existed prior to 1948, when they where overrun by invading Arab armies and destroyed. Kfar Etzion and other villages in the Jerusalem-Bethlehem corridor fell to Arab forces in May 1948 and those captured were massacred. Sons and daughters of Jews who lived there until 1948 were the first to return after the 1967 war.

In Hebron, the Jewish community existed throughout the centuries of Ottoman rule, until the massacre during the Arab rioting of 1929. Such settlements as Neve Ya’acov and the Gush Etsion block were established under the British Mandatory Administration, which allowed Jewish settlement in these areas.Even though British Mandate Authorities, particularly in the latter period of the Mandate, were not sympathetic to the Zionist cause, they nevertheless permitted the establishment of Jewish settlements in all areas west of the Jordan River, implementing the League of Nations Mandate. In fact,the Mandate called for Jewish settlement in all of the areas under British control including the almost 80% of the Mandate land that the British gave to create Trans-Jordan and prohibited Jewish settlement there.

Israel’s administration of the territory in 1967 replaced Jordan’s control of the West Bank and Egypt’s of the Gaza Strip. Egypt and Jordan gained control of these areas during the 1948 War with the newly established Israel, which according to the 1947 UN Partition Plan, were to be part of the independent Arab state to be established alongside an independent Jewish state. Neither Jordan nor Egypt had legal sovereignty over these areas. Israel maintains that these areas can thus not be considered “occupied territories” under international law, since Israel did not “occupy” them from another sovereign nation, but are “disputed territories” over which there are competing claims, and whose future must be determined through negotiations. Since 1967, Israeli governments have maintained a willingness to withdraw from areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in a peace agreement with the Arabs.

Under the Allon Plan, a proposal drawn up shortly after the 1967 war by Yigal Allon under which Israel would retain that section of the West Bank which would allow it to maintain defensible borders, the Labor government created some 21 settlements along the Jordan Valley and Eastern slopes of Samaria during that period, and avoided construction on the mountain ridge from Nablus to Jerusalem to Hebron.

None of the signed agreements between Israel and the Palestinians restrict the building or expansion of settlements. Indeed, the issue of settlements is specifically noted as an issue that will only be discussed during final status negotiations, the final stage of the peace process. The only prohibition in these agreements is that neither side take steps to change the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, such as unilateral declarations of statehood or annexation, prior to final status negotiations. The Israeli Government has voluntarily frozen the building of new settlements, but recognizes the needs of existing settlements to meet the changing needs of their residents, such as the expansion of existing homes to accommodate growing families.

Since 1967, Israeli governments have maintained a willingness to withdraw from areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in a peace agreement with the Arabs. In such a case, it was commonly expected that at least some of the settlements would have to be uprooted, just as the Israeli town of Yamit was dismantled following Israel’s peace agreement with Egypt. At Camp David in July 2000, Ehud Barak reportedly offered to uproot all Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and the isolated settlements on up to 95 percent of the territory of the West Bank, as part of a final status agreement. The Palestinians rejected this offer.

The Yom Kippur War in October 1973 was a profound shock to Israel. Even though thecountry emerged from the war victorious, having once again successfully defended itself from attacks by much larger Arab countries, the legacy of the war was somewhat negative. There were significant changes within Israel, and in Israel’s relations with other countries, primarily the United States.

Within Israel

The October 1973 War had a devastating effect on Israel. More than 6,000 troops had been killed or wounded in eighteen days of fighting. The loss of equipment and the decline of production and exports as a consequence of mobilization came to nearly US$7 billion, the equivalent of Israel’s gross national product for an entire year. Most important, the image of an invincible Israel that had prevailed since the June 1967 War was destroyed forever.

Considering the disadvantageous conditions under which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) entered the war, its ultimate achievements were outstanding. Of the several factors which turned the tide, undoubtedly the most significant was the heroic performance of the IDF’s reservists. Pitched into combat at literally a moment’s notice, Israel’s citizen-soldiers saved the country from military humiliation. That accomplishment exerted a profound effect on Israeli strategic planning. Although in later years, the conclusion came to be questioned, the performance of the IDF reservists in 1973 was considered at the time to be a vindication of the IDF’s force structure as a whole. Hence, whereas several other dimensions of Israeli security thinking were subsequently reviewed and in some cases revised, the IDF’s retention of its traditional framework of military service was not affected.

The June 1967 War had given Israel in general and the declining Labor Party in particular a badly needed morale booster, but the events of October 1973 shook the country’s self-confidence and cast a shadow over the competence of the Labor elite. A war-weary public was especially critical of Minister of Defense Dayan.

In its interim report of April 1974, the Agranat Commission, a body established after the war to determine responsibility for Israel’s military unpreparedness, claimed that it couldn’t take Moshe Dayan’s military background into account, and that it should judge him as a “civilian” defense minister. As such, the commission concluded that Dayan did not bear any personal responsibility, and that his ministerial responsibility was a public and political question rather than a judicial one. Dayan offered his resignation to Prime Minister Golda Meir, but it was not accepted. The commission put the blame on the Israeli military, and called for the dismissal of David Elazar, then army chief of staff.

Upon publication of the Agranat Commission report, Prime Minister Meir, whose performance was praised by the commission, took full responsibility, resigned on April 11, 1974 and brought about the establishment of the first Rabin government. Meir continued to be a major influence in the Labor Party.

The government formed in 1974 by Yitzhak Rabin, who had been chief of General Staff during the Six Day War and later ambassador to the US, signed disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria, and an interim agreement with Egypt. These agreements first established the principle of “territories for peace.”

Relations with the United States

The October 6, 1973 surprise attack on Israel by Egypt and Syria caused huge initial losses of personnel and material. Israel urgently needed more tanks, planes and ammunition. The Soviet Union was supplying the Arab attackers and Israel turned to the United States for help. That help was needed urgently with the survival of Israel at stake. After a delay of 3 days, the United States Nixon administration agreed to provide Israel with full replacement of all its losses.

The resupply set in motion a shift in American policy that would solidify the US-Israel relationship. Israel’s vulnerability during the war led to its increasing dependence on United States military, economic, and diplomatic aid. The war set off a spiraling regional arms race in which Israel was hard pressed to match the Arab states, newly enriched by skyrocketing world oil prices. At the same time,Nixon saw Israeli military power as a significant benefit to the United States in offsetting the Soviet’s inroads to the region as well as promoting regional stability.

As a direct result of the war, the United States quadrupled its foreign aid to Israel, and replaced France as Israel’s largest arms supplier. The doctrine of maintaining Israel’s “qualitative edge” over its neighbors was born in the war’s aftermath. This was based both on US appreciation of Israel’s role as a defender of Western values in a generally hostile region, and also on the Cold War calculus of opposing the client states of the Soviet Union.As a consequence of the war, the Nixon administration became committed to achieving peace in the region in order to offset or replace Soviet influence with the Arab countries and to stop the crippling effects of the Arab oil embargo on the US, Europe, and Japan.

Before the war, Congress barely managed to pass annual loans to Israel in the $500 million range by a few votes. But after the war, Israel began to receive about $2.1 billion a year, half in loans and half in grants. Almost all of the money went to purchase American-made military hardware. Five years later, Israel began to receive $3 billion in grants as a result of the 1978 Camp David accords, that led to the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

Relations with Arab Countries

The Yom Kippur War demonstrated to the Arab countries that Israel could not be defeated on the battlefield even under conditions as optimal as they are likely to get. This in turn led to an increased interest in diplomacy as the route to gains against Israel.

As a result of the intensive efforts of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Israel withdrew back across the Suez Canal and several miles inland from the east bank of the Suez Canal behind a UN-supervised cease-fire zone. On the Syrian front too, Israeli territorial gains made in the war were given up. After the war Egyptian and Syrian diplomatic relations with the United States, broken since the 1967 war, were resumed, and clearance of the Suez Canal began. The Yom Kippur War brought about a major shift of power in the Middle East and ultimately led to the signing of the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

Following the Yom Kippur War most of the African states and some other Third World countries emulated the eariler action of the Soviet block and severed diplomatic relations with Israel. In 1975 the UN General Assembly passed its infamous “Zionism equals racism” resolution. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which strengthened its international status in 1974, continued its terrorist attacks against Israel; Israel, in turn, refused to have anything to do with the PLO.

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British, Arab, and Jewish reactions to the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry were not favorable. Jewish terrorism in Palestine antagonized the British, and by February 1947 Arab-Jewish communications had collapsed. Britain, anxious to rid itself of the problem, set the United Nations in motion, formally requesting on April 2, 1947, that the U.N. General Assembly set up the Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). This committee recommended that the British mandate over Palestine be ended and that the territory be partitioned into two states. Jewish reaction was mixed–some wanted control of all of Palestine; others realized that partition spelled hope for their dream of a homeland.

The Arabs were not at all agreeable to the UNSCOP plan. In October the Arab League Council directed the governments of its member states to move troops to the Palestine border. Meanwhile, President Truman instructed the State Department to support the U.N. plan, and, reluctantly it did so. On November 29, 1947, the partition plan was passed by the UN General Assembly as Resolution 181.

In July of 2000, Yasser Arafat walked out of the Camp David peace talks and began plans for the armed struggle to resume. On September 27, 2000 Sgt. David Biri, 19, of Jerusalem, was fatally wounded near Netzarim in the Gaza Strip in the explosion of a roadside bomb. The next day in the West Bank city of Kalkilya, a Palestinian police officer working with Israeli police on a joint patrol opened fire and killed his Israeli counterpart. Also on September 28, 2000, Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. This visit became the pretext for instigating large scale demonstrations, the start of the al-Aqsa infifada.

Sharon did not attempt to enter any mosques during his 34 minute visit to the Temple Mount, Judaism?s holiest place, which Muslims have renamed Haram al-Sharif. His visit was conducted during normal hours when the area is open to tourists. Palestinian youths ? eventually numbering around 1,500 ? shouted slogans in an attempt to inflame the situation. Some 1,500 Israeli police were present at the scene to forestall violence.

There were limited disturbances during Sharon’s visit, mostly involving stone throwing. During the remainder of the day, outbreaks of stone throwing continued on the Temple Mount and in the vicinity, leaving 28 Israeli policemen injured, three of whom were hospitalized. There are no accounts of Palestinian injuries on that day. Significant and orchestrated violence was initiated by Palestinians the following day after Friday prayers.

In a revealing interview with the London-based Arabic daily Al-Hayat (September 29, 2001), Marwan Barghouti, head of the Tanzim, admitted his critical role in igniting the October 2000 intifada in both the West Bank and Gaza, as well as among the Israeli Arabs:

• I knew that the end of September was the last period (of time) before the explosion, but when Sharon reached the al-Aqsa Mosque, this was the most appropriate moment for the outbreak of the intifada….The night prior to Sharon’s visit, I participated in a panel on a local television station and I seized the opportunity to call on the public to go to the al-Aqsa Mosque in the morning, for it was not possible that Sharon would reach al-Haram al-Sharif just so, and walk away peacefully. I finished and went to al-Aqsa in the morning….We tried to create clashes without success because of the differences of opinion that emerged with others in the al-Aqsa compound at the time….After Sharon left, I remained for two hours in the presence of other people, we discussed the manner of response and how it was possible to react in all the cities (bilad) and not just in Jerusalem. We contacted all (the Palestinian) factions.

In the evening of the same day, Barghouti traveled to the Arab Triangle inside Israel where he was to participate in a conference. He confessed:

• While we were in the car on the way to the Triangle, I prepared a leaflet in the name of the Higher Committee of Fatah, coordinated with the brothers (e.g., Hamas), in which we called for a reaction to what happened in Jerusalem.

Imad Falouji, the Palestinian Authority Communications Minister, said at a rally in Lebanon on March 3, 2001,
that the violence had been planned in July, far in advance of Sharon’s “provocation.” He said:

• Whoever thinks that this [war] started as a result of Sharon’s despicable visit to Al Aksa is in error. It was planned since Arafat’s return from Camp David [where he] firmly stood up to Clinton and rejected the U.S. terms.

The intifada has little to do with Sharon’s visit, and everything to do with the Palistinian Arabs’ political agenda.Sakhr Habash, a member of the Fatah’s Central Committee, gave an interview to the Palestinian Authority newspapger, including this comment on the outbreak:

• [The Intifada] did not break out in order to improve our bargaining ability in the negotiations, nor as a reaction to Sharon’s provocative visit to Al-Haram Al-Sharif: this was only the spark. It was accumulated in the depths of our people and was bound to explode in the face of Barak’s government because of the political problem that was put off for more than a year and a half — the problem of independence.

On September 29, Palestinian Arabs staged large demonstrations and threw stones at police at the Western Wall in Jerusalem. Police used rubber-coated metal bullets and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4 persons and injuring approximately 200.

Palestinians began violent demonstrations against IDF soldiers, settlers, and other Israeli civilians throughout the occupied territories; these demonstrations and ensuing clashes are known to Palestinian Arabs and many Israelis as the “al-Aqsa intifada”.

From the beginning, in September 2000, the al-Aqsa intifada developed into the worst period of violence in Israel’s history, excepting only the periods of all-out war with neighboring Arab countries.

Israeli Officers (1955): Lieutant Meir Har-Zion, Major Arik Sharon Lieutant General Moshe Dayan (Chief of Staff) Captain Dani Matt, Lieutant Moshe Efron Major General Asaf Simchoni, Captain Aharon Davidi Lieutant Ya’akov Ya’akov, Captain Raful Eitan

In 1955, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser began to import arms from the Soviet bloc to build his arsenal for the confrontation with Israel. In the short-term, however, he employed a new tactic to prosecute Egypt’s war with Israel. He announced it on August 31, 1955:

• Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the Land of Israel….There will be no peace on Israel’s border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel’s death.

These “heroes” were Arab terrorists, or “fedayeen”, trained and equipped by Egyptian intelligence to engage in hostile action on the borders and to infiltrate Israel to commit acts of sabotage and murder. The fedayeen operated mainly from bases in Jordan, so that Jordan would bear the brunt of Israel’s retaliation, which inevitably followed. The terrorist attacks violated the armistice agreement provision that prohibited the initiation of hostilities by paramilitary forces; nevertheless, it was Israel that was condemned by the UN security council for its counterattacks.

The escalation continued with the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran, and Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956. On October 14, 1956 Nasser made clear his intent:

• I am not solely fighting against Israel itself. My task is to deliver the Arab world from destruction through Israel’s intrigue, which has its roots abroad. Our hatred is very strong. There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations.

Less than two weeks later, on October 25, Egypt signed a tripartite agreement with Syria and Jordan, placing Nasser in command of all three armies. A massive arms deal with Czechoslovakia threatened to flood Egypt with new Soviet equipment. When Egypt sealed off the Israeli port of Eilatby blocking the Straits of Tiran, effectively stopping Israel’s sea trade with much of Africa and the Far East, it was a violation of international agreements that amounted to an act of war.

The continued blockade of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, combined with the increased fedayeen attacks and the bellicosity of recent Srab statements, prompted Israel, with the backing of Britain and France, to attack Egypt on October 29, 1956.

The Sinai Campaign temporarily ended the activities of the fedayeen; however, they were renewed a few years later by a loosely knit group of terrorist organizations that became know as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

For Britain and France, who allied with Israel in the Sinai Campaign, the war was about the Suez Canal. Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal for Egypt on July 26, 1956. The nationalization of the canal took the world by surprise, especially the British and French stockholders who owned the Suez Canal Company. Although Nasser promised that the company would be compensated for its loss, Britain, France, and Israel began plotting to take back the canal and overthrow Nasser as well. Britain, France and Israel united in secret in what was to become known as the tripartite collusion, something that they denied publicly for many years. Israel opted to participate in the plans against Egypt to gain favor in the sight of western nations because the small developing nation of Israel was in constant fear of being overrun by Arab nations.

In the 1980s, US policy in the Middle East was cautious. Failure in Lebanon during the period of the Israeli operations there starting in 1982, led to a policy of staying out of the area unless and until the local parties to the conflict were ready to negotiate. Negative experiences with the Marines in Lebanon and with the peace process in particular, including the failure of the 1982 Reagan Plan made the White House consider the area very unpromising. And US efforts to bring the PLO into a diplomatic process, directly or through Jordan, were frustrated by the PLO’s continued policy of terrorism and its policy that the only end-result that they would accept was the destruction of Israel. In October 1987, Secretary of State Shultz said:

• The Palestinians must be involved in the peace process if it is to mean anything. There isn’t any question about that. [But] it’s also true there isn’t a role in the peace process for people whose tactics are violent and refuse to renounce violence, who refuse to recognize that Israel is there as a state[. Instead they must be] ready to talk and try to make peace.

The outbreak of Arab violence during the first intifada in December of 1987 brought new urgency to US efforts to broker some kind of solution. To respond to the situation and show US engagement, Shultz produced a new plan, presented in January 1988, which combined elements of the Camp David accords, the Reagan plan, King Hussein’s proposals, and Israeli Foreign Minister Peres’ ideas for an international conference. Between February and June 1988, Shultz used the Kissinger technique of “shuttle diplomacy” to promote his plan by travelling three times to the Middle East in the five months.

The basic elements of the Shultz plan called for:

• Begin negotiations hosted by the five permanent UN Security Council members, attended by all parties accepting UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and renouncing violence and terrorism.
• The Palestinians would be represented by a joint Jordan-Palestinian delegation who

would negotiate the terms of a three-year transitional period for the territories

• The international meetings would facilitate separate bi-lateral negotiations for a final settlement, but have no veto or enforcement power.

Egypt, Jordan, and Foreign Minister Peres supported the plan. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir questioned the timetable, international forum, and territory-for-peace formula. the PLO and Syria were very critical and West Bank/Gaza Palestinians refused to meet with Shultz, apparently on orders from the PLO. Shultz was able to maintain that no party had said “no” to his proposal but, by the same token, none took it up enthusiastically.

The election of George H.W. Bush in November 1988 was the end of the Reagan Administration and any remaining momentum on the Schultz Plan was lost. But, by stating the conditions under which the US would begin to deal directly with the PLO, Schultz had caused a debate within the PLO. In November 1988 the PLO announced publically (the Algiers Declaration) that they would take the minimal steps needed to fulfill US preconditions for holding meetings with it. Arafat finally recognized the importance of the US as a regional power broker, but he also overestimated the ability of the US to bring Israel to the table to impose a settlement.

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The 1929 Arab riots in Palestine triggered another British Commission of Inquiry. In this instance, Sir Walter Shaw chaired the four member Commission, which visited the area and delivered its report in March, 1930.

The principle findings of the Shaw Commission were:

• The violence occurred due to “racial animosity on the part of the Arabs, consequent upon the disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future.”
• The Arabs feared economic domination by a group who appeared to the Arabs to have unlimited funding from abroad.
• The Commission acknowledged the ambiguity of former British statements to both Arabs and Jews.

One of the commission members, Lord Snell, wrote a dissenting opinion, while the majority recommended:

• An immediate statement of British intentions in Palestine
• A re-examination of immigration policy
• A scientific inquiry into land usage and potential
• A clarification of the Zionist Organization’s relationship with the Mandate

Acting on these recommendations, the British Government authorized the Hope-Simpson expert investigation of land capacity issues), and, after considering the Shaw Commission and Hope-Simpson reports, the Colonial Secretary issued the Passfield White Paper of 1930, the recommended statement updating British policy in the Palestine Mandate.

However, the British still seemed to be saying to each interest group what each wanted to hear, regardless of the facts. For example, at a meeting of the League of Nations Mandates Commission in Geneva in 1930, after the Shaw Report recommeded changes in immigration policy, the British representative said:

• We fully realise the important part played by immigration in the policy which we are carrying out under the mandate, as approved by the Council of the League of Nations, namely, that of setting up in Palestine a National Home for the Jewish people. As has been stated repeatedly we have no intention of departing from that policy, or of acting otherwise than in accordance with the terms of the mandate.

In reality, the British clamped down on immigration and prevented many thousands of Jews from leaving Europe to escape the Nazi menace.

On September 4, 1999, the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum was signed in Egypt by Ehud Barak, newly elected Prime Minister of Israel, and Yasser Arafat. The ceremony was also attended by Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, His Majesty King Abdullah, King of Jordan, and Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State. This agreement was needed because the timetable of the Oslo Peace Process, most recently in the form of the Wye River agreement of 1998 had seriously slipped due to Palestinian non-compliance with the security requirements and the consequent Israeli refusal to continue with scheduled redeployments. The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum restated the commitment of the two sides to full implementation of all agreements reached since the first Oslo Agreement of September 1993, and attempted to resolve the outstanding issues of the interim status, in particular those set out in the Wye Memorandum, in order to form a bridge between the completion of the interim period and the initiation of the permanent status negotiations on an accelerated basis.

Under the timetable of the 1993 Declaration of Principles final status talks were originally due to have been completed by May 4, 1999 – five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. The Sharm al-Sheikh memorandum set a new date of September 13, 2000 for the completion of the talks. In the meantime it committed the two sides to agree by March 13, 2000 on a “framework” for the eventual final status agreement, a deadline that was not met.

The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum reiterated the obligations of both parties in an effort to put the timetable of Wye back on track. It again recited the many security obligations of the Palestinians which had been ignored or violated continuously. It called for release of prisoners and redeployments by Israel which were carried out, at least until corresponding actions by the Palestinians were not.

Even though the timeline for the final status framework could not be realized, the United States used the committment to maintain pressure on both sides during intensive working-level meetings in late 1999 and the first half of 2000. The 2000 permanent status negotiations led to Camp David in August of 2000 and the rejection of significant Israeli concessions by Yasser Arafat. Arafat’s walkout doomed the permanent status negotiations and the Oslo Peace Process effectively ended with the start of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000.

On October 17, 2000, less than a month after the violence of the al-Aqsa intifada erupted in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel, President Bill Clinton met with Middle Eastern leaders for two days in Sharm al Shaykh, Egypt, in a US-sponsored effort to engineer a stop to Israeli?Palestinian violence.

Despite Clinton’s optimistic appraisal that “we made real progress,” the results of Sharm were indeterminate. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat didn’t hold face-to-face talks. Nor did the estranged “peace partners” sign an agreement or even publicly shake hands. Instead, President Clinton simply read a statement at a press conference summarizing three steps on which he said the parties had agreed. Clinton refused to answer questions.

According to the statement, both sides agreed to issue public statements calling for an end of violence and to take steps to end the confrontations. The parties also confirmed that they would consult with Washington regarding how to move forward with the resumption of final status negotiations. Of these steps, however, the only one to be implemented was one initiated by Mr. Clinton himself ? the establishment of a committee that would submit a report “on the auspices of the US president for publication.” This was a modest success, since Clinton was able to persuade the Palestinian leadership to abandon its demand for an international commission of inquiry under UN auspices, and instead accept a “committee of fact-finding” appointed by Clinton. This committee, formally known as the “Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Commission” came to be known as the Mitchell Commission and their report became the “Mitchell Plan”.

After the Sharm El-Sheikh Conference, the al-Aqsa intifada went on as before.

Pres. Nasser of Egypt saw his prestige collapse from the debacle of the Six Day War in 1967. Egyptian forces were destroyed as the Israeli’s swept through the Sinai to the Suez Canal, killing at least 3,000 soldiers. The devastation and loss of the Sinai oil fields threatened to bankrupt the Egyptian government. Arab internal hostilities and growing Palestinian nationalism strained Nasser’s abilities. At age 52, he collapsed and died of a heart attack on September 29, 1970.

Anwar Sadat took over from Nassar and tried to interest Israel in peace proposals on his terms in 1971. Failure in that arena led to the surprise attack on Israel of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Although the Arab strikes against Israel were not successful, the end of the Yom Kippur War led to intense diplomatic efforts to achieve a permanent peace in the region and to a renewed Arab interest in diplomatic, rather than armed, methods of making progress with Israel. In addition to the problems of the war itself, the deteriorating economy in Egypt, accompanied by a growing distance between rich and poor, led to internal strife, riots, strikes, attacks on the rich. These internal pressures raised the attention of the international community, particularly the United States, concerned that internal strife would weaken Sadat’s moderate policies.

Convinced that peace with Israel would reap an enormous “peace dividend,” Sadat initiated his most important diplomatic ploy. On Wednesday, November 9, 1977 Sadat told the People’s Assembly, Egypt’s parliament:

• Israel would be astonished when they hear me say this. But I say it. I am ready to go even to their home … to the Knesset and discuss peace with them if need be.

Then on Friday, November 11, Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin took up Sadat’s offer and extended an invitation to the Egyptian leader in a message broadcast directly to the Egyptian people. Begin said:

• Let us say to one another, and let it be a silent oath by the peoples of Egypt and Israel: no more wars, no more bloodshed and no more threats.

Then followed a week of activity to formalize the invitation and the timing of a meeting,in an exchange of letters transmitted between Israel and Egypt by the US ambassadors in Tel Aviv and Cairo. Sadat and Begin then announced the Egyptian would arrive in Israel Saturday night, November 19th. Advance planes from Egypt were met in Israel by cheering crowds.

Sadat held talks in Damascus with Syrian President Hafez Assad in an unsuccessful attempt to win Syrian support for the mission the Egyptian called his “sacred duty.” Syria was unmoved. Violent Arab opposition to the trip erupted with a pair of explosions at the Egyptian Embassy in Damascus.

On Saturday, November 19 Sadat’s jet — Egyptian One — brought Anwar Sadat to Israel. He was greeted by the blare of trumpets and a 21-gun salute in a formal airport welcome by Begin, Israeli President Ephraim Katzir and many past and present Israeli leaders. Sadat drove to Jerusalem with Katzir and met briefly with Begin at the King David Hotel, his base for the 36-hour visit. On Sunday, Sadat prayed at the Al Aqsa Mosque and visited the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial with Begin.

That afternoon, Sadat mounted rostrum of the Knesset and speaking forcefully in Arabic he called his visit an “important juncture in the history of the world.” As expected, Sadat restated Arab demands including Israeli withdrawal from war-won lands and a permanent home for the Palestinians. But then he declared:

• I wish to tell you today and I proclaim to the whole world: We accept to live with you in a lasting and just peace.

Begin, following Sadat to the rostrum, called on Arab leaders to open peace negotiations and declared:

• Everything must be negotiated and can be negotiated.

The Israeli also hailed the courage shown by his old foe in coming to Israel:

• We Jews appreciate courage, and we will know how to appreciate our visitor’s courage.

Sadat was named “Man of the Year for 1977″ by Time Magazine.

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What happened at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in 1982?

Sabra and Shatila are two Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, Lebanon where nearly two thousand Palestinian refugees were massacred during three days from September 16 to September 17, 1982. The massacre was carried out by hundreds of Christian Lebanese Phalangists with the aid of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) surrounding the camp.

The Israeli invasion in Lebanon and the siege of Beirut during 1982 witnessed a written agreement between the U.S Envoy and Palestine according to which Palestinian fighters would depart Lebanon, leaving the Palestinian refugees under the U.S. guarantee of safety. The Israeli army sealed off the refugee camps after the Palestinian fighters left and established a command post where primary members of the atrocity were Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, along with other Israeli army officials and Chief of Lebanese Forces Intelligence Elie Hobeika.

Some people assert that the massacre was carried out by Lebanese Forces and some assert the act to be carried out by Phalangists because Lebanese Forces were established by Bachir Gemayel and Lebanese Phalanges by his father, Pierre. Bachir Gemayel was assassinated on September 14 and sources regard this massacre as an immediate retaliation as the LF entered the camps right that afternoon and carried out a heinous massacre which lasted for 62 hours. They assume that Gemayel was killed by the hands of PLO; however, other sources reveal that the assassination was carried out by some Syrians who objected Gemayel’s alliance with Israel.

The IDF invaded Lebanon on June 5, 1982 and reached the outskirts of Beirut within a few days. It didn’t take long to understand that IDF’s mission, which started as removing the threat of any PLO attacks, had more to it. Bringing power in Beirut so that they sign a peace agreement with Israel was one such far-reaching aim. The LF units entered the camps on the order of security and intelligence officer Elie Hobeika. LF unit started killing the Palestinians refugees brutally upon entering the camps. Apart from the reason of taking a revenge on the Palestinians, another compelling reason was the belief held between the Maronite communities that the best way of dealing with Palestinians is by taking drastic measures so that they flee the country. Massacre which occurred at Sabra and Shatila is one of the many attacks that took place during the civil war in Lebanon. Other similar incidents include Massacre of Christians in 1976 and the massacre of the Palestinian refugee camp in Tal al-ZaDtar in August 1976.

Throughout the evening of September 16 and all next day, IDF surrounding the camps received reports of sporadic killing inside the camp; however, they responded with indifference and took no serious notice until the reports could no longer be ignored and ordered LF to pull out of the camps only then. LF raped and murdered men, women and children, cutting them open and throwing them on piles of rubbish.

The casualties occurred in the massacre are all reported different by Lebanese investigation committee (460), the Kahan Committee (700 to 800) and the Palestinian Red Cross (2000). Kahan commission was established by the Israeli government to investigate and found out that Israeli military personnel were involved and were aware that a massacre was in progress without taking steps to put a stop to it. And so it regarded Israel to be indirectly responsible for the massacre and held Ariel Sharon responsible for disregarding the act of massive bloodshed and not taking preventive measures. However, this did not cause any lasting damage to his image as Sharon was elected the Prime Minister of Israel in 2001.

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On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly, in its 128th plenary session, by a two-thirds vote (33 to 13 with Britain and nine others abstaining) passed Resolution 181 partitioning Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. The Jewish community of Palestine jubilantly accepted partition despite the small size and strategic vulnerability of the proposed state. Not only were the West Bank and Gaza Strip not included, but alsoJerusalem, most of the Galilee in the North and parts of the Negev desert in the South were excluded.

After the vote was announced, the six Arab delegations of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen stormed out threatening war and the annihilation of the Palestinian Jews. Pakistan’s delegation followed suit. The Arab national movement in Palestine, as well as all the Arab states, angrily rejected partition. They demanded the entire country for themselves and threatened to resist partition by force. Had they acceptedthe UN proposal in 1947, the independent Palestinian Arab state, covering an area much larger than Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and Gaza, would have been created along with Israel. Instead, they rejected the plan and launched a war to destroy the nascent Jewish state.

Almost immediately there was Arab violence against the Jews in Palestine. Mordechai Palzur, the former chief of protocol at the Israeli Foreign Ministry, quotes a report published in Foreign Relations of the United States 1947 by Robert Macatee, consul general of Jerusalem:

• It is tragic that many of the present casualties comprise innocent and harmless people going about their daily business. They are picked off while riding in buses, walking along the streets and stray shots even find them while asleep in their beds. A Jewish woman, mother of five children, was shot in Jerusalem while hanging out clothes on the roof. The ambulance rushing her to the hospital was machine gunned and finally the mourners following her to the funeral were attacked and one of them was stabbed to death.

The Arabs were blunt in taking responsibility for starting the war. Jamal Husseini, the Arab Higher Committee’s spokesman, told the Security Council on April 16, 1948:

• The representative of the Jewish Agency told us yesterday that they were not the attackers, that the Arabs had begun the fighting. We did not deny this. We told the whole world that we were going to fight.

The British commander of Jordan’s Arab Legion, John Bagot Glubb admitted:

• Early in January, the first detachments of the Arab Liberation Army began to infiltrate into Palestine from Syria. Some came through Jordan and even through Amman . . . They were in reality to strike the first blow in the ruin of the Arabs of Palestine.

UNSCOP was prevented by Arab and British forces from doing a full investigation in Palestine. They reported to the Security Council on 16 February 1948:

• Organized efforts are being made by strong Arab elements inside and outside Palestine to prevent the implementation of the Assembly’s plan of partition and to thwart its objectives by threats and acts of violence, including armed incursions into Palestinian territory… This Commission now finds itself confronted with an attempt to defeat its purposes, and to nullify the resolution of the General Assembly.

Jerusalem became the scene of the bloodiest battles, in danger of destruction, which aroused international concern. On 6 May 1948, the Special Session of the General Assembly recommended that:

• … the Mandatory Power appoint, under Palestine legislation, before 15 May 1948, a neutral acceptable to both Arabs and Jews, as Special Municipal Commissioner, who shall, with the co-operation of the community committees already existing in Jerusalem, carry out the functions hitherto performed by the Municipal Commission. (General Assembly Resolution 187 (S.II).)

A Philadelphia attorney, Mr. Harold Evans, was appointed to the post, but he never set foot in Jerusalem. The General Assembly failed to decide on a Statute of Jerusalem, and turned down a proposal submitted at the decisive hour before the Mandate lapsed for a temporary trusteeship regime of the city.

The United States, the Soviet Union and most other member states of the United Nations immediately recognized Israel after it declared independence on May 14, 1948, and indicted the Arabs for their aggression. The United States urged a resolution charging the Arabs with breach of the peace. Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko told the Security Council, May 29, 1948:

• This is not the first time that the Arab states, which organized the invasion of Palestine, have ignored a decision of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. The USSR delegation deems it essential that the council should state its opinion more clearly and more firmly with regard to this attitude of the Arab states toward decisions of the Security Council.

The initial phase of the fighting ended after the Security Council threatened July 15 to cite the Arab governments for aggression under the Charter. By this time, the Haganah had been renamed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and succeeded in stopping the Arab offensive.

During the summer of 1948, Count Folke Bernadotte was sent by the UN to Palestine to mediate a truce and try to negotiate a settlement. Bernadotte’s plan called for the Jewish State to relinquish the Negev and Jerusalem to Transjordan and to receive the western Galilee. This was similar to the boundaries that had been proposed prior to the partition vote, and had been rejected by all sides. Now, the proposal was being offered after the Arabs had gone to war to prevent partition and a Jewish state had been declared. The Jews and Arabs both rejected the plan. Bernadotte was assassinated by LEHI extremists in Jerusalem on September 17, 1948, an act that resulted in the elimination of the LEHI organization by mainstream Jewish leaders.

Although UN Resolution 181 is still sometimes cited when it is advantageous to the pro-Arab Palestinian position, the State of Israel has consistently maintained that the Partition Resolution became null and void when it was rejected by the Arab side in 1947.

As late as 1999, Resolution 181 was once again the focus of attention, more than 50 years after it was passed by the United Nations and rejected by the Arabs. The Palestinian Authority arranged for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to pass a resolution calling for Palestinian self-determination only on the basis UN Resolution 181. This was a blatant attempt to rewrite all of the history of the years between 1947 and 1999 and it was swiftly denounced.

Ironically, the United Nations has been an anti-Israel institution since shortly after the UN was instrumental in the founding of the State of Israel. Unfortunately the UN was often subverted by a coalition of third-world countries, Soviet client states, pro-Arab and anti-Semitic forces who could use actions against Israel as a proxy for stabs against the United States and its democratic allies. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, this coalition was absorbed by the Middle Eastern forces seeking to destroy Israel. Today, the UN cannot be seen as a useful guide to world opinion or the moral course of action.

The United Nations will see it self in a new role this month as Palestine mounts a bid for membership in 2011.

Dr. Gunnar Jarring, Sweden’s Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was appointed by the United Nations to work with Israel and the Arab states to try toimplement UN Security Council Resolution 242. This was a strange appointment because Jarring remained Ambassador to the Soviet Union, a country which had broken off its diplomatic relations with Israel, making it difficult or impossible for Jarringto do anything that might be viewed as favorable to Israel. Jarring met with parties in the Middle Eastin early 1968, but the Arab states refused direct or even indirect contact with Israeland Jarring was not the man to challenge them.

By 1969, the Nixon administration, with Henry Kissinger as National Security Adviser, was deeply committed to a detante with theSoviet Union and reaching some agreement on the Middle East was vital to their efforts. On March 13, 1969, Israel’s Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin met with US Secretary of State William Rogers to discuss a set of US proposals for Arab-Israeli peace, the first time in US-Israel relations that the US had authored its own plan. The plan was completely unacceptableto Israel since it called for Israel’s unilateral withdrawal to pre-1967 borders without any Arab peace and security commitments to Israel.

Israel rejected the plan, but the US presented it to the Soviet Union and Arab states nonetheless. The Arab and Soviet governments turned it down, refusing to discuss any bi-lateral agreement with Israel. They insisted on a UN-imposed withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines, to be guaranteed by the UN and buttressed by security arrangements. The secret plan, never announced publically, seemed to be dead.

Israel’s Prime Minister Golda Meir visited the United States in late September 1969, and met with President Nixon in Washington on September 25 and 26.

By the end of 1969, there was heavy fighting along the Suez Canal, and Arab terrorists were engaged in sabotage actions against Israel from Jordan and Syria, assisted by the armed forces of those two countries.

On December 9, US Secretary of State Rogers, revived the plan by making the same proposals for a Middle East peace settlement, based on an interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242, in a public speech that became known as the Rogers Plan, although it was really Nixon’s plan. Golda Meir described the Rogers Plan as a disaster for Israel, saying:

• It would be irresponsible for any Israeli government to support such a plan.

The administration did not consult with Israel before the plan was announced, and the American secretary of state, who had met with foreign minister Abba Eban a few days before, concealed the imminent announcement from him.

The proposals were still unacceptable toIsrael who recalled Yitzchak Rabin, their US ambassador, to return home for consultations.On December 22, 1969 Israel’s Cabinet formally rejected the Rogers Plan.In a vote in the US Congress in 1970, 70 Senators and 280 Representatives rejected Secretary of State Rogers’ peace plan as being too one-sided against Israel.

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Marwan Barghouti was born on June 5, 1960, in the West Bank, outside of Ramallah, the son of a farmer. He was one of the founders of the Shabiba, the Fatah youth organization. Fatah is the largest constituent organization in the PLO, and is headed personally by Yasser Arafat. Schooled in Hebrew during his time in Israeli jails, Barghouti was a field Fatah leader during the first intifada of 1987, when he was deported by Israel. Barghouti served in PLO headquarters in Tunisia. He returned to the West Bank in 1994 and was elected to the Palestinian Legislative Council of the Palestinian Authority, created by the 1995 Oslo II Interim Agreement, in 1996.

Barghouti initially came into prominence because of his willingness to speak out against the corruption of the Palestinian Authority leadership. He tried to distinguish himself from “the Tunisians,” the PLO exile leadership that accompanied Yasser Arafat to the West Bank and Gaza Strip with the implementation of the Oslo accords.

In 1995, Arafat set up the Tanzim (“organization” in Arabic) as a paramilitary force of the Fatah, separate from the Palestinian Authority. This provided Arafat a certain distance and deniability regarding its attacks on Israelis, instead of his using the Palestinian Authority security services. Nonetheless, Arafat directly arms and finances the Tanzim. Barghouti, who helped found the Tanzim, is regarded as its commander, with Arafat’s full backing. When Barghouti lost the election for the position of General Secretary of Fatah, Arafat cancelled the election results.

Barghouti has self-confessed to a central role in the contrived opening moves of the al-Aqsa intifada which has taken thousands of lives, Israeli and Palestinian Arab, since its start in 2001. At the same time he aspires to be successor to Yasser Arafat and needs to portray himself as a moderate to the West.

Barghouti wrote an op-ed piece in the Washington Post on January 16, 2002, presenting himself as a reasonable Palestinian leader with limited political aims, who also renounces terrorism and advocates only the Palestinian Arabs’ right to self-defense:

• And while I, and the Fatah movement to which I belong, strongly oppose attacks and the targeting of civilians inside Israel (emphasis added), our future neighbor, I reserve the right to protect myself, to resist the Israeli occupation of my country and to fight for my freedom.

Yet the next day, a member of Fatah’s Tanzim militia attacked a Bat Mitzvah party in Hadera, killing six civilians and wounding over thirty. Israeli security sources have firmly established that Marwan Barghouti knew of the Hadera attack in advance, and gave it his blessing. Barghouti is on Israel’s wanted list in connection with this Tanzim terrorist operation, and others. He denies accusations that he participates in military operations.

The New Yorker magazine (July 9, 2001) published a “Letter From Gaza,” where Barghouti was asked what would Israel have to do to bring an end to the intifada? He replied:

• We need one hundred per cent of Gaza, one hundred per cent of the West Bank, one hundred per cent of East Jerusalem, and the right of return for refugees.

It was then pointed out that former Prime Minister Ehud Barak had, at the Camp David summit in 2000, offered the Palestinians a series of dramatic concessions, close to Barghouti’s list of demands: a free Gaza, around ninety per cent of the West Bank, a capital in East Jerusalem, and so on. Barghouti responded:

• No! Nothing less than a hundred per cent is acceptable.

And if you get a hundred per cent? Will that end the conflict? His reply:

• Then we could talk about bigger things. I’ve always thought that a good idea would be one state for all the peoples.

Moderate? In Barghouti’s thinking, there is no room for a Jewish State of Israel.

In March and April of 2002, during Israel’s Operation Defensive Shield, documents were discovered in Yasser Arafat’s Ramallah compound demonstrating that the “al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade” is directed by Marwan Barghouti, who passes concrete instructions to Al-Aqsa operatives. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, a cover name for a reorganization of Fatah, was declared a terrorist organization by the US after a series of deadly attacks against Israel were attributed to them.

On April 15, 2002 Israeli security forces arrested Barghouti in Ramallah, part of Israel’s Operation Defensive Shield. He was tried in Israeli courts for a series of murders and other crimes where he was linked by evidence. In May of 2004 he was convicted of the murder of five civilians and of involvement in four terror attacks. On June 6, 2004 he was given five consecutive life sentences plus an additional 40 years in prison (20 years for attempted murder and another 20 for membership in a terror organization).

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Road Map for Peace was a plan initiated by the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations; the “quartet” of international entities. The basic principles of the plan were declared by U.S. President George W. Bush in a speech delivered on June 24, 2002 which was the establishment of an independent Palestinian State coexisting with Israel. According to him:

“The Roadmap represents a starting point toward achieving the vision of two states, a secure State of Israel and a viable, peaceful, democratic Palestine. It is the framework for progress towards lasting peace and security in the Middle East.”

In exchange for the independent statehood, the Road Map called for democratic reforms from Palestinian Authority and restrain from violence. And Israel was required to accept the Palestinian government and lift occupation from West Bank and Gaza Strip and to dismantle the settlement outposts. However, the Road Map did not see as much progress as it aimed to.

The road map process was divided in three phases with a collective solution reaching no later than 2005. Based on its principle, the Road Map will “bring an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories that began in 1967” and create “an independent democratic Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors.”

Phase I of the road map aimed to end violence from both Israel and Palestine, put an end to Israeli settlement activities in Gaza Strip and the West Bank and for Palestinian Authority to gain recognition as Palestinian government. Phase II stated creation of an interim Palestinian state whose borders will be set on temporary basis. Phase III will lead to final negotiations regarding the status of Jerusalem, fixation of Palestinian borders and international recognition for both Palestine and Israel. However, the plan was rejected by the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon stating that he does not approve of the settlement freeze.

Although the plan of Road Map was set for a designated period, it was also “performance-based”, meaning that peaceful solutions will be derived from it only when Israel and Palestine fully corporate with each other and fulfill their sides of the deal. The plan also did not state anything about the long-going issues regarding the status of Jerusalem and defining of the Palestinian borders, keeping the issue of “final status” open to successive negotiations.

Even today the principles of Road Map remain the basis for all the peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine. However, Israel held view that Palestine has failed to put a rein on violence and Palestine said that Israel remained adamant for not vacating the settlement outposts. Experts have also regarded Road Map similar to Oslo Accords where no final agreements were laid out and were simply frameworks for negotiations.

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The Six-Day War ended at 1630 GMT on June 10, 1967 when a cease-fire became effective on the Israel-Syrian front. Israel’s casualties amounted to 759 dead and about 3,000 wounded. Arab casualties were never officially tallied, but are believed to be about 15,000. Israel had avoided the threat to its very existence, but also remembered well that there was no peace after the victory in 1948-49. Therefore,Israel was determined to hold the new cease-fire lines until a permanent peace was established.

Israel’s victory was devastating to the Arab countries, who had expected a quick and easy victory for themselves. Instead they not only failed to achieve their goal of destroying Israel, but on the contrary Israel gained all of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, Sinai, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank.

In the United Nations the Security Council had been inert and ineffectual during the emergency that preceded the war. During the war they became active and met each day of the fighting, attempting to arrange a cease-fire. On June 10, the Soviet Union, embarrassed that its Arab client states lost the war, broke off diplomatic relations with Israel, followed by the Soviet puppet regimes in Bulgaria, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary. On June 13, the Soviet Union asked that a special emergency session of the General Assembly be convened. The Assembly was addressed on June 19 by Soviet Premier Kosygin, who called for condemnation of Israel, withdrawal of its forces from all areas occupied in the war, and payment of compensation by Israel for damage inflicted on Egypt, Syria and Jordan. His address was answered by Israel’s Foreign Minister.

The discussion in the Assembly went on for a month while a number of draft Resolutions were considered. On July 21, the session adjourned having decided nothing and referred the issue back to the Security Council. The Council, after long discussions, on November 22 unanimously adopted Resolution 242, which became the basis for future United Nations policymaking on the Middle East conflict.

The Arab States had no interest in peace, despite overtures from Israel. Israel advocated direct negotiations between the parties, without prior conditions, aimed at the conclusion of binding peace agreements. Until peace was made, the Israel Defence Forces were deployed on the new cease-fire lines, and the areas occupied in the Six-Day War came to be administered by an Israeli Military Government. Jerusalem was reunified at the end of June 1967, and the whole city was thus brought under Israeli law.

Immediately after the Six Day War many observers believed that the shock of defeat would bring the Arabs to their senses and force them to the conference table where a just and lasting peace might be negotiated for the benefit of the whole region. But the Arab countries were encouraged in their dreams of conquest by the Soviet Union, which embarked on the rebuilding of their shattered armies. At a summit meeting in Khartoum in late August 1967 they established a uniform policy of three nays: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel.

As a result of the Israeli victory in the Six Day War, a great spiritual uplift was felt in Israel and among Jews all over the world. The re-unification of Jerusalem made it possible to return to the legacy of Jewish history in the Old City, in Bethleh, in Hebron and more. Israel after the Six Day War stretched from Mt. Hermon to Sharm a-Sheikh, from the Jordan River to the Suez Canal. But the end of the war failed to bring quiet to the new borders. Israel’s Arab neighbors did not accept their defeat. Sporadic flare-ups began immediately after the war, including terrorist attacks and static artillery bombardments.

The PLO was forced out of the territories of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and Gaza and relocated to Jordan. They proceeded to rebuild, and went on to threaten the regime of King Hussein, who eventually expelled the PLO from Jordan through a bloody 1970 fight with the Jordanian Army.

Michael Adams of the Council for Anglo-Arab Understanding, a pro-Arab lobby, made the claim that the Israeli army had massacred 200 Arabs in Gaza. David Pryce-Jones, an esteemed journalist who in 1973 wrote The Face of Defeat, a book about the Palestinians, was alarmed at the charge of such an atrocity in the territory he was covering. He relates:

• “So I investigated. The story had begun with Gazans themselves. For days on end, they escorted me helpfully through the crowded streets of Gaza City from one house to another in search of families with a missing relative. There was always one more address to be visited, and one more rumor to be explored, but we found neither victims nor burial place for the simple reason that none existed. The story was untrue.”

Led by Saudi Arabia, OPEC announced on October 16, 1973, as part of the political strategy that accompanied the Yom Kippur War, that the Arab countries were cutting production and placing an embargo on shipments of crude oil to Western countries, the US and the Netherlands in particular. At the same time, they imposed a complete boycott of Israel. The oil companies and other intermediaries cooperated with the embargo; the result was that world oil prices rose to previously unheard of levels, four times the previous highs. The economies of the industrialized countries across the globe were damaged; by early 1974 most of the world was hit by the worst slump since the Great Depression of 1932-1940.

While psychologically effective for a time, the actual results of the Arab/OPEC strategy were primarily price increases, not supply disruption. During the October 1973 to March 1974 embargo period, crude oil supplies in the US grew tightest in February 1974 and even then were only 5.1 percent lower then the daily average for the first three-quarters of the preceding year. What is more, the Netherlands, singled out by the Arabs, experienced less of a shortfall than France and Britain, the countries that led western Europe’s pro-Arab political initiative. The Arab states ended their production limitation plan and embargo without winning their political demands against Israel.

Nonetheless, over the next decade or so the Arabs grew enormously wealthy from the “oil shock”. Huge cash flows poured into the Gulf states who responded with buying sprees for military weapons, building projects, and lavish consumption. US and European arms manufacturers, banks, shipping, and industrial building contractors like Bechtel did very well making a business out of “recycling petrodollars”.

At the same time, however, the much higher prices for crude oil stimulated development activity in every country that had any potential for oil fields. It took years, but ultimately old fields were expanded and new fields were discovered, wells were drilled and pipe lines built to ports. The global supply of crude oil was dramatically increased, brought forth by the higher prices, as any first year economics student could have predicted. This resulted in a still-growing glut and the Middle East, while still quite important, is no longer the dominant world supplier of oil. The collapse of the oil cartel in the 1980s, the transformation in the global energy markets, and the political disunity in the Arab world have made the notion of the “Arab oil weapon” a distant memory.

During the era when the Arab nations boycotted Israel, corporations and nations had to agree to Arab wishes and not do business with Israel. While not necessarily pro-Israel, these nations and their companies did not enjoy the unreasonable demands of Arab kings, dictators and even terrorist nations and groups who extorted financial benefits or political concessions in exchange for maintaining the oil flow. Now that the oil weapon has been defused (largely), the emphasis for the developed world has shifted to an eager participation with Israel’s high-tech markets and the well-developed Israeli consumer market.

Even the Arab countries, at least the moderate ones, understand the changes; Saudi Arabia has disavowed the use of oil as a weapon. Every regime, regardless of its structure or politics, wants the cash flow from their oil. And the principal suppliers of US oil today are more reliable and better allies than the Persian Gulf nations.

All is not completely well, however. International institutions have methods and practices that were developed to protect the oil supplies, even at the expense of Israel’s security. Even though the current situation has changed, the institutions change much more slowly.

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On May 14, 1948, the leaders of the Jewish organizations in Palestine, headed byDavid Ben-Gurion,proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel, to take effect at midnight that night.

At that point, the State of Israel came into existence. The United States recognized the provisional Jewish government as de facto authority of the Jewish state within minutes. The Soviet Union granted de jure recognition almost immediately in 1948 along with seven other states within the next five days (Guatemala, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia).

Israel’s success in defending its territory against the invading Arab armies in 1948made the country an established reality. General elections were held on January 25, 1949: the provisional State Council was replaced by an elected Parliament (Knesset) and the Provisional Government by a regular parliamentary Government.De jure recognition by the United States was extended on January 31, 1949 after the permanent government was sworn in.On January 29, 1949, the former Mandatory Power, Britain, recognized the state of Israel, a step that also recognized the end of British efforts to affect the course of the region?s politics.

In the fall of 1948, Israel had applied for membership in the United Nations but failed to win the necessary majority in the Security Council. In February 1949, Israel renewed its application for membership in the United Nations. On March 4, 1949, the Security Council recommended to the General Assembly that it be admitted. On May 11, Israel was admitted, to become the 59th member. Between January 1, 1949 and May 11. 1949, Israel was recognised by 32 States, in addition to the 20 that had accorded it recognition prior to December 31, 1948. Today Israel has fulldiplomatic relations with most countries of the world, except portions of the Islamic/Arab blockthat continue to believe that Israel can somehow be eliminated.

Quneitra, in the Golan Heights, (also called Al Koneytra or Kuneitra) was captured by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War, suffering heavy damage in the process. As the only town along the front with Israel, Quneitra served as the Syrian command center until the 1967 war. The Syrian army’s officer’s club, barracks, and fuel and ammunition dumps were prominent buildings in the town. By the time Israeli troops actually entered the town, most of the population had fled.

Between the 1967 war and the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Syria did not hesitate to shell Israeli forces stationed in Quneitra, further damaging the town. At the outbreak of the 1973 war, Quneitra was a major target for Syria’s opening assault on Israeli troops. The town changed hands several times, as tank fire and artillery battered buildings throughout the town. Quneitra was repeatedly shelled by artillery and tanks belonging to Syria and her Arab allies.

In 1974, as part of the Israel-Syria disengagement agreement, Quneitra was handed back to Syria. Rather than repairing the damage and allowing Quneitra?s residents to return as called for in the agreement, however, Syria instead left the town in ruins. They put up billboards and built a”a museum of Israeli brutality” to exploit what Syria charges are “Zionist crimes”.

Statements in the media often echo the Syrian canard, with reporting such as, “Quneitra was destroyed by the Israelis before being handed back to Syria in 1974.” When Pope John Paul II visited Syria in 2001, Quneitra was chosen as a location for prayers to provide a platform for this Syrian propaganda against Israel and to promote the fictitious story of the fate of Quneitra. The facts are quite different from the Syrian invention.

According to reporters who were there at the time, Quneitra fell victim to war and military attacks, including Syrian shelling after Israel took control in 1967. For instance, a Los Angeles Times article of June 12, 1967 included a sub-head which referred to Quneitra as the “ruins of [a] captured town.” The article reported that Quneitra:

• …was a town of smoldering ruins. Heavily armed convoys patrolled the debris-covered streets…

and:

• Life was at a virtual standstill, with all shops closed or wrecked.

This damage, obviously the result of the just-concluded war, occurred a full seven years before Israel?s supposed spiteful bulldozing of the town, as claimed by Syria.News reports of border clashes in the Golan Heights before the Yom Kippur War and of the fighting during the war often mentioned Syrian shelling of Quneitra or of combat there. The book Myths and Factsnotes, in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Quneitra:

• …was shelled and captured by Syrian troops, retaken by Israelis, and then defended against intense Syrian counter attacks. Tanks roamed through the town, between and through buildings.

The book also reports that Quneitra:

• …also suffered damage from 81 days of artillery duels that preceded the disengagement.

A May 5, 1974 dispatch from Quneitra published in the Times of London, reported the town:

• is in ruins and deserted after seven years of war and dereliction. It looks like a wild west town struck by an earthquake. . . Nearly every building is heavily damaged and scores have collapsed.

These and other reports refer to Quneitra as “destroyed” long before the time when Syria claims Israel bulldozed the town. There is no doubt the major damage was caused by Syrian attacks and not from any action by Israel.

In May 2001, the New York Times was forced to retract biased reporting about Quneitra, saying in a Correction:

• In article on Monday [May 7, 2001] about the visit of Pope John Paul II to Syria referred imprecisely to the destruction in the Golan Heights city of Quneitra, where he has since delivered a prayer for peace. The city was captured by Israel during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. It is the Syrians who contend that the Israelis used dynamite and bulldozers to level the town before they left in 1974. Israel says the damage was a byproduct of fighting in the wars of 1967 and 1973.

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The preamble to the League of Nations document that establishes the British Mandate for the territory of Palestine states the purposes as follows:

• Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and
• Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty [the Balfour Declaration], and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and
• Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country;

Article 6 further states:

• The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

By this document, the British government was made responsible for the territory known as Palestine for the specific purpose of facilitating Jewish immigration, settlement, and the establishment of a “national home for the Jewish people”. While it is noted that the “civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” shall not be prejudiced by the purpose of the Mandate, the clear intent was to go forward with the Zionist program of Jewish immigration and settlement.

Unfortunately for all parties, early optimism that this could be done with justice for all was destroyed by Arab hostility to the basic concept, however implemented, and increasing anti-Jewish violence from the Arabs as the Mandate period proceeded. Ultimately the British reneged on their obligations and adopted alargely pro-Arab approach to policies in the Mandate territory.

Starting in the mid-1970s, an Arab-Soviet-Third World bloc joined to form what amounted to a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) lobby at the United Nations. The solidly anti-Israel Arab block was joined by the Soviet Block (opposing Israel as leverage against the US) and many smaller countries from Africa or elsewhere who were intimidated by Arab oil-power, were leaning toward the Soviets, or were anti-American as a reaction to their own colonial histories.

Since the UN Security Council was protected by the US veto power,it was in the General Assembly where these countries — nearly all dictatorships or autocracies — frequently voted together to pass resolutions attacking Israel and supporting the PLO. Sometimes this was directly related to issues with Israel itself, and sometimes Israel was a convenient proxy for a multitude of other agendas.

In 1974, when the UN General Assembly invited Yaser Arafat to address the body,he was the first representative of a non-governmental organization to appear before a plenary session of the General Assembly, and also the first speech to the UN by the head of a terrorist organization, responsible by his own admission for death and destruction across the Middle East. Arafat gave his speech on November 13, 1974 in his revolutionary garb with a holster attached to his hip (although he left the gun outside the hall). In the speech he bitterly denounced Israel as imperialist, colonialist, and reactionary. He recited all the familiar Palestinian claims about “usurpation of our land” and refugees.He attempted to ally himself with anti-colonialist, nationalist movements all over the globe. Arafat closed his speech with a threat to Israel, saying:

• Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter?s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat: do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.

Even though Arafat’s militant words were based on unfounded assertions and a mythical history of the Middle East, he was not seriously challenged. In fact, his speech received a standing ovation by the UN delegates, excepting the US, Israel and few others. The anti-Israel block of the UN General Assembly embraced the Palestinians and their terrorist leader. On November 10, 1975, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 3237 that conferred on the PLO the status of observer in the Assembly and in other international conferences held under United Nations auspices. This permanent representative status was a special arrangement for the PLO, a terrorist organization not a nation. The “PLO Observer Mission” then opened an office in midtown Manhattan as its UN base of operations.

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The Palestinian National Covenant

The Palestinian National Covenant is the founding charter of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), adopted at the PLO’s founding congress in May 1964. The Covenant sets forth the organization’s stated aims and goals. Almost all of the articles in the Covenant explicitly or implicitly deny Israel’s right to exist and reject any peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

For example, these articles:

• Article 19: The establishment of Israel is fundamentally null and void, whatever time has elapsed …
• Article 15: [We call for] the liquidation of the Zionist presence in Palestine
• Article 22: The liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence and will contribute to the establishment of peace in the Middle East …

The Covenant also denies the existence of the Jewish people as a nation and any ties that it might have to the Land of Israel [Article 20: "Nor do Jews constitute a single nation"]. It declares in Article 9 that “armed struggle is the only [emphasis added] way to liberate Palestine”.

The bottom line is that the Palestinian National Covenant calls for the destruction of the State of Israel. The Israelis, quite naturally, thought that the inflammatory language should be changed before they could consider the PLO to be a serious “partner for peace”.

What did Yasser Arafat agree to do?

In a letter dated September 9, 1993 — part of the Oslo Accords — signed by Yasser Arafat as Chairman of the PLO, Arafat agreed that:

• … the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators
• … those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel’s right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid
• … the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.

But nothing was done to change the Covenant. The requirement was restated in another letter from Arafat to Rabin which accompanied the May 4, 1994 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area (the Cairo Agreement), but no action was taken by Arafat and the PLO.

Because the changes were not made, the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II) made the requirement even more specific:

• ARTICLE XXXI (9) The PLO undertakes that, within two months of the date of the inauguration of the Council, the Palestinian National Council will convene and formally approve the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant, as undertaken in the letters signed by the Chairman of the PLO and addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994.

What actions were taken by the PLO to live up to its agreements?

The Oslo II agreement was signed on September 24, 1995 but the change was not made within the time period specified. On April 24, 1996 there was a vote by the PLO’s Palestine National Council. The vote was widely reported in the media as having repealed the clauses of the PLO Charter which deny Israel’s right to exist and call for its destruction through violence. The governments of the United States and of Israel welcomed the vote, stating that it marked the fulfillment of the Palestinian obligation on the Covenant.

But, again, that was not actually the case. The PNC action, which has not been officially fully disclosed, only stated an intention to make changes at a future date and did not specify, in detail, the changes that would be made. The matter was referred to a legal committee for study. No specific anti-Israel clauses in the Covenant were declared officially abrogated. Moreover, the process was incomplete because the PNC did not draft a new Covenant. After winning the election in May 1996, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu declared the failure to revise the Covenant to be a violation of the agreements by the Palestinians.

In the 1997 Hebron Agreement, it was specifically noted, again, that the PLO was commited to, “Complete the process of revising the Palestinian National Charter.” Thereafter, Arafat and the PLO governing bodies insisted that they were in compliance based on the PNC vote in 1996, but legal analysts do not agree. In January 1998, Chairman Arafat sent letters to President Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair purporting to “put to rest” concerns about the PNC resolution and setting out a list of articles supposedly canceled or amended by the decision. But personal statements by Arafat have no legal effect; only a vote of 2/3 of the PNC can ammend the Covenant (Article 33). On December 14, 1998, the Palestinian National Council, in accordance with the Wye Memorandum, which required compliance with the earlier agreements, convened in Gaza in the presence of US President Clinton and voted to reaffirm their decision to amend the Covenant. But, again, this was insubstantial window dressing. Their action didn’t actually amend the Covenant and the Palestinian Authority remained in violation of the lengthening series of agreements.

Although the Palestinian National Council (PNC) has twice taken formal decisions to revise the Palestinian National Covenant (1996 and 1998) calling for Israel’s destruction, the PNC Chairman, Salim Za’anoun, stated on February 3, 2001, in the official Palestinian Authority newspaper, that the Palestinian Covenant remained unchanged and was still in force [Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, 3 February 2001, as translated by MEMRI].

Former CIA Director James Woolsey said:

• Arafat has been like Lucy with the football, treating the rest of the world as Charlie Brown. He and the PNC keep telling everyone they’ve changed the charter, without actually changing it.

This saga of the Covenant revision is an example of the lack of good faith on the part of Arafat and the Palestinian Arabs in the course of the Oslo peace process. But, it probably does not make a difference whether the Covenant is actually revised or not. The hatred and violence directed against Israel by the Palestinian Arabs does not originate with the piece of paper called the Palestinian National Covenant.

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Although the PLO’s diplomatic contacts with West European and Third World countries were steadily increasing in the mid-1970s, the PLO’s terrorism and ideology prevented it from making headway with the US government whose policy, first formulated by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1975, was to refuse to deal with the PLO until it accepted UN Resolution 242, abandoned terrorism, and recognized Israel’s right to exist. These conditions were designed to show that the PLO had genuinely changed its position so as to make possible successful talks and a stable settlement. There were some secret contacts between US embassy officials and the PLO in Lebanon for security purposes and indirect exchanges in which Washington tried to persuade the PLO to meet the conditions, but formal talks and recognition were delayed.

When the PLO and its leadership decided to change tactics, their strategic goal remained unchanged. The goal was still to see, as soon as possible, a Palestinian state with its own government in all the land west of the Jordan River. In their thinking there was no room for Israel or its Jewish inhabitants. For example, on December 20, 2001 Arafat said in a speech:

• We shall fight on this blessed land, on this blessed land, this is our message and it is not by accident that one-hundred and four years after [the First Zionist Congress] and despite all the conspiracies and all the blood that was spilled, [Palestine] continues to raise its head and its flag, Allah willing, Allah willing. One of our flowers and one of our cubs will wave the flag over the walls of Jerusalem, over its mosques and over its churches…

Still, it was necessary to give up the PLO image as a terrorist gang and change perceptions, at least in the West, so the PLO would be seen as a peace-seeking organization. At the same time, there was an internal constituancey in the PLO and among Islamic extremists who would not be satisfied by diplomatic initiatives alone. Therefore, armed force and violence had to continue in parallel with diplomatic approaches. To reconcile these conflicting aims, the PLO began to develop the distinction between “terrorism”, which is forbidden by world opinion, in contrast to the continuation of “the armed struggle” in the territories against the Israeli occupation, which could be sold to the world as “justified”.

On November 7, 1985, Yasser Arafat formulated these distinctions into a far-ranging declaration, now known as “the Cairo Declaration”, which was approved by the Palestinian National Council on November 19, 1988 in Algeria. In this declaration, Arafat says:

• PLO approves its 1974 decision on the condemnation of all forms of foreign operations and all forms of terror… From today, the Organization will take all deterrent steps against those who violate this decision.

However, in the same declaration, Arafat further says, “the opposition to the Israeli occupation,” will continue by, “all possible means,” in the territories [in order to], “achieve the withdrawal from the territories.”

Because of American pressure on the PLO, which continued behind the scenes, in an attempt to also blur the term “armed struggle” the PLO did not mention the term in its Declaration of Independence in 1988 or in other documents since then.

Arafat claimed that he had renounced terrorism in his 1985 Cairo Declaration, but State Department officials and other agencies say the record shows otherwise. Terrorist actions traced back to the PLO itself or one of its allied organizations continued through the 1980s, 1990s, and into the new century.

The PLO maintains that the intifada in the territories is not terrorism, and not an armed struggle, but a form of un-armed civilian struggle. Therefore, the PLO can make the statements required of it, to renounce terrorism, and stay in the diplomatic game while the struggle goes on. Israelis and others continue to die from suicide bombers and other attacks but Yasser Arafat can still say that he has given up terrorism.

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US policy, first formulated by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1975, was to refuse to deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) until it accepted certain conditions. These conditions for US contact with the PLO were set by Kissinger in a 1975 US-Israel memorandum of agreement. Kissinger promised that the United States:

• … will not recognize or negotiate with the PLO as long as the PLO does not recognize Israel’s right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

This memorandum–and later the Camp David accords–conditioned any party’s participation at a peace conference on “the agreement of all the initial participants.” Thus, Israel could veto PLO presence. In later years, US Presidents frequently reiterated these commitments. In 1985 Congress passed, and President Reagan signed a law codifying them and adding that the PLO had to renounce the use of terrorism before the United States would “recognize or negotiate with [it].”

These conditions were designed to exclude a radical, terrorist PLO from any negotiations and to use US leverage to press it toward moderation. The PLO had to show that it had genuinely changed its position so as to make possible successful talks and a stable settlement. For more than a decade, however, the PLO had no interest in changing, and continued to use terrorism as its primary method of operation.

But by the late 1980s, the PLO found itself marginalized, forced to operate from Tunisia, far from the center of the action, trying to control the streets during the first intifada starting in 1987. Peace negotiations were in the air, but to participate Arafat and the PLO came to recognize that they had to satisfy the United States’ pre-conditions.

During the Shultz Peace Plan initiative in early 1988, the US was firm in blocking PLO participation until the minimal conditions were met. There was a danger to the PLO that Jordan would lead Palestinians at the proposed talks. Arafat acted on two fronts: he made sure no Palestinians would participate in the Shultz talks and he started a process that would meet the US conditions. By late 1988, Yasser Arafat believed that nothing was going to happen in the Middle East without the US and, somewhat overstated, he believed that the US could pressure Israel into an agreement they might not otherwise accept.

During 1988, secret channels and intermediaries were used to establish acceptable language for the PLO to use to satisfy the United States. Arafat’s next attempt to publically meet the US conditions was the Algiers Declaration of the Palestinian National Council in November 1988, a document based on the policy revisions discussed in the Cairo Declaration of November 7, 1985. Examining the Algiers declaration, the US government concluded that it fell short since the document did not explicitly recognize Israel’s right to exist and was ambiguous on accepting the two UN resolutions and on terrorism. On November 26, 1988, Shultz rejected Arafat’s request for a visa to address the UN in New York because of the PLO’s continued involvement in terrorism against Americans.

The secret channel discussions continued. During November, a message giving a presidential pledge to start a dialogue if the PLO met the conditions was sent by National Security Advisor Colin Powell through a private individual meeting with PLO officials in Stockholm. Meeting with American Jewish activists there, Arafat hinted at willingness to meet this standard. In early December, Shultz said the Stockholm statement was not sufficient but again said there would be an immediate dialogue if Arafat did so.

When the United States denied Arafat a visa, the UN General Assembly voted to meet in Geneva, Switzerland. Arafat secretly pledged to the United States that he would fulfill its conditions in his December 13, 1988 address. But Arafat broke this promise and the United States found his statement unsatisfactory. To avoid losing the opportunity, Arafat went further at a press conference the next day, saying, “Our desire for peace is strategic and not a temporary tactic.” He went down the checklist:

• The PLO accepted UN Resolution 242
• The PLO promised recognition of Israel
• The PLO renounced terrorism

Arafat concluded:

• We want peace…we are committed to peace, and we want to live in our Palestinian state and let others live.

Responding to the PLO’s public pledges of this policy change, Shultz quickly announced that the US conditions were met and a US-PLO dialogue began in Tunis. Those talks ultimately led to the 1991 Madrid Conference.

There was a working assumption in the United States that Arafat’s declaration of December 1988, in which he grudgingly recognized Israel and renounced terrorism, signified a long-term change PLO policy, and was not just tactical. Yet the inflamed rhetoric and violent activities of the PLO continued while Arafat talked peace. The US government was very reluctant to publically denounce the PLO for this duplicity lest the hard-won peace process be derailed. This US unwillingness to confront PLO reality had the effect of putting Israel on the defensive. Israeli actions to fight PLO terror could not be seen in proper context while the US refused to acknowledge the PLO’s terrorism as producing the defensive Israeli action.

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Royal Commission Report

Peel Commission Partition Map

The violence of the Arab Revolt starting in 1936 led Britain to set up a new Royal Commission (the Peel Commission) in to examine the conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. A long term solution was needed for the political future of Palestine. The Jewish Homeland contemplated by the Mandate could develop as an independent state, a part of a federal state or within a binational territorial state. And what should be done with the Arabs, still the majority of the population? Should they be given control over the territory given their absolute denial of any national rights whatsoever to the Jews, a clear conflict with the fundamental basis of the Mandate?

In their Report of July of 1937, the Peel Commission attributed the underlying cause of the Arab revolt to the desire of the Arabs for national independence and their hatred and fear of theestablishment of a National Jewish Home. The Commission recommended freezing Jewish immigration at 12,000 per year for five years and that a plan for partition of the land be developed.

With regard to partition, the Peel Commission advised that “the most strenuous effort should be made to obtain an agreement for the exchange of land and population” following Churchill’s perceptive comment that the implementation of Zionism presumed a policy of population transfer. The Peel report suggested that in the last resort, “the exchange would be made compulsory.” The precedent cited was the Convention of Lausanne (1923), which provided, on paper, international legal sanction for the compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey.

The Peel Commission recommendation for partition was rejected by the British Government and there was no further consideration of the idea of population transfer.

During late 1999 and the early months of 2000, three way talks (Israel, Palestinians, with the US as facilitator) were held by working-level teams to create the necessary preparations for the Oslo Peace Process “final status” negotiations. The goal was to complete a framework agreement by May, and to conclude the permanent status agreement by September 13, 2000 as agreed in the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum.

The negotiations were on-again and off-again throughout the year as various impasses were reached and work-arounds were found. The US kept up relentless pressure to keep the talks going. President Clinton gave it very high priority since the Clinton administration was ending after the November 2000 elections and Clinton very much wanted to leave office with a Middle East peace agreement in hand, and perhaps the Nobel Peace Prize as well.

The chronology included these events:

• November 14, 1999: Barak and Arafat met in Tel Aviv
• January 4, 2000: Steering committee agreed on 5% redeployment, part of the second redeployment
• January 30, 2000: Multilateral track of Madrid Framework resumed in Moscow
• March 9, 2000: Barak-Arafat Ramallah agreement on completing the second redeployment; permanent status talks to resume
• March 21, 2000: Palestinian and Israeli negotiators resumed permanent status negotiations at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, DC
• April 11, 2000: Clinton-Barak met in Washington, DC
• May 15, 2000: Interim Agreements Steering and Monitoring Committee met in Jerusalem after new fighting
• May 22, 2000: Barak cut off talks due to violence in territories
• June 6, 2000: US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met with Barak and Arafat (separately) to push for progress toward framework agreement
• July 5, 2000: President Clinton invited Barak and Arafat to summit at Camp David

Despite many problems and delays, the working level meetings succeeded well enough to lead to the Camp David 2000 Summit convened on July 11, 2000. However, the summit ended in failure on July 25 after Israeli Prime Minister Barak put unprecedented concessions on the table in order to get to an agreement, but Yasser Arafat rejected them and walked out.

• 1991, Madrid Conference
• September 1993 signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (Oslo Accords)
• May 1994, Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area
• September 1995, Israel and PLO signed the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II)
• January 1997, the parties concluded the Hebron Agreement
• October 1998, Israel and the PLO signed the Wye River Memorandum
• September 1999, the Israeli Government and the PLO signed the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum
• March through June 2000, Intensive working-level talks between the Israeli Government and the PLO
• July 2000 Camp David meeting. Despite unprecedented Israeli proposals, Arafat rejected all and walked out
• January 2001 Taba Conference. Last gasp of the Oslo process after start of the al-Aqsa intifada

Thomas Friedman of the New York Times gave this wrap-up of the peace process, after Taba and Arafat’s speech at Davos:

• The Olso peace process was about a test. It was about testing whether Israel had a Palestinian partner for a secure and final peace. It was a test that Israel could afford, it was a test that the vast majority of Israelis wanted and it was a test Mr. Barak courageously took to the limits of the Israeli political consensus – and beyond. Mr. Arafat squandered that opportunity.

The Passfield White Paper, issued by Colonel Secretary Lord Passfield on October 21, 1930, was another British policy statement on the Palestine Mandate, the result of studies ordered following the 1929 Arab riots. It incorporated the recommendations of the Shaw Commission and the expert testimony of the Hope-Simpson Report, which called for a new, formal statement of policy to resolve questions causing dissention in the Mandate land.

Clearly pro-Arab, anti-Zionist in tone, the Passfield White Paper used the Hope-Simpson findings on carrying capacity of the land to recommend limits on Jewish immigration and land ownership. Because of the alleged shortage of arable land, a finding that was not supported by the details of the Hope-Simpson Report, Jewish development would no longer be permitted and Jewish immigration would be slowed. All practices that prevented Arabs from obtaining employment were to be curtailed.

Furthermore, the Passfield paper reiterated the cultural nature of the National Home as defined in the Churchill Paper of 1922. Specifically, it “espoused the theory of an equal obligation under the Mandate to the Jews and the Arabs and denied that the clauses designed to safeguard the rights of the non-Jewish communities were merely secondary conditions qualifying the provisions which called for the establishment of the National Home. [Appendix IVPalestine: Historical Background, Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry]

The Zionist movement was extremely disappointed and angered by these conclusions. Jewish organizations worldwide and British opponents mounted a major campaign against the White Paper resulting in a letter from British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald (February 13, 1931) to Dr. Chaim Weizmann that somewhat eased the offending provisions.

Photo ? Jack Hazut

Kiryat Arba suburb of Hebron

Hebron has a long and rich Jewish history. It was one of the first places where the Patriarch Abraham resided after his arrival in Canaan. King David was anointed in Hebron, where he reigned for seven years. One thousand years later, during the first Jewish revolt against the Romans, the city was the scene of extensive fighting. Jews lived in Hebron almost continuously throughout the Byzantine, Arab, Mameluke, and Ottoman periods. It was only in 1929 — as a result of a murderous Arab pogrom in which 67 Jews were murdered and the remainder were forced to flee — that the city became temporarily an Arab-only city.

During the Jordanian occupation from 1948 to 1967, Jews were not permitted to live in the city, nor — despite the terms of the 1948 Armistice Agreement — to visit or pray at the Jewish holy sites in the city. Additionally, the Jordanian authorities and local residents undertook a systematic campaign to eliminate any evidence of the Jewish presence in the city. They razed the Jewish Quarter, desecrated the Jewish cemetery and built an animal pen on the ruins of the Avraham Avinu synagogue

After Judea and Samaria were recaptured by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War, Rabbi Moshe Levinger led a group of ten Jewish families to settle in Hebron and eventually develop Kiryat Arba. The Jews living in Hebron today have deep ideological convictions regarding maintaining the city’s Jewish presence.

The Book of Genesis relates that Abraham purchased the field where the Ma’arat Hamachpelah, Tomb of the Patriarchs (aka The Cave of Machpelah), is located as a burial place for his wife Sarah. According to Jewish tradition, the Patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and the Matriarchs Sarah, Rebecca, and Leah are buried in the Tomb. The Tomb, sacred to both Jews and Muslims, is known to Muslims as the Ibrahimi Mosque, and is used for daily prayer services by both religions. Hebron contains many sites of Jewish religious and historical significance, in addition to the Tomb of the Patriarchs. These include the Tombs of Othniel Ben Kenaz (the first Judge of Israel) and Avner Ben Ner (general and confidante to Kings Saul and David), and Ruth and Jesse (great- grandmother and father, respectively, of King David). Victims of the 1929 pogrom, as well as prominent rabbinical sages and community figures, are buried in Hebron’s ancient Jewish cemetery.

Hebron, with a small number of Jews living in the midst of the now-Arab city, has been the site of many violent incidents. Since 1968 over 24 Jews have been killed by Palestinian Hebronites, including six Jewish yeshiva students who were shot on their way from Sabbath prayers in 1980. Jewish settlers in the area have also been responsible for anti-Palestinian attacks, including the 1983 killing of three Palestinians at the Muslim College of Hebron and the January 1997 shooting of 7 Palestinians by Israeli soldier. But the best known, and most serious incident of Israeli violence against Arabs was in February 1994, when Dr. Baruch Goldstein, a resident of Kiryat Arba, opened fire with a Galil assaultrifle on Muslim worshippers at the Machpelah Cave, murdering 29 and wounding 125. [Some Arab accounts claim many more deaths, but most reports agree on the number 29.] Even though this terrorist act was no larger than attacks carried out against Israeli Jews, and was not in any way supported by the Israeli government or the Jewish people, it seriously impacted the peace process and led to the installation of an international observer force in Hebron, arrangements solidified by the Hebron Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians signed in 1997. All over the Middle East, Arabs rioted, attacked Jewish communities, and staged protests. The massacre remains a flash point of debate today, frequently cited to justify Arab terrorist attacks against Jews.

Baruch Goldstein’s slaughter cannot be excused or explained away. In order to try to fathom what led to his act, these contributing factors are available:

• The long history of Arab persecution of Jews in Hebron
• Hebron Muslims were aggressive in threatening Jewish residents, nearby settlers, and worshipers at the Tomb of the Patriarchs. At Purim services the evening before the massacre, as Jewish worshippers, including Goldstein, were reading the Scroll of Esther, local Muslims loudly disrupted the ceremony with chants of “It-bakh al Yahud” (slaughter the Jews), a cry frequently heard in Hebron.
• Goldstein, an IDF medical officer, may have received reports circulating at that time of an impeding pogrom on the scale of 1929 that was to occur within days against the Jews of Hebron.
• Goldstein lost friends to terrorist attacks and treated victims as their doctor. He may have been motivated by revenge.

None of these factors excuse Goldstein’s murderous rampage, but they do establish a context of Arab provocations. The truth died with Goldstein at the hands of the mob of survivors who killed him to end the attack.

On June 26, 1994, the Israeli Cabinet adopted the findings and recommendations of the Shamgar Commission’s report on the Hebron massacre, which found that Baruch Goldstein alone was responsible for the murders at the Machpelah Cave. According to the 338-page report, despite the numerous operational deficiencies the Commission uncovered and even if the operations had worked according to plan, the massacre could not have been prevented. Both the military and political echelons were exonerated.

The principal findings were the following:

• Baruch Goldstein acted alone in planning the massacre in advance and told no one of his plan beforehand
• Palestinian testimony of army and Jewish help in the massacre was discounted as contradictory and inconsistent
• No fragments were found that would support the testimony of survivors concerning a grenade explosion
• The political leadership and security forces could not have been expected to predict such an attack

The principal recommendations were to ban Jewish settlers and off-duty soldiers from entering the Cave with weapons, to separate Jewish and Arab worshippers with barriers, separate entrances and different schedules; to create a special guard unit for the Cave, to modify open-fire orders to include Jewish settlers in extreme circumstances and to enforce the law equally for both Arabs and Jews.

Baruch Goldstein was affiliated with the Israeli organization Kach (Hebrew for “Only Thus”), founded by radical Israeli-American rabbi Meir Kahane. The stated goal of Kach and its offshoot Kahane Chai, which means “Kahane Lives,” (founded by Meir Kahane’s son Binyamin following his father’s assassination in the United States), is to restore the biblical state of Israel. Both organizations were declared terrorist organizations by the Israeli Cabinet in March 1994 following the groups’ statements in support of Dr. Baruch Goldstein’s attack on the al-Ibrahimi Mosque and their verbal attacks on the Israeli Government. The Shamgar Commission found that Kach was not involved in Goldstein’s rampage and did not know of his plan.

In the eyes of the Israeli security establishment — not to mention almost all sectors of the public — Goldstein came to symbolize the worst-case scenario in Israe
li-Palestinian relations. In the eyes of some fellow settlers, however, he was a hero who may have forestalled a coming Arab attack. Goldstein was buried on a bluff in the Judean hills, on the outskirts of Kiryat Arba, the settlement adjacent to Hebron, in a marble tomb rising from a landscaped plaza. His grave has become a shrine for Israelis who agree with the Hebrew inscription:

• Here is buried the martyr, the doctor. May the Lord avenge his blood.

The grave prompted a stormy debate in the Knesset Interior Committee and the Israeli government declared the shrine illegal in 1998, but it still stands. Scores come there in pilgrimage every week, each leaving a pebble on the grave to mark the visit.